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In response to the 1929 collapse of the securities industry, Congress enacted two principal pieces of New Deal legislation-the Se-curities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 The
1933 Act regulates the initial distribution of securities to the public
primarily by requiring extensive public disclosure of information
affecting the issuer of a new security.' The 1934 Act is designed to
regulate already-issued securities primarily through controls over securities markets4 and broker-dealers. 5 Although both acts contain
broad "anti-fraud" provisions,6 the Exchange Act's Section 10(b) is
§ 77a-77aa (1970) [hereinafter cited as "Securities Act" or "1933 Ace'].
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970) [hereinafter cited as "Exchange Act" or "1934 Act"].

' 15 U.S.C.
2

See Securities Act §§ 5, 10, 11, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77j, 77k (1970).
§ 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78e, 78f, 78h, 78i, 78k (1970).
5 Exchange Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970); Jacobs, The Impact of SecuritiesExchange Act
Rule 10b-5 on Broker-Dealers, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 869 (1972).
6 Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970), provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the fight of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), in pertinent part provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange2

4 See Exchange Act

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
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normally a more useful tool for defrauded plaintiffs. 7 Nevertheless,
this highly significant section, which is now the most widely litigated
securities provision in the nation, remained in relative obscurity in the
years immediately following its enactment. Indeed, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) did not promulgate 10b-5 under this
section until eight years after enactment of the 1934 Act.
SEC Rule 10b-5 8 constitutes the major implementing regulation
of the Exchange Act's anti-fraud provisions. It governs six distinct
factual patterns in the securities industry: trading on the basis of
undisclosed material information;9 issuing misleading corporate
publicity; 10 selectively disclosing important nonpublic data, referred
to as "tipping";"i manipulating a securities market; 1 2 trading and
other activities of broker-dealers;' 3 and-the subject of this
4
article-mismanaging a corporation.'
The role of Rule 10b-5 in the regulation of securities is an
emerging one. The Supreme Court did not recognize a private right
of action under the Rule until 197 1,'5 and the application of the Rule
to the regulation of corporate mismanagement is, for the most part,
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
' Section 17(a) provides redress only to defrauded buyers. Due to the unsettled state of the
§ 17(a) civil liability issue, the similarity between the substantive provisions of§ 17(a) and Rule
IOb-5, the lack of doubt as to the availability of a IOb-5 right of action, and the more definitive
case law under Rule 10 b-5, most defrauded buyers have relied and probably will continue to rely
more heavily on 1Ob-5 than on § 17(a). Defrauded sellers, of course, have only 10b-5 available to
them.
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) [hereinafter cited as "the Rule" or "10b-5"]. The Rule
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
9 See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (Ist Cir.), cert denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
10 See, e.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
11 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cerL denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
12 See, e.g., Thorton v. SEC, 171 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1948).SeegenerallyJacobs,Regulation of
Manipulation by SEC Rule 10b-5, 18 N.Y.L.F. 511 (1973).
13 See, e.g., Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 367 F.2d 157
(2d Cir. 1966). See generallyJacobs, supra note 5.
14 See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
15 See id. at 12 n.9. There was little doubt among the lower courts on this score for 25 years
before the High Court spoke on the matter.
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of fairly recent origin. Nevertheless, the importance of Rule 1Ob-5 in
theregulation of corporate mismanagement is great and, in view of
these recent Supreme Court pronouncements, 1 6 is likely to become
greater.
This was not always the case, however. Indeed, in 1952, the
Second Circuit decision in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.'" dealt a
chilling blow to the effective employment of lOb-5 to redress mismanagement wrongs. A single sentence containsBirnbaum's key holdings:
[Section 10(b)] was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation
or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase
of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and that Rule [10b-5] extended protection only to the
defrauded purchaser or seller. 18
Judge Augustus Hand, speaking for the court, made three distinct
rulings in that singular, oft-quoted pronouncement: (1) Rule lOb-5
reaches only practices which are ordinarily part of securities transactions; (2) the Rule does not embrace mismanagement; and (3) only a
defrauded buyer or seller can invoke the Rule.
All three holdings have been attacked, and the first two have
been considerably weakened by subsequent court decisions.' 9 With
this erosion of the Birnbaum doctrines, federal regulation of corporate mismanagement has expanded substantially. For example, Rule
lob-5 now affords mismanagement victims a federal forum whether
or not the fraudulent scheme is ordinarily associated with a securities
transaction. 20 Furthermore, as this Article seeks to demonstrate, Rule
2
lOb-5 also regulates corporate mismanagement. '
I
SCOPE OF RULE

10b-5

A.

Relationship to State Law
Although the relationship between the owners of a corporate
enterprise and its managers2 2 is traditionally a state concern, a body

6

Id. at 10; see Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467,477 (5th Cir. 1973); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg.
Co., 476 F.2d 795, 801 n.8 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Hanraty v. Ostertag, 470 F.2d 1096, 1098
(10th Cir. 1972) (mismanagement within lOb-5).
17 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
18

Id. at 464.

19

As to the third aspect of theBirnbaum holding, see notes 83-101 and accompanying text

infra.

20 See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11 n.7 (1971); In re

Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 842 (D.N.J. 1972).
21 See notes 56-66 and accompanying text infra.
22 The authorities generally speak in terms of a corporation and its stockholders, a custom
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of federal corporation law is developing in response to acts of corporate mismanagement occurring "in connection with the purchase or
retained herein for convenience. Rule 10b-5, however, is broader in that it governs relationships
between the owners of any entity which issues a security to evidence ownership and the
management of that entity. For example, the Rule would protect persons holding an equity or
creditor position with a general or limited partnership, Massachusetts business trust, or joint
stock association. See Feldberg v. O'Connell, 338 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mass. 1972). It also reaches
investment companies although they are also subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1970). SEC v. Midland Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 609, 617 (D.S.D.
1968); Lessac v. Television-Elec. Fund, Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 92,305 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (settlement); SEC Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No.
3548, at 1-2 (Oct. 3, 1962). See also Black & Co., No. 3-3460 (S.E.C.Jan. 1973), summarized in
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,224, at 82,692 (state official responsible for investing state funds gave substantial business to broker in exchange for personal gain).
The law of mismanagement regarding securities transactions by private trusts is not as well
developed as that concerning corporations and partnerships. According to one court, a
threshold question when the trust is a buyer or seller is whether it is a "person." Rippey v.
Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp. 704, 714 (D. Colo. 1966). There seems to be no
justification for this concern. The Rule's first clause prohibits "any person" from engaging in
fraudulent conduct, but does not demand that the plaintiff be a "person." Nor is this construction required by the definition of "purchase" or "sale." Rippey held that a trust is not a person
(id.), ignoring the Supreme Court's admonition to construe the securities laws liberally.See, e.g.,
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).See also Exchange Act § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)
(1970) (definitions apply "unless the context otherwise requires"). A trust has been construed to
be a person under § 16(a) of the Exchange Act. See Exchange Act Rule 16a-8(c), 17 C.F.R. §
240.16a-8(c) (1973); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1965 (Dec. 21, 1938). Only the
most restrictive and erroneously narrow reading of the word "person" wouldjustify the result in
Rippey. Bosche v. LouartCorp., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,231, at
97,067 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
Quite apart from the above issue, courts have been hesitant to grant remedies for breach of
a trustees duties. This is reminiscent of the courts' reluctance, stemming from Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), to delve into
corporate mismanagement matters. With the virtual abandonment of the latter position as a
strong analogy, one would expect that Rule lOb-5 applicability to trust mismanagement would
enjoy a similar growth. But the results to date have been disappointing to plaintiffs. See
American Cancer Soc'y, Inc. v. Fulton County Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,. 72 Civil No. 576
(S.D.N.Y., May 1, 1972), opinion summarized in [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 93,464 (court noted in passing that claim seems no more than estate mismanagement;
reciprocal business arrangements by trustee-bank); Schaffner v. Chemical Bank, 339 F. Supp.
329, 335-337 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (class action by trust beneficiaries not maintainable; plaintiff
allowed to bring individual claim); Manus v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,299, at 91,649-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (question if beneficiary
authorized trust to make purchase; in absence of requisite form of scienter, merely breach of
fiduciary duty).
On the other hand, the court, in Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
correctly applied 10b-5 to a claim brought by a trust beneficiary for self-dealing by the trustee.
The court treated the beneficiary as the seller of stock in the trust. It also distinguished the
following quotation of the Second Circuit both because it was dicta and because self interest was
present in Heyman:
[T]he beneficiary of a trust agreement does not have an implied civil cause of action
under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 against a trustee who, with full knowledge of all material
information, sells shares from the trust corpus in an arm's length transaction for what
the beneficiary considers to be inadequate consideration.
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 212 (2d Cir.),rev'donothergroundson rehearingenbanc,
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sale of any security. '2 3 Indeed, as the Second Circuit has recently
stated: "We are concerned here with an important enforcement provision of a federal statute [Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] intended not
only to expand the common law but to create new, far-reaching and
uniform law of shareholder-management relations in congressionally
designated areas of substantive corporation law ....
Some evidence exists that Congress did not intend to govern all
internal corporate affairs;2 5 however, Congress did affirmatively
enter the field in mandating controls upon the solicitation of stockholder votes 26 and the use of inside information.2 7 Similarly, although the Rule does not purport to govern the entire range of
fiduciary obligations between stockholders on the one hand and
directors, officers, and controlling shareholders on the other, 28 it may
apply even though a securities transaction is only part of a larger
29
scheme of mismanagement.
One result of this latter development is that Rule 1Ob-5 and state
common law often provide concurrent avenues of redress.3 0 This
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). But the trial judge in Heyman
questioned whether a beneficiary could maintain a derivative suit on behalf of the estate. 356 F.
Supp. at 966 n.10.
The SEC has brought suit alleging that a corporation's management used funds from two
employee pension funds for improper purposes. SEC v. Posner, 71 Civil No. 2256 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed May 20,197 1),complaintsummarizedin[1970-1971 Transfer Binder ] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,049.
23 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973); see note 82 and accompanying textinfra.
24 Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722,729 (2d Cir. 1971),rev'don othergroundson rehearing
en banc, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972); accord, McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824,834 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
22 Note, Rule lOb-5 CorporateMismanagement Cases: Who Must Deceive Whom? 63 Nw. U.L.
REv. 477, 483 (1968).
26 Exchange Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
27 Id. § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970).
28 See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life& Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); Review
71 v. Alloys Unlimited, Inc., 450 F.2d 482, 486 (10th Cir. 1971); Smith v. Murchison, 310 F.
Supp. 1079, 1083-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Brummer v. Rosenberg, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,341, at 97,625-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244
F. Supp. 25, 28 (D. Md. 1965); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 775-76 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); see Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303, 308 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 858 (1971) (action might be reprehensible, but not necessarily redressible under
securities laws). Contra, Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The SEC may seek
injunctive relief even though a private plaintiff is unable to recover monetary damages. SEC v.
Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 435 F.2d 510, 517 (2d Cir. 1970).
29 See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
30 See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 808 (5th Cir. 1970); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339
F.2d 764, 767-68 (2d Cir. 1964); Simon v. New Haven Board & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297,
299 (D. Conn. 1966); Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559,564 (S.D.N.Y.
1964). As to the interaction of state appraisal statutes and the Rule, see note 112 infra. Whether
a cause of action is available understate law is not relevant to the scope of lOb-5. Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (197 1); Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714,718 (2d
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federal-state overlap poses a central policy question: to what extent
should the Rule provide a remedy parallel to state law, the traditional
fountainhead of law in this field? A desire to permit state policy
determinations to predominate may explain the reluctance of some
courts to expand further the application of Rule lOb-5 to
mismanagement. 31
Moreover, courts construing the Rule refer to state law to resolve
a number of issues. For example, the laws of the jurisdiction of
incorporation determine whether a transaction is a merger or a sale of
assets, 32 as well as whether redemption terms must appear in the
corporate charter.3 3 State law governs the ability of a merged corporation to sue for illegal acts arising from the merger,3 4 and it also may
dictate whether the approval of a receivership court must be obtained
before a company can commence an action.3 5 In addition, Rule lOb-5
itself embodies many common-law principles. 36
Nevertheless, federal law governs most issues in lOb-5 litigation;
the role of state law is quite limited. 37 Issues such as directors' conflicts
of interest, 38 the validity of exculpatory provisions,3 9 and the effectiveness of a ratification 40 are not resolved according to state standards. A 10b-5 case cannot be successfully defended on the ground
Cir. 1972).See also Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1244(5th Cir. 1971) (can pursue
claim even if others can sue under federal securities laws).
"1 Seeburg-Commonwealth United Litigation, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 93,277, at 91,596 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), opinion replaced on other grounds,[1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,802 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
3 See Pomierski v. W.R. Grace & Co., 282 F. Supp. 385, 393-94 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
See Ericksen v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1190, 1192-93 (D. Minn. 1972).
34 See note 115 infra.
" See Fields v. Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co., 454 F.2d 682,685 (7th Cir. 1971); Annot., 29 A.L.R.
1501 (1922).
" See Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1971). Especially in its
infancy, the Rule borrowed its elements-if not the quantum of evidence to prove those
elements-from the common law.
31 McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 833-34 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939
(1961); accord,Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722,725-30 (2d Cir. 1971),rev'don othergroundson
rehearingen banc, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972) (state requirements not to hinder enforcement of
10b-5 claims); note 112 infra (state appraisal rights not to limit 10b-5). Butsee Fields v. Fidelity
Gen. Ins. Co., 454 F.2d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 1971) (10b-5 suit against corporation in receivership
must conform to state law, and permission of state receivership court required); note 115 infra
(availability of suit to disappearing corporation in merger).
38 See generallynotes 146-201 and accompanying textinfra. State statutes govern conflicts of
interest also. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713
(McKinney Supp. 1972).
"' See notes 285-86 and accompanying text infra. The question of the validity of an
exculpatory provision was raised in Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345,365 (D.N.J. 1966),rev'don
other grounds, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968), but the point was bypassed on other grounds.
40 See notes 283-94 and accompanying text infra.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:27

that the alleged wrong is unassailable under state law. 4 1 In fact, if the
Rule applied merely to acts cognizable at common law4 2 or to those
for which state law provides no redress, 43 the desired uniformity of
results 4 4 under the Rule would be seriously impaired.
B.

Relationship With PartiesInvolved in the Mismanagement Claim.

Despite the Birnbaum restrictions, 45 it is now clear that transactions are not insulated from attack merely because insiders committed the fraud,4 6 i.e., merely because the claim is based on mismanagement. In one of its few 10b-5 decisions, 47 the Supreme Court, in
1971, held that "the controlling stockholder owes the corporation a
fiduciary obligation--'one designed for the protection of the entire
community of interests in the corporation-creditors as well as
stockholders.' "48 In the same case, the Court also held that a corporation is an investor protected by the Rule even though the fraudulent
" SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 461-64 (1969) (approval by state insurance
commission); see Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 215 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion),
rev'd on othergrounds on rehearingen banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cerL denied, 395 U.S. 906
(1969) (law of Alberta); Continental Tel. Corp. v. Lycoming Tel. Corp., [1967-1969 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,193, at 96,913 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (issuance of securities
approved by Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission).
42 The Rule reaches a number of areas which common law does not. See SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
"' The district court in Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786, 789-90 (S.D.W. Va. 1954), held
that I Ob-5 reaches only those situations in which state law cannotaid the plaintiff, but the Fourth
Circuit seemed to go out of its way in a per curiam decision to disagree on this point. 222 F.2d
464, 465 (4th Cir. 1955).
" See Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 728 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds on
rehearingen banc, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972).
4'See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
46 Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792,808 (5th Cir. 1970); Rekantv. Dresser, 425 F.2d 872,
,881-82 (5th Cir. 1970); Kane v. Central Am. Mining& Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559,564 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); see Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971) (fact that officer perpetrated
fraud irrelevant); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (fraud by
insiders provides no immunity). See generally notes 174-93 and accompanying text infra.
47 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); accord, Youngv.
Seaboard Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,042, at 94,197 (D.
Utah 1973) (10b-5 covers mismanagement that injures creditors).
48 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). The Fifth
Circuit in Coffee v. PermianCorp. has gone further, holding that "as majority stockholders they
were under a duty to act in the best interest of the minority stockholders." Coffee v. Permian
Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir. 1973). Compare id. at 1045 (dissenting opinion). The
dissent in Coffee concluded that the majority overstated the rule: "While a majority
shareholder's dealings with a corporation are subject to vigorous scrutiny for basic fairness, an
inherently fair transaction.should be upheld even though it not be in the best interest of the
minority."Id.; accord, Gracev. Grace Nat'l Bank, 465 F.2d 1068, 1072-73 (2d Cir. 1972) (undear
if state law or 10b-5 controlling) (merger unassailable if gives equitable treatment to minority
stockholders even though treatment favors parent).
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scheme involved does not impair the integrity of a stock market. 4 9
Nor is the scope of lOb-5 liability limited to insider-defendants who
buy or sell securities in transactions with their own corporation.5 0
C. Parties to a Rule lOb-5 Mismanagement Action
Rule 10b-5 suits to redress corporate mismanagement can be
brought by three types of plaintiffs. The injured corporation may sue
either directly or by means of a stockholders' derivative action. 5 ' A
stockholder may seek redress individually when he is personally hurt
(e.g., when he receives less than he should in a merger between two
corporations under common control).5 2 A stockholder may also bring
an action as a representative of all other stockholders similarly
situated, provided the requirements of a class action are met.5 3 A
corporate creditor is the final potential plaintiff, and under the Rule
suit is not precluded when the fraud injures only creditors.5 4
The class of accountable defendants in a 10b-5 mismanagement action depends on the facts of each case.5 5 Directors,56 offi49 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). It follows thata
10b-5 cause of action exists when a corporation sells its securities for inadequate consideration
even though no distribution to the public is thereafter made. See notes 296-99 and accompanying text infra. Similarly, despite a reservation by the Tenth Circuit in Chiodo v. General
Waterworks Corp., 380 F.2d 860, 863-64 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1004 (1967), it is now
clear that the Rule applies to the sale of all the stock of a business. See, e.g., Walling v. Beverly
Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393, 395 (9th Cir. 1973); Special Trans. Serv., Inc. v. Balto, 325F. Supp.
1185 (D. Minn. 1971); Mastan Co. v.Jackson, 321 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Baileyv. Meister
Brau, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 539,543 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 304
F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 422 F.2d 1100 (2d Cir. 1970); Bowman &
Bourdon, Inc. v. Rohr, 296 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mass.),affdpercuriam,417 F.2d 780 (lstCir. 1969).
See generally notes 405-12 and accompanying text infra (acquisitions).
50 See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (sale of
Treasury bonds and misappropriation of proceeds); Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d
Cir. 197 1),rev'd on othergroundson rehearingenbanc,453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972) (sale of control
and fraudulent redemption of debentures); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (sale of stock to controlling person); New Park Mining
Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (purchase by corporation of shares of
another company, and insiders receive shares of other company for no consideration).
51 In a stockholders' derivative suit, a cause of action belonging to the corporation is
asserted on its behalf by a stockholder.
52 See notes 388-412 and accompanying text infra.
11 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
54 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (creditors and
policy holders injured, but not stockholders).
5 The class of defendants in misrepresentation and concealment cases is different.
5 See, e.g., Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722,724 (2d Cir. 197 1),rev'd onrehearingenbanc,
453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972); Rekantv. Desser, 425 F.2d 872,874,876 (5th Cir. 1970); Pappas v.
Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1968); Loeb v. Whittaker Corp., 333 F. Supp. 484, 485
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). When two corporations under the same control merge or engage in other
proscribed conduct, directors ofboth corporations would be appropriate defendants.See Travis
v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 518 (8th Cir. 1973).
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cers, 57 and controlling stockholders5 8 can be liable under certain circumstances.5 9 Third parties may also be answerable when they are
active wrongdoers, aid and abet a breach, or join in a conspiracy to
60
violate the Rule.
When the board of directors approves an action which constitutes a 1Ob-5 infraction, the individual directors might be personally
liable. Directors who vote in favor of the proposition should be
answerable unless they can demonstrate that their vote was procured
by material misrepresentations or omissions and that a reasonably
prudent director would not have discovered the falsity.6 1 Directors
who misrepresent facts to or conceal information from their fellow
board members would. also be liable. 62 Indeed, directors who abLewis v. Spiral Metal Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,919
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), seems wrongly decided. There directors were held liable although no cause of
action was made out against the person alleged to have purchased securities for inadequate
consideration.
Vr See, e.g., Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 724 (2d Cir. 197 1),rev'd on rehearingenbane,
453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972); Condon v. Richardson, 411 F.2d 489,490 (7th Cir. 1969); Ruckle v.
Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1964) (officers also directors).
58 Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 724 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on rehearingen bane, 453
F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972); Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303, 304 (5th
Cir.),cert.denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971) (stockholders as class liable); Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc.,
444 F.2d 1241, 1244-45 (5th Cir. 1971) (all stockholders liable); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc.,415 F.2d 1326,1328 (7th Cir. 1969) (parentand grandparent). Section 20(a)
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970), is an alternative means of reaching a controlling
stockholder, if the stockholder can be considered as controlling the directors or officers. Two
leading cases construing § 20(a) are Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439,447 (E.D.N.Y. 1969),
affd per curiam, 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970).
59 Understate corporate law, issuance ofstock and securities convertible into stock must be
authorized by the board of directors, a committee of the board, or the stockholders. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 153 (Supp. 1970); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 504(c),(d), 505(a) (McKinney
1963). A large percentage of the I Ob-5 mismanagement frauds involve issuances of a security, so
the directors are apt to be defendants in those cases.See SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289
F. Supp. 3, 39-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970); notes 175-76 and
accompanying textinfra (specifies instances'in which officers have power to act and when actions
ultra vires).
"' See, e.g., Herpich v. Wilder, 430 F.2d 818, 819 (5th Cir. 1970),cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947
(1971) (seller of control; conspiracy theory); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872,874 (5th Cir. 1970)
(co-conspirators); Feldberg v. O'Connell, 338 F. Supp. 744, 745 (D. Mass. 1972) (accountant
who misrepresented).
61 See Mader v. Armel, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REp. 93,027, at
90,790-91, 90,796 (S.D. Ohio 1971), affd, 461 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023
(1972) (not liable if did not know of wrongdoing and should not have known of wrong;
exonerated even though made no investigation); Aronstam v. Tenney Corp., [1967-1969
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,237, at 97,087-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (notliable if did
not participate in decisions). The element of discovery by a reasonably prudent director may be
apt only when a negligence standard applies. Recklessness by a reasonably prudent director may
have to be shown when negligence is too low a general standard on which to impose liability.
6'2 See notes 164-65 and accompanying text infra.
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stained from a vote were not exonerated in a famous case. Directors who vote against a matter may nevertheless be answerable if they
do not sufficiently disassociate themselves from the fraud. 64 Interested directors would be responsible as well. 65 Of course, directors
are not accountable for actions taken by the board after their
resignation.6 6

D. Integration of Transactions
The Rule's use as a means of providing redress for complicated
friudulent schemes involving a series of transactions is one of its most
important features.67 Under certain circumstances, courts will view
68
schemes involving many transactions as though they were one plan.
This approach is suggested by the broad terms of the Rule, e.g.,
"scheme," "course of business," and "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security."
Integration-of a number of transactional steps has two consequences. First, the scheme may be viewed as a single entity to determine whether a fraud has been committed even though no single
transaction was a violation. The Second Circuit has made clear its view
in this regard in Drachman v. Harvey:6 9 "[Tihe allegation of a multi63 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 212 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on rehearingen bane,
405 F.2d 215, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1968), cerL denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (directors representing
controlling stockholder abstained on proposal to sell shares to that stockholder). Directors who
are not present at the meeting and who neither know about the offending conduct nor should

know about it are not liable.See Segalv. Coburn Corp. of America, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,009, at 90,719, 90,723 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), affd sub nom. Segal v.
Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 1972).
64 This type of action is similar to conspiracy. See United States v. Goldberg, 401 F.2d 644,
648-49 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.denied, 393 U.S. 1099 (1969). In Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 605
(2d Cir. 1972), the Second Circuit dismissed a complaint as to two directors who claimed that
they had not participated in any proposed transaction with Colonial as alleged in the
complaint, that they were never members of [the corporation's] executive committee,
never voted for any proposed sale to Colonial of [the corporation's] accounts receivable, that they were never officers of [the corporation], and had voiced their opposition
to any sale until further information was furnished to enable a proper evaluation
thereof.
6'5See note 173 and accompanying text infra.
66 Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11,33 (7th Cir.),cert.denied, 408 U.S.

925 (1972).
But see notes 430-35 and accompanying textinfra (lootingof corporate assets). A director should
be liable for the foreseeable effects of actions he approved if he is no longer a director.
67

See generally Bromberg, Integration, 5 REv. SEC. REG. 877 (1972).

68 Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 808 (5th Cir. 1970) (court looks at entire scheme in
certain circumstances).
The Supreme Court's broad reading of lob-5 in theBankersLife case should also encourage
lower courts to integrate transactions. In finding a violation of the Rule, the Court stated: "The
crux of the present case is that [the corporation] suffered an injury as a result of deceptive
practices touching its sale of securities as an investor." Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971) (emphasis added).
69 453 F.2d 722, 731 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'don rehearingen bane, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972),

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:27

transactional, pervasive and fraudulent conspiracy cannot create a
right of action under § 10(b) merely by linking two transactions neither
of which standing alone would violate that section." This is the
clearest wording of any court on this subject, but opinions in two
other circuits could be construed as reaching the opposite
conclusion. °
Second, actions which are not assailable by themselves are
nevertheless redressible if they are part of a scheme containing at
least one transaction which breaches the Rule. The Drachman case is
again the clearest example. The plaintiff in that case sought to recover for the issuer a premium paid for a controlling block; the claim
by itself could not have been prosecuted successfully. 7' But the plaintiff alleged that the corporation had been injured by being forced to
redeem debentures as part of a plan to insure the buyer's control. The
redemption was deemed fraudulent, and the claim for the control
premium was upheld by construing the sale of control and the redemption as part of the same scheme.7 2 The court thus permitted
recovery under the Rule for an unassailable transaction (the sale of
control), and accepting the contention that the transactions were two
phases of the same scheme, tied damages in that transaction to an
unlawful second transaction (the redemption).
Rarely is the integration concept applied as distinctly as inDrachman; however, most other courts confronting this problem concur in
theDrachman result.7 3 Under an integration approach, damages may
rel3ing on Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd,
404 U.S. 6 (1971) (emphasis added).
70 Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970) (mismanagement prior to
liquidation); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 798, 803-10 (5th Cir. 1970); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 269-70 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
71 See notes 83-101 & 416-18 and accompanying text infra.
72 Although the plaintiff requested damages related only to the sale of control, damages
from the fraudulent redemption were also recoverable. See generally notes 457-63 and accompanying text infra.
7' Authorities reaching the same conclusion include: Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d
383 (5th Cir. 1970) (unclear what relief requested and no reference to transactions as one
scheme; uphold whole complaint by individual stockholder although has standing on only one
transaction); Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970) (one scheme although not so stated
in opinion; unclear what relief requested, but uphold corporation's cause of action including
nonsecurity transactions when some actionable and others not); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d
792, 810 (5th Cir. 1970) ("broad scheme," "overall conspiracy," and "consistent course of
conduct"; corporation allowed to sue for all transactions although some breaches and others
not); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.),cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967) (no
mention of single scheme, although clearly such case; victim corporation has cause of action to
recover control premium when defendants propose to merge corporate buyer of control into
victim corporation and cause victim corporation to pay for control premium in that manner);
Boggess v. Hogan, 328 F. Supp. 1048, 1050, 1052-53 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (tenderor for corporation
A's stock buys from management of corporation A stock in corporation B at premium as
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be recovered not only for the transaction which violates the Rule ,7
but also for the other transaction, which, standing alone, would not be
not actionable 75 or for both transactions.
Integration has myriad applications. For instance, if a person
sells control to someone who he knows or should know will loot the
corporation or waste its assets, the seller should be liable for both the
control premium and the injury arising from the looting and waste,
assuming that any transaction constituting the looting or waste is a
breach of Rule 10b-5. 7 6 The integration doctrine also encompasses
mismanagement designed to injure stockholders individually. For
example, recovery might be permitted for the type of looting which
normally is not actionable under the Rule, including actions undertaken (1) to reduce the amount that stockholders will receive ifi a
liquidation 77 or in a merger between their corporation and another
company under common control, 78 or (2) to permit the issuer, insidinducement for corporationA's management to support tender offer; plaintiff requests making
of sale and distribution of proceeds to minority stockholders of corporation A who did not
tender; such stockholders held sellers since corporation A changed so much by shift of control
and claim upheld); see Filmways, Inc. v. Artistic Liquidating Corp., [1967-1969 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 92,332 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (employment contract in connection
with acquisition of business; fraud in acquisition and plaintiffseeks to unwind acquisition and
employment contract).
Other cases have not integrated transactions. See, e.g., Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d
1305, 1312-13 (2d Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 390 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), affd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearingen banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d
Cir. 1968) (integration principle accepted on rehearing), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (waste
after change of control not cause of action; waste consisted of selling securities for inadequate
consideration); see Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795,797, 800 (8th Cir. 1970) (no cause of action if
control sold to looter who wastes assets because neither corporation nor minority shareholders
are buyers or sellers; whether waste included securities transactions not stated); Hoover v.
Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213,228-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (no claim of conspiracy to waste assets; waste by
new controlling persons not causally related to change of control; whether waste involved
securities trading not mentioned); Note, CurrentProblemsUnder the SecuritiesActs: The Expanding
Uses of Rule lOb-5, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 313, 320 (1969).
74 Boggess v. Hogan, 328 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Il1. 1971).
" See, e.g., Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc).
76 Bloomenthal,FromBirnbaum to Schoenbaum: The ExchangeActand Self-Aggrandizement, 15
N.Y.L.F. 332,366 (1969) (should have cause of action; no mention that looting or waste must be
violation); Ruder, Pitfallsin the Development ofa FederalLaw of Corporationsby Implication Through
Rule 1Ob-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185, 204 (1964) (same);see Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
& Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),affd, 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970),rev'don
othergrounds,404 U.S. 6 (1971) (showing of fraud required in claim oflooting). As to looting and
waste generally, see notes 430-35 and accompanying text infra.
77 Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1042-44 (5th Cir. 1973); Coffee v. Permian
Corp., 434 F.2d 383, 384-86 (5th Cir. 1970).
78 Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1332 (7th Cir. 1969)
(corporate opportunity allegedly taken, and if true, injured corporation entitled to receive
better ratio in sale of all its assets). Whether an unfair merger is a 10b-5 violation per se is
discussed in the text accompanying notes 395-403 infra.
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ers, or their associates to purchase the company's securities from the
79
public at depressed prices.
Because of its vast potential, integration could be applied to
inappropriate situations. Unless forced to prove by a preponderance
of evidence that the questionable transactions are part of one scheme,
conspiracy, or course of conduct, plaintiffs could attack a plethora of
actions unrelated to a lOb-5 breach for a defendant's single violation
of the Rule. 80 Attempts to limit integration to appropriate situations
account for most of the divergent results in this area.8 1
An analysis of the applicability of Rule 10b-5 to specific acts of
corporate mismanagement naturally divides into two parts: the applicability of the various general elements of the Rule to mismanagement claims and the relationship to the Rule of specific acts of corporate mismanagement. These two aspects of the application of the
Rule to mismanagement are treated separately below with emphasis
upon the current status of decisional law in the mismanagement area.
II
ELEMENTS OF RULE 10b-5 VIOLATIONS
"In Connection With the Purchase or Sale of any Security"
The last clause of Rule 1 Ob-5 requires that proscribed activities
be "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 82 This
requirement is considered here in two segments. First, what is the
meaning of the "in connection with" clause? Second, under what
circumstances is a stockholder or a corporation a purchaser or seller?
A.

1. The "In Connection With" Clause
The words "in connection with" have been construed to require
that the plaintiff be a buyer or seller, and that the fraud be related to
the securities transaction. The 1952 case of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp.8 3 established the principle that a plaintiff must be a buyer or
'9 This practice is quite similar to manipulation accomplished by mismanagement. See
Jacobs, supra note 12, at 349-51.
80 A similar problem exists in connection with imposing the proper limit on a manipulation
claim arising out of corporate mismanagement. Id. at 550-51.
81 Except for the Schoenbaum district court decision, the cases cited in note 69 & notes
73-76 supra, involve such situations. Similar to the Schoenbaum district court decision in this
regard is Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079, 1084-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (sale of control when
issuer purchases stock of corporation and two partially-owned subsidiaries to bolster price of
corporation's stock; insufficient connection between sale of control and other purchases).
82 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973). A comparable requirement is contained in § 10(b) of the
1934 Act (15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970)).
83 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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seller before he has standing to challenge a transaction under Rule
lOb-5. In a derivative suit, the corporation must be a purchaser or
seller, 4 although the stockholder bringing the action on the
company's behalf need not be.8 5 A stockholder suing individually or
as a representative of a class must demonstrate that he and members
of the class bought or sold.8 6 Only parties to a "purchase" or "sale"
transaction can be classified as "purchasers" or "sellers."8 ,7 It is not
enough that the plaintiff was deprived of a chance to buy or sell8 8 or
that the defendant offered to buy the plaintiff's securities.8 9 In actions
for injunctive relief, however, most courts distinguish Birnbaum and
do not require trading by the plaintiff corporation or stockholder. 9
The required relationship between the fraud and the securities
transaction poses knottier questions. 9 1 Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. 9 2 provides a vehicle for discussion. The
action brought on behalf of the corporation was based on misappropriation by looters of the proceeds from the sale of the corporation's
United States treasury bonds. 93 The district court held that no claim
was stated:
84 See, e.g., Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 824 (5th Cir. 1970); Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d
795, 800 (8th Cir. 1970); Lewis v. Sanly, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1
92,687, at 99,020 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).See also Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 677,681-82 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (rejecting claim that corporation an indirect seller).
85 See Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819,824 (5th Cir. 1970); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792,
807 (5th Cir. 1970); Ross v. Longchamps, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 434, 438-39 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
86 See, e.g., Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303, 305-06 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795,800 (8th Cir. 1970); Edelman v.
Decker, 337 F. Supp. 582, 584-87 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Most v. Alleghany Corp., [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,583, at 98,665 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Contra, Tully v.
Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 839-42 (D.N.J. 1972) (retrospective injunctive relief
granted, but in dictum court indicates causation, rather than nature of relief, controlling).
87 Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890,912 (D. Me. 1971); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),affd, 430 F.2d
355 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
88 Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 539,544 (N.D. Ill.
1970); Levine v. Seilon, Inc.,
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,941, at 90,487 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd,
439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir.. 1971) (stockholder induced to retain stock).
89 Cooper v. Garza, 431 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1970).
90 The cases are collected in Kahan v. Rosensteil, 424 F.2d 161, 170-73 (3d Cir.),cert.denied,
398 U.S. 950 (1970). Mismanagement cases recognizing the injunction-damages dichotomy
include Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580,581 (2d Cir. 1968); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco,
Inc., 384 F.2d 540,547 (2d Cir. 1967); Inre Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1333
n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (dictum); Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403,406 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
9,It is no defense that a transaction could be accomplished without the use of securities if a
securities transaction was used and there was fraud "in connection with" it. Bailey v. Meister
Brau, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 539, 543 (N.D. Il. 1970).
The broad phrasing of the "in connection ivith" clause is also partially responsible for the
integrated treatment of a series of transactions as a part of one scheme. See notes 67-81 and
accompanying text supra.
92 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
93 Id. at 8.
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In order to sustain a complaint alleging fraud under section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act, it must appear with reasonable clarity from the face
of the complaint either (1) that a purchase or sale of securities is at
the crux of a fraudulent scheme; or (2) that inducing a purchase or
sale of securities is the object of a fraudulent scheme; or (3) that
fraudulent statements, misstatements, or omissions are made in a
manner which is reasonably calculated to influence the investing
public, or are of the sort which the reasonable investing public
might rely upon; or (4) that the trading process is abused through
potential market manipulation or the spread of watered stock.
.'.Rule 1Ob-5 requires the employment of fraud in connection
with a security transaction, which is essentially different from the
effectuation of a security transaction in connection with a fraudulent activity.9 4

This statement appeared accurately to represent the law at that time,
and subsequent cases reached the same conclusion. 95 The Second
Circuit affirmedthe district court's decision, 9 6 only to be reversed by
the Supreme Court. The Court rejected the district court's reasoning
in one sentence: "The crux of the present case is that [the corporation] suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an investor." 97
The Supreme Court's broad language indicates that Rule 10b-5
proscribes fraud with which a securities transaction is only tangentially involved. Other courts had refused to recognize a cause of
action when fraud occurred in one securities transaction and stand94 300 F. Supp. 1083, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).

95See Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 732 (2d Cir. 1971) (require fraud intrinsic to
security transaction), rev'd on rehearingen banc, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972) (reconsideration
prompted by Supreme Court's decision inBankersLife case); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792,
808-09 (5th Cir. 1970) (purchase or sale or inducement to purchase or sell must be subject of
scheme); Segal v. Coburn Corp. of America, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 93,009, at 90,721-22 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), affd sub nom. Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602 (2d
Cir. 1972); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 539,543 (N.D. II1.
1970) (no cause of action
if fraud incidental or merely designed to obscure true deal); Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp.
1079, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (incidental stock transaction not enough); SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach
Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3,40 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970); Kaminsky v.
Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (peripheral connection not sufficient); Pettit v.
American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (reluctant to use 1Ob-5 if fraud only
incidental; 10b-5 applicable).
The point of view expressed by the district court in Bankers Life still retains some vitality,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's direction. See Seeburg-Commonwealth United Litigation, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,802, at 93,450-51 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). Denial of recovery in the later case, however, was not based solely on the ground that the
violation is merely part of a larger scheme of mismanagement. See note 45 and accompanying
text supra.
96 430 F.2d 355, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1970).
97 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971).
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ing was predicated on another. 98 Recent cases reflect a changed view
of the "in connection with" requirement in response to the Supreme
Court's direction in the Bankers Life case. 9 9 Application of the Supreme Court's test on an ad hoc basis, however, will be necessary to
determine whether, in a given case, the relationship between the
fraud and the securities transaction is too attenuated to support a
1Ob-5 claim.
A number of decisions have interpreted "in connection with" as
requiring the fraud to be perpetrated upon the plaintiff. 0 0 The Fifth
Circuit, on the other hand, has indicated that a corporation can
recover for frauds practiced on others.' 0 '
2.

The "Purchaseor Sale" Requirement

Courts have not yet precisely outlined the scope of "purchase or
sale" for purposes of the Rule.' 02 It is clear, however, that these words
in transactions which are
are construed broadly' 03 and can be satisfied
'0 4
"sales."'
or
not common-law "purchases"
98 Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 539,544 (N.D. Il1. 1970); Smith v. Murchison,
310 F. Supp. 1079, 1084-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (no causal relationship between sale giving standing and damage arising from other sale); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,941, at 90,488 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),affd, 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971).
" See notes 67-81 and accompanying textsupra. Injannes v. Microwave Communications,
Inc., 461 F.2d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 1972), the court indicated that the fairly direct nexus between
the alleged fraud and a sale or purchase of securities, which formerly was required, was no
longer necessary,
See also Feldberg v. O'Connell, 338 F. Supp. 744,747 (D. Mass. 1972) (dissolution of limited
partnership-sale for, purposes of IOb-5-delayed by misrepresentations held to state claim),
relying on Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Voege v. American
Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369, 374 (D. Del. 1965) (promise implied at date of
purchase; fraud related to sale). Relating a subsequent fraud back to the original purchase is
done only rarely. See Cooper v. Garza, 431 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1970).
100 Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 130, 132 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 384
F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369,375 (D.
Del. 1965); O'Neill v. Maytag, 230 F. Supp. 235, 239 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.
1964); Kremer v. Selheimer, 215 F. Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
lo'Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1244 n.7, 1245-46 (5th Cir. 1971) (corporation also injured). See also notes 169-72 infra (deceit, "new fraud," and negligence under
mismanagement).
102 The statutory definitions are broad, but they are also vague. "The terms 'buy' and
'purchase' each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." Exchange Act §
3(a)(13), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1970). "The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to
sell or otherwise dispose of." Id. § 3(a)(14), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14).
103 See e.g., Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 733 n.54 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other
groundson rehearingen banc, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972); Maderv. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 160 (6th
Cir. 1968),cert. denied, 394 U.S. 903 (1969).Seealso In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp.
1327, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
104 Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 858 (1971); Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 160-61 (6th Cir. 1968),cert. denied, 394 U.S.
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Some transactions clearly are purchases or sales. This is true, for
instance, of a corporation's purchase or sale of securities of another
enterprise' 0 5 or a purchase of its own securities.' 0 6 Issuance by a
corporation of its own securities is also considered a sale.' 0 7 In addition, any transaction fitting the common-law concept of "purchase" or
"sale" qualifies under the Rule.
One of the more difficult problems in this area is ascertaining the
status of mergers.' 0 8 The Supreme Court and numerous lower tribunals have held that a completed merger is a sale.' 0 9 Some cases
indiscriminately apply this conclusion to all persons and entities affected by the merger, but a more refined analysis is necessary.
A merger can be analyzed from the point of view of the parties
affected by the transaction,i.e., the constituent corporations and their
respective stockholders. 0 In a merger, the surviving corporation
sells its securities to stockholders of the disappearing entity and buys
903 (1969); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262,266 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 389 U.S. 977
(1967); Hooperv. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195,203 (5thCir. 1960),cert.denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1961).
10- See generally notes 379-87 and accompanying text infra.
106 See generally notes 368-78 infra. For a discussion of redemptions, see note 140 and
accompanying text infra.
107See notes 299-302 and accompanying text infra. A sale of treasury shares would also be
a "sale" for lOb-5 purposes.
108 A particular merger could be classified as either an ordinary, long-form merger, in
which stockholders of both corporations must vote to approve the transaction, or as a shortform merger, permitted under state statutes, between a parent company and its almost whollyowned subsidiary, in which no stockholder vote is required. The analysis in the text applies to
both types of mergers. Arguably, minority stockholders in short-form mergers have no investment discretion, and hence no sale should arise with respect to their shares. However, the courts
and the SEC have not adopted this rationale. See, e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627,
633-35 (2d Cir.),cerL denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316, at 7 (Oct.
6, 1972).
109 See, e.g., SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453,464-68 (1969); Knauffv. Utah Constr.
& Mining Co., 408 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir.), cert.denied, 396 U.S. 831 (1969); Mader v. Armel,
402 F.2d 158, 159-61 (6th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 903 (1969); Dasho v. Susquehanna
Corp., 380 F.2d 262,266 (7th Cir.),cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co.,
374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S.
Co., 319 F. Supp. 795, 801 n.l1 (D. Del. 1970); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Baldwin-Montrose
Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1970). For a history of the SEC's view ofwhen a
merger is a "sale,"conpare24 U. MIAMI L. REv. 205,208-09 (1969)with 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 362,
365-66 (1967). The SEC's former view of mergers as"no sale" has been superseded by Securities
Act Rule 145 (17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1973)), adopted in 1972.
On the other hand, a merger is not a purchase and sale when it amounts merely to a
reorganization of one company. In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1334 (E.D.
Pa. 1972) (creation of holding company); cf. Securities Act Rule 145(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. §
230.145(a)(1) (1973). Another example of a merger that is not a sale is a corporate merger into a
shell subsidiary in order to change a state of incorporation. See id. § (a)(2), 17 C.F.R. §
230.145(a)(2) (1973).
110 Of course, some creditors, like stockholders, are security holders. In a merger, the
status of such creditors as buyers or sellers is indistinguishable from that of stockholders.
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their shares."' Stockholders of the disappearing entity therefore buy
securities of the surviving corporation and sell their stock in the
disappearing company." 2 The disappearing corporation is neither a
buyer nor a seller" 3 unless it sells its treasury stock, other securities
owned as investments, or shares of subsidiaries." 4 The question of

"I Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 27 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925%i
(1972); Mader v. Armel, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,027 (S.D.
Ohio 1971), affd, 461 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972); Bragalini v.
Biblowitz, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,349, at 97,665 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Simon v. New Haven Board & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D. Conn. 1966).
Compare Lewis v. Bogin, 337 F. Supp. 331, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (to determine if injury to
surviving corporation, resulting entity not considered new corporation, to which survivor
transfers its property).
A fair number of mergers now are accomplished by the merger of a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the surviving corporation into a second corporation. This transaction is more in
the nature of an acquisition, but the surviving corporation is a seller and the second
corporation's stockholders are buyers.
The laws of some states permit a merger even though the stockholders of the disappearing
entity receive only cash. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)(5) (Supp. 1968); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 902(a)(3) (McKinney 1963). In thatsituation, the surviving corporationis obviously
not a "seller" of its securities, although stockholders of the disappearing entity are sellers. See
also note 126 and accompanying text infra.
1'2 See, e.g., SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453,467 (1969); Knauffv. Utah Constr. &
Mining Co., 408 F.2d 958,960-61 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 831 (1969) (merger equated
with sale); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967) (short-form merger); Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 234, 238 ID. Neb.
1972); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331, 1358-59 (E.D. Pa. 1971),affd,
458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972) (amalgamation); Schwartzman v.
Tenneco Mfg. Co., 319 F. Supp. 1278, 1282-83 (D. Del. 1970); Laufer v. Stranahan, [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,617, at 98,774-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Voege v.
American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369, 374 (D. Del. 1965).
Neither the status of these stockholders as sellers or buyers nor their ability to bring suit is
dependent upon whether they have rights of appraisal under state law or whether they have
exercised such rights as they may have. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634-35 (2d
Cir.),cert.denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (appraisal rights available, but plaintiff did not surrender
stock); Weisman v. MCA, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 258, 264 n.8 (D. Del. 1968) (shares surrendered after
merger, but plaintiff still allowed to sue); Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 269-72
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (appraisal not sole remedy); Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F.
Supp. 369,373, 375 (D. Del. 1965) (appraisal demanded, but not yet processed; can sue even if
demand appraisal without knowing of fraud); Eagle v. Horvath, 241 F. Supp. 341, 344-45
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (stockholder not limited to right of appraisal); see Voege v. Smith, 329 F. Supp.
180, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (no appraisal rights available, but that alone not grounds or dismissal);
cf. Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1332-33 (7th Cir. 1969) (sale of
assets) (10b-5 remedies not affected by failure to exercise, or nonexistence of, appraisal rights).
See also In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 357 F. Supp. 869, 875 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (hinting that
transaction in which appraisal rights lost may constitute purchase or sale).
"' See Schwartzman v. Tenneco Mfg. Co., 319 F. Supp. 1278, 1282-83 (D. Del. 1970);
Lockwood, CorporateAcquisitions and Actions Under Sections 10(b) and 14 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 23 Bus. LAw. 365, 371 (1968).
114 Another approach is to focus upon the merger agreement, signed by the constituent
corporations, which may fall within the statutory definition of"sale." "The terms 'sale' and 'sell'
each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." Exchange Act § 3(a)(14), 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(14) (1970). The merger agreement is a contract pursuant to which the surviving
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the standing of the disappearing corporation is somewhat academic
because a class action by persons who were stockholders of the disappearing corporation at the time of the merger can fully redress any
fraud perpetrated upon the corporate entity. 1 5 Stockholders of the
corporation that survives the merger retain their certificates and
usually are not considered purchasers or sellers,"16 but two approaches might lead to an opposite conclusion. First, one case seems
to hold that stockholders of the surviving corporation are purchasers
when they receive new or additional securities of the surviving corporation or when the terms of the securities they hold are modified as
part of the merger." 7 Second, it is arguable that such stockholders
are investors in a different enterprise after the merger." " The surviving corporation could sue to redress fraud perpetrated on it in concorporation sells its stock to stockholders of the disappearing entity, and the stockholders ofthe
disappearing corporation sell their stock to the surviving enterprise. Another avenue reaching
the conclusion that the disappearing corporation is a seller is suggested in note 128 infra.
115 Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627,637 (2d Cir.),cert.denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967);
see Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792,813 (5th Cir. 1970). State law places certain restrictions on
the ability of a disappearing corporation to bring suit even though the action is brought in
federal court.See Basch v. Talley Indus., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (according to FED.
R. Civ. P. 17(b), law of corporation's domicile determines its ability to sue); Miller v. Steinbach,
268 F. Supp. 255, 266-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (Pennsylvania law precludes suit, but federal law
overrides); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 252 F. Supp. 212, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd inpart,374
F.2d 627 (2d Cir.),cert.denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (suit not permitted by Delaware law unless by
or against corporation subsequently merged); Polakoffv. Delaware Steeplechase & Race Ass'n,
254 F. Supp. 574,580-81 (D. Del. 1966) (ability of disappearing corporation to sue left open).
116 Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Neb. 1972) (stockholder not
seller "unless a sale is made pursuant to dissenters' rights"); see Lockwood, supra note 113, at
371-72. Contra, Bragalini v. Biblowitz, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,349, at 97,664-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (upholding entire complaint brought derivatively and
individually by stockholder of surviving corporation). Stockholders of the surviving corporation may, however, have a personal cause of action for material misstatements and omissions in
the proxy material they receive pursuant to Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
117This theory is one explanation of the result in Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F.
Supp. 240, 243 (D. Neb. 1972), but the more likely reasoning of the court can be found in
Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Neb. 1972).ButseeInre Penn Cent.
Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1972); cf. note 141 and accompanying text
infra (recapitalization).
18 For instance, if a very large corporation merges into a very small company, the
stockholders of the surviving corporation are, economically speaking, investors in an entirely
different enterprise, and they could be considered sellers. See notes 134-36 and accompanying
text infra; cf. note 127 infra. This rationale may explain why stockholders of the surviving
corporation were permitted to sue in Lewis v. Bogin, 337 F. Supp. 331, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(merger or parent owning 87% into subsidiary; point not discussed). See also In re Penn Cent.
Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327. 1334 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (because of combination of two sets of
assets, ordinary merger deemed sale).
Another way to reach the conclusion that stockholders of the surviving corporation are
sellers would be to focus on a sale by the stockholders pursuant to dissenters' rights. See Nanfito
v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Neb. 1972).
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nection with the merger. Absent an equitable lien," 9 however, recovery would benefit all stockholders at the time ofjudgment (including
former stockholders of the disappearing entity who profited from the
fraud), rather than those who were injured, namely the stockholders
of the surviving entity immediately prior to the merger.
Another subject of litigation is the point at which the merger has
sufficiently progressed for a sale to take place. In a long-form merger,
both boards of directors approve the merger, a merger agreement is
executed, stockholders of each company adopt the agreement, and
appropriate documents are then filed with the states of incorporation. The merger is not effective under state law until all these steps
are taken. The merger is considered a sale by most courts when the
documents are filed, 120 even if a shareholder of the disappearing
corporation has not yet surrendered his stock certificates. 121 Furthermore, a board of directors resolution approving a merger has
been held to render the corporation a buyer or seller 1 22 when the
parties to the merger are controlled by the same persons.' 2 3
The merger analysis applies also to consolidations in which the
consolidating corporations "merge" into a new entity whose securities
are issued to their respective stockholders. The consolidating corporations and their stockholders are equivalent, in this context, to the
disappearing partner in a merger and its shareholders. The new
entity in a consolidation is treated in the same way as the surviving
company in a merger.
119 An equitable lien was granted in deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., [19691970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,486, at 98,295-96 (D. Colo. 1969). To
vindicate properly all rights, the lien should benefit stockholders of the surviving corporation as
of the effective date of the merger.
120 See cases cited in notes 109-18 supra. In Fabrikant v. Jacobellis, [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,686, at 99,017 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), the court did not decide
whether a stockholder has standing to sue if he alleges a conspiracy to cause a merger which fails
after injury is incurred.
121 Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627,634 (2d Cir.),cert.denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
122 Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1970). Compare Greenstein v. Paul,
275 F. Supp. 604,605 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),affd, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968) ("once-proposed short
form merger [which] was not consummated" not sufficient to constitute sale); see Travis v.
Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 522-23 & n.13 (8th Cir. 1973) (two corporations under
common control; here "technical details remain to be completed," but still treat as completed
merger); Schenkerv. Meridan Inv. & Dev. Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 93,612 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (terminated merger proposal; damage and injunctive claims
not dismissed as moot). See also Condon v. Richardson, 411 F.2d 489,492 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'g
275 F. Supp. 943,950 (S.D. Ill. 1967). Compare Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580, 581 (2d Cir.
1968) (in suit for "accounting, damages and other appropriate relief," corporation notbuyeror
seller when merger between controlling and controlled corporation temporarily abandoned
after board resolution adopted).
123 A fortiori, a resolution of the board of directors should have the same consequences in a
short-form merger.
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Acquisitions can be analyzed along similar lines. The acquiring corporation is a seller when the consideration it pays consists
entirely or partly of securities.12 5 Itis also a buyer if it purchases stock
of the acquired entity or if it buys the assets of the acquired corporation and these consist partly of stock of subsidiaries, treasury stock, or
investments in other enterprises. 1 2 6 Stockholders of the acquiring
corporation are not buyers or sellers unless they are able to convince a
court that the acquisition so radically changed their corporation that
in effect they sold the shares they owned and bought stock in a new
enterprise. 1 27 If the acquired corporation sells its assets, it is a seller
only if some of its assets consist of securities; 128 it is a buyer if at least
12 9
part of the consideration paid for its assets consists of securities;
but it is neither a buyer nor a seller when the acquiring corporation
buys its outstanding stock. Shareholders of the acquired corporation
are sellers when their shares are purchased by the acquiring corpora30
tion and are buyers as well if securities are issued in exchange.
Although shareholders of the acquired corporation are not ordinarily sellers when corporate assets are sold, 13 1 the result should be
different when liquidation of the acquired corporation is part of the
acquisition plan.' 32 In a liquidation, the shareholders of the acquired
corporation are sellers of their shares, and if securities form a portion of the consideration for the assets, they are purchasers of the
securities distributed in liquidation.' 3 3
See generally Lockwood, supra note 113, at 372-75.
'25Filmways, Inc. v. Artistic Liquidating Corp., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 92,332, at 97,589 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (corporation seller whether it acquires assets or
stock). The acquiring company is not a seller of securities if it pays all cash in the transaction.
126 The acquiring corporation should also be considered a buyer if it assumes any obligations evidenced by a note or bond.
127 Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890,911-13 (D. Me. 1971), in which
the acquisition reduced the interests of the original stockholders from 100% to 35%, rejected
this approach. Nevertheless, form should not prevail over substance, and stockholders of a
small company should be deemed sellers if in the "acquisition" their company "acquired" a large
conglomerate by issuing shares equal to many hundreds of times the previously outstanding
total. Cf. note 118 supra.
128The acquired enterprise should also be considered a seller if the acquiring corporation
assumes debt evidenced by notes or bonds.
129 Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1330 (7th Cir. 1969)
(stock-for-assets transaction).
1M0 Hanraty v. Ostertag, 470 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1972).
131 Arguably, a stockholder is a seller when he seeks appraisal. See note 118supra & notes
134-36 and accompanying text infra. The existence of an appraisal remedy depends on state
corporation law, however. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 262, 271 (1967) (appraisal rights
only in mergers and consolidations, but not in sales, leases, or exchanges) with N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAw. § 910(a)(1)(B) (McKinney 1963) (appraisal rights in mergers, consolidations, sales, leases
and exchanges).
132 There are tax reasons for a liquidation following a sale of assets. See INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 337.
124

123 Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1330 (7th Cir. 1969)
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Several cases have attempted to define when a purchase or sale
takes place in the mismanagement context. According to the Fifth
Circuit, "a shareholder should be treated as a seller when the nature
of his investment has been fundamentally changed from an interest
in a going enterprise into a right solely to a payment of money for his
1 34
shares."'
During the previous year, that court had opined that a
shareholder is a seller if he" 'as a practical matter' has no choice but to
surrender his interest in the corporation and to exchange his shares
for cash.' 3 5 The Seventh Circuit expressed a broader rule: "[T]he
fraudulent substitution of shareholder status in one company for the
same status in another may constitute a cognizable legal injury in and
of itself."' 3 6 The two courts of appeals relied on merger cases to
37
justify their tests.'
These expansive definitions of a securities sale bring a number of
transactions within the purchase or sale provision of the Rule. For
example, a corpQrate liquidation, in which stockholders are entitled
to their corporation's assets, constitutes a sale by them of their shares
even if the statutory liquidation procedure is not followed, and the
liquidation is only substantially completed. 3 8 Likewise, dissolution or
termination of a limited partnership is a sale by the limited
partners. 3 9 Similarly, an issuer's call for redemption of a security is a
sale by the security holder, and a redemption is a purchase by the
corporation. 40 A recapitalization, however, is not a purchase or sale
4
because each stockholder's economic interest remains unchanged.' '
(stock-for-assets transaction). Even without a liquidation, a sale and purchase may be consummated. See notes 134-36 and accompanying text infra. See also note 138 and accompanying text
infra (liquidation). Stockholders are purchasers when their corporation sells its assets and they
have the option of receiving an initial consideration or a pay-out. Fidelis Corp. v. Litton Indus.,
Inc., 293 F. Supp. 164, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
134 Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303, 307 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 858 (1971); accord, Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062, 1066 (N.D. Ga.
1972).
"-' Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1970).
136 Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1332 (7th Cir. 1969).
137 See notes 109-19 and accompanying text supra.
138 Dudley v. Southeastern Factor,& Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303,307-08 (5th Cir.),cert.denied,
404 U.S. 858 (1971); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383,386 (5th Cir. 1970). The question
of whether the stockholder "purchases" securities distributed to him in the liquidation was left
open by the Fifth Circuit in Dudley although the district court had held that no purchase took
place. 315 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (N.D. Ga. 1970). The district court appears to be incorrect. See
notes 132-33 and accompanying text supra.
"I Feldberg v. O'Connell, 338 F. Supp. 744, 746-47 (D. Mass. 1972); see Fershtman v.
Schectman, 450 F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972) (whether
dissolution of limited partnership amounts to sale left open).
140 Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 736, 737 n.2 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc).
141 See In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 357 F. Supp. 869, 873-76 (E.D. Pa. 1973);In re Penn
Cent. Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1338-39 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (reorganization); notes 467-69
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The question of whether a purchase by a corporation of forty
percent of the outstanding shares from one holder transforms the
other stockholders into purchasers in a new enterprise was left open
by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Coffee v. Permian
Corp. 142 The district court had held that the remaining stockholders
were not purchasers. 143 Another district court refused to equate
dilution of the equity of the old stockholders resulting from a series of
14 4
acquisitions to a purchase or sale by those stockholders.
A 1971 decision held that stockholders of a target company
became investors in a new enterprise and hence "sellers" when their
management was secretly bribed in connection with a tender offer
and the tenderor planned to loot their corporation. 4 5
B.

The Element of Fraud

A plaintiff must prove deception, "new fraud," or negligence to
make out a mismanagement claim under Rule 10b-5 . 46 This reinfra. See also Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 234,238 (D. Neb. 1972) (merger and
sale pursuant to dissenters' rights possible).
142 434 F.2d 383, 384, 386 (5th Cir. 1970).
143 Coffee v. Permian Corp., 306 F. Supp. 1371, 1373-74 (N.D. Tex. 1969),rev'd, 434 F.2d
383 (5th Cir. 1970).
144 See Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 912 (D. Me. 1971); accord,
Wolfv. Frank, 477 F.2d 467,478 (5thCir. 1973) (dilution ofequity interest held not to constitute
cause of action although other cases in different circuits support opposite conclusion). This
reasoning indicates that existing stockholders are not buyers or sellers when the corporation
sells stock for inadequate consideration, even though the reduction in the value of their stock is
sufficient contact tojustify federaljurisdiction. See Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515,
527-28 (8th Cir. 1973); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208-09 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds on rehearingen banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
Other cases have discussed this concept in the buyer-seller context. See Rekant v. Desser, 425
F.2d 872, 880-81 (5th Cir. 1970); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 300 F.
Supp. 1083, 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affid, 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds,404
U.S. 6 (1971).
145 Boggess v. Hogan, 328 F. Supp. 1048, 1052-53 (N.D. Il1. 1971).
116 See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 214 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearingen
banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Robbins v. Banner Indus.,
Inc., 285 F. Supp. 758, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501, 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25,28 (D. Md. 1965). Compare Note,
Rule 10b-5 and Purchase by a Corporationof Its Own Shares, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 307, 326 (1966)
(injury to corporation should be enough to make out claim of mismanagement). Most cases
addressing these elements involve derivative suits, but a plaintiff suing individually or as a
representative of a class on the basis of mismanagement must likewise show deception, "new
fraud," or negligence. See, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540,546 (2d Cir.
1967); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967);
Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369,375 (D. Del. 1965). One reason
for the infrequent discussion of deceit in cases seeking individual recovery is that proxy
statements are often involved, and the opinions concern themselves with the adequacy of
disclosure in the proxy statement.
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quirement is comparable to the scienter or intent element which must
1 47
be shown in other fields policed by the Rule.
1. Deception
In several cases, violations of Rule lOb-5 have been found without discussions of deception, "new fraud," or negligence. 48 A greater
number, however, reflect judicial awareness -of the scienter element
and require the plaintiffs to prove deception on the part of the
defendants. 4 9 This raises conceptual difficulties for, as one commen147 Compare Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971)
(negligence insufficient)with City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221,229-30,230 n.9 (8th
Cir. 1970) (negligence standard). The liability of a director or officer for a corporation's
misrepresentations in corporate publicity, for example, would be governed by the intent
requirements for misstatements, rather than by the deception, "new fraud," or negligence
requirements of Rule 10b-5.See, e.g., Mader v. Armel, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 93,027, at 90,790-91, 90,796-98 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
148 For instance, deception was not analyzed in some cases involving securities sold for
inadequate consideration.See, e.g., Hooperv. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195,200-03
(5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Garfinkle,
[1969-1970 Transfer Binder CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,427, at 98,019 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Aronstam v. Tenney Corp., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,237, at
97,087-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Continental Tel. Corp. v. Lycoming Tel. Corp., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 92,193, at 96,912 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Berel Indus., Inc. v.
Abrams, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,118, at 96,559 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Packer v. Meyers, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 91,707
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559, 561-64 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 266-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). No
discussion of deception is present in early cases dealing with purchases ofsecurities forexcessive
consideration. See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363,364-65 (1966) (manipulation followed by purchase); New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmersupra at 267. Other cases have not
examined the deception element in finding a 1Ob-5 breach when assets were sold for too little or
purchased for excessive consideration. See, e.g., Surowitzv. Hilton Hotels Corp.,supra at364-65
(manipulation followed by purchase); SEC v. Midland Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 609, 617-18
(D.S.D. 1968); Berel Indus., Inc. v. Abrams,supra at 96,559; Dembitzerv. First Republic Corp.
of America, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 91,445, at 94,744 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Dauphin Corp. v. Davis, 201 F. Supp. 470, 472 (D. Del. 1962).
149 The following deceptioA cases involved sales of securities for an insufficient price.
Jannes v. Microwave Communications, Inc., 461 F.2d 525, 527, 529 (7th Cir. 1972) (deception
existed although notdiscussed); Schoenbaumv. Firstbrook,405 F.2d 200,211-13 (2d Cir.),rev'd
on this ground on rehearingen banc, 405 F.2d 215, 218-20 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906
(1969); Brummer v. Rosenberg, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REp. 92,341,
at 97,626 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (using both deceit andSchoenbaum en banc approaches); Continental
Bank & Trust Co. v. Garfinkle, 292 F. Supp. 709, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Robbins v. Banner
Indus., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 758,761 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501,504
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp. 616, 620-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Heilbrunn v.
Hanover Equities Corp., 259 F. Supp. 936,938 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The same doctrine is applicable
to cases in which securities of a corporation are repurchased for an excessive price. O'Neill v.
Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 767-68 (2d Cir. 1964), affg, 230 F. Supp. 235, 239 (S.D.N.Y.); Most v.
Alleghany Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binderj CCH FED. SEC. L. REp. $ 92,583, at 98,666
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Weber v. Bartle, 272 F. Supp. 201,204 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Carlinerv. Fair Lanes,
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tator noted, it is as difficult to think of a corporation being deceived as
being in love.' 50
The basic test of "deception". is whether the corporation's investment judgment is impaired.' 5 ' The deception can be
nonverbal1 5 2 and "need not be deception in any restricted common
law sense.'

53

On the other hand, deception does not arise merely

because a transaction has an improper purpose, 54 nor is bad judgment considered a form of deception actionable under the Rule. 155 A
distillation of the cases applying these principles indicates that "deception" exists if (1) material facts are concealed from the corporation
or from some or all members of the decision-making body, (2) misrepresentations of material facts are made to the company or to some
or all members of the decision-making body, or (3) one or more of the
directors or officers who are members of the decision-making body
participate in the questioned transactions by selling securities to or
buying them from the corporation.

5 6

Depending upon whose ap-

proval is required, the decision-making body can be an officer, the
board of directors, a committee of the board, or the stockholders.
Opinions frequently refer to the concealment of inside information. Concealment by an insider from some or all members of the
corporate decision-making body brings the case into the area of
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25,28-29 (D. Md. 1965). The same deceit rationale is found in cases in which
assets were bought for too much or sold for too little. See, e.g., Jannes v. Microwave Communications, Inc., supra at 527, 529 (deception existed, although not discussed); O'Neill v. Maytag,
supra, at 767-68; Mostv. Alleghany Corp.,supra at 98,666; Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 300
F. Supp. 731,734-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (deceit and Schoenbaum en bancapproach utilized); Heitv.
Davis, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,698, at 95,567 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
See also Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 824-27 (5th Cir. 1970) (fits within rationale of en banc
Schoenbaum case so deception not necessary); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 879-82 (5th Cir.
1970) (rationale of second Schoenbaum decision adopted so deception not necessary under
circumstances).
IS0 Patrick, Rule lOb-5, Equitable Fraud and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: Another Step in the
Continuing Development of Federal CorporationLaw, 21 ALA. L. REv. 457, 469 (1969).
11 Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792,809-10 (5th Cir. 1970), quoting Shell v. Hensley, 430
F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 213 (2d Cir.),rev'don
rehearing en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
152 See Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546 (2d Cir. 1967), quoting
O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964).
153 O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964); Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp.
1099, 1108 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Hensley v. Love, 298 F. Supp. 698,699 (N.D. Ala. 1969); cf.SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192-93 (1963) (involved Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to 80b-21 (1970)).
154 See notes 260-62 and accompanying text infra.
' See notes 200-01 and accompanying text infra (negligence standard under the Rule
discussed).
"' See Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1249 (5th Cir. 1971) (concurring
opinion) (regarding time relationship between sale and deception).
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mismanagement. Mismanagement concepts do not apply, of course,
when there is no misrepresentation or concealment among members
of the decision-making body and false statements or omissions to that
body do not stem from an officer, director, or controlling stockholder. In such a case, the principles governing misrepresentations
15 7
and omissions in securities transactions generally would control.
If a controlling stockholder misstates or omits to state a material
fact to the board of directors, leaving one or more of the directors
58
ignorant of the truth, deception is practiced on the corporation.1
More often all directors know the relevant data. Nevertheless, courts
have had little trouble in holding that all directors can defraud the
corporation. 59 "Concealment" from the company is not really an apt
expression under this fact pattern. The real issue is whether the
directors' knowledge will be imputed to the corporate entity, 160 and
this is determined by agency principles.' 6 1 Even if all directors have
the information, agency law will deny imputation of a director's
157 A leading case is SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
M5Hoff v. Sprayregen, 339 F. Supp. 369, 373-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see SEC v. Fifth Ave.
Coach Lines, Inc., 435 F.2d 510, 517 (2d Cir. 1970) (controlling persons caused sale of asset
without full disclosure to board or approval of board). The controlling person may have
problems even if all directors know the truth. See notes 177-99 and accompanying text infra
(discussing "new fraud").
159Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 878 n.14 (5th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 200,211-12 (2d Cir.),rev'donrehearingenbanc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968),cert. denied,
395 U.S. 906 (1969); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24,29 (2d Cir. 1964); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083, 1101 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),affd, 430 F.2d
355 (2d Cir. 1970),rev'donothergrounds, 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp. 616,
621 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Globus, Inc. v.Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524,530 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Heilbrunn v.
Hanover Equities Corp., 259 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The court in Weber v. Bartle,
272 F. Supp. 201, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) rejected on public policy grounds the argument that
causation is absent when a majority of the board conceals facts from the other directors.
160Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 213 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearingen banc, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cerL denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Heilbrunn v. Hanover Equities Corp.,
259 F. Supp. 936,938 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);see Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11,24-25 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972) (board members must disclose adverse personal interests
to stockholders).
When an officer's or employee's knowledge would be imputed to the corporation under
agency principles, but the directors are not actually aware of the true facts when the board acts,
deception occurs because in such a situation the judgment of the decison-making body is
impaired. Although somewhat inconsistent with cases questioning whether directors' knowledge is imputed to the corporation, this result seems proper when an unbiased assessment of
the situation by the decision-making body is sought. See Cox, FraudIs in the Eyes of the Beholder:
Rule lOb-5's Application to Acts of Corporate Mismanagement, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 674, 685 n.49
(1972).
161 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 211 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearingen banc, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Note,FiduciarySuits UnderRule 10b-5,
1968 DUKE L.J. 791, 796-97.
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knowledge if some or all directors3 have a conflict of interest, i.e., are
6
interested 162 in the transaction.
If some directors conceal information from or misrepresent facts to the other directors,' 1 64 a cause of action then accrues to
the corporation based on an impairment of its investmentjudgment.
Whether knowledge is imputed to the corporation in such cases is
irrelevant.16 5 It follows that deception is not practiced if directors do
162 Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 26 n.36 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925

(1972), contains an excellent discussion of what constitutes a conflict of interest. The court in
Dasho was concerned about any interest of a director "of sufficient importance to influence his
action as a director" or which would "conflict with [his] status as [a] shareholder or director." In
reaching a determination on the conflict of interest question, it is permissible to weigh a
director's conflict against his substantial stock interest and conclude that his independence is not
compromised. Id. A person should not be considered interested in a transaction merely because
he receives a benefit from it other than that received by stockholders on a pro rata basis. See note
174 and accompanying text infra. Compare Exchange Act § 14(a), Schedule A, Item 7 (f),
Instruction 2(d).
One explanation of Segal v. Coburn Corp. of America, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. V 93,009, at 90,718-19, 90,721-22 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), is that an improper
purpose does not render directors interested in a transaction. Cf. notes 260-63 and accompanying textinfra (concealment of improper purpose not actionable). A more probable explanation
of the opinion is that the judge applied incorrect legal standards.
163 See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 211-12 (2d Cir.),rev'donrehearingen
banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp.,
339 F.2d 24,29 (2d Cir. 1964); Lewis v. Adler, 331 F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (board
committee); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 539,541-42 (N.D. Il. 1970); Continental
Bank & TrustCo. v. Garfinkle, 292 F. Supp. 709,711 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F.
Supp. 616, 618-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Heilbrunn v. Hanover Equities Corp., 259 F. Supp. 936,
938 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 735 (2d Cir. 1971) (dissenting
opinion),rev'donrehearingenbanc, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972); cf. Weber v. Bartle, 272 F. Supp.
201, 203-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (tender offer for issuer's shares to perpetuate control). The court
in Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 300 F. Supp. 731,736 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), is incorrect in stating
that deception does not arise even when amajorityof the directors has a conflict. Note, Texas Gulf
Sulphur: Expanding Concepts of CorporateDisclosure Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 43 ST. JOHNs L. REv.
655, 682 n.102 (1969). Compare Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 25 (7th Cir.),cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972).
164 The interrelationship between causationand participation by a majority of the board in
the fraud is discussed in note 210 and accompanying text infra.
165 Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 25-26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925
(1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 213 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearingen banc, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (corporation not imputed with
knowledge unless voters deceived); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24,26,29 (2d Cir. 1964)
(concealment by majority of board from minority); Lewis v. Adler, 331 F. Supp. 1258, 1263
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Pappas v. Moss, 303 F. Supp. 1257, 1280 (D.N.J. 1969) (concealment and
misrepresentation by some directors to others); Weber v. Bartle, 272 F. Supp. 201, 203-04
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (majority of directors concealed from minority); Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall
Corp., 201 F. Supp. 466, 467-69 (D. Del. 1962). But see Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake
Co., 419 F.2d 787, 803 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) (no deception when
chairman of board conceals from other directors that merger partner's net income will be
$5,000,000 less than planned); Most v. Alleghany Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 92,583, at 98,664-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (concealment by one director from
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not take part in the transaction, the board is fully informed, and no
the information from being imputed to the
conflict prevents
66
corporation.1

Facts may also be concealed from or misrepresented to stockholders. When stockholders vote, they are the decision-making body,
analogous to the board of directors.' 67 A cause of action therefore
arises when facts are misrepresented to or concealed from voting
stockholders.' 68 On the other hand, information known by stockholders when they are not voting is irrelevant. 6 9 In dealing with
deception by directors, some courts view the stockh'olders as being the
corporate entity. This avoids what those courts see as a conceptual
trap-directors being equated with the corporation and the corporation therefore defrauding itself.'7 0 Application of this approach,
other 11 directors concerning New York Central; seven of I1 on New York Central's board and
therefore no deception, but quaere about deception of remaining four directors).
166 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 211 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearingen ban4c, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (board representatives of controlling
stockholder abstained from authorization vote regarding sale to that stockholder); O'Neill v.
Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964) (buying back stock for too much and selling assets for
too little); Most v. Alleghany Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,583, at 98,666 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (exchange of controlled company's shares for corporation's
shares; court in effect imputes knowledge concerning controlled entity); Condon v. Richardson, 275 F. Supp. 943, 949 (S.D. I11.1967), rev'd on other grounds, 411 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1969);
Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25, 29 (D. Md. 1965). Board members should be
deemed to have knowledge of all publicly available information such as stock prices. See Mostv.
Alleghany Corp.,supra at 98,666. The concepts of"new fraud" and negligence may nevertheless apply.
167 Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524, 529 (S.D.N.Y. J967); Simon v. New Haven
Board & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297,299 (D. Conn. 1966);see Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
6
F.2d 200, 213 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearingen anc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 906 (1969) (speaking of deception of "those entitled to vote"). Whether the stockholder vote is required by state corporate law or is undertaken for some other reason is
immaterial under 10b-5.
168 See, e.g., Simon v. New Haven Board & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D. Conn.
1966); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also notes 283-94
and accompanying text infra (ratification and voting by stockholders).
169See note 275 and accompanying textinfra. Directors who are alleged to have had inside
information and to have issued stock or options for inadequate consideration, have a defense if
stockholders knew the information. Lewis v. Adler, 331 F. Supp. 1258,1265 (S.D.N.Y. 197 1);see
Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 25-26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972)
(duty to disclose board's interest in transaction to stockholders). But, for publicly held corporations, this is the equivalent of admitting that information is public knowledge.
In Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369, 375 (D. Del. 1965), the
court found deceit based upon breach of an implied representation by the corporation that it
would deal fairly with its stockholders. See also Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627,635 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (deception of stockholders in tender offer related to
subsequent short-form merger between tenderor and target company).
170 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 215 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), rev'd on
rehearingen banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Bailey v. Meister
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however, reaches the wrong conclusion when directors vote and
deceive the company while nonvoting shareholders are aware of the
information yet cannot block the action without resort to the courts.
Rule 1Ob-5 protects creditors against fraud perpetrated on a corporation by directors and shareholders.1 7 1 It follows that when the rights
of creditors or stockholders are at issue the corporation must be
viewed as an entity comprising a community of interests
72
-stockholders, creditors, and others dealing with the corporation.
Deception has also been found when some or all of the directors
bought the securities in question from the issuer or sold them to the
corporation. Such trading is itself a form of deception even though
the board was fully informed and no misrepresentation or concealment occurred. 17 3 This type of director involvement could render a
transaction objectionable, even if the director did not have a conflict
of interest which would have prohibited imputation of his knowledge
74
.to the corporation.
Brau, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 539,542 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 300 F. Supp.
731, 734-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Some cases employing the "new fraud" concepts, rather than
deception, also look to the shareholders.See, e.g., Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714,719 (2d Cir.
1972) (" 'outsiders' (such as minority shareholders)"); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,supra at 220;
Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1968).
171 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
172 See Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1246 (5th Cir. 1971) (future stockholders and creditors, persons contracting with corporation, and tax authorities defrauded).
173 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 213 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearingen banc, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24,
29 (2d Cir. 1964); Brummer v. Rosenberg, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L REP.
92,341, at 97,626 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp. 616,621 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Heilbrunn v. Hanover Equities Corp., 259 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see Hoff v.
Sprayregen, 339 F. Supp. 369, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (issuance of securities finders' fee to firm
owned by two directors). Contra, Robbins v. Banner Indus., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 758, 760-761
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); cf. Heit v. Davis, [ 1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,698,
at 95,567 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (transactions with 40% stockholder); Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244
F. Supp. 25, 28-29 (D. Md. 1965) (buying shares from controlling stockholder). Of course, the
directors do not have to buy all the shares. Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., supra at 29.
In Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 677, 680-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), directors of Fairchild
purchased Republic stock knowing that Fairchild intended to make a tender offer for Republic
stock. Republic then sold some assets to Fairchild, received Fairchild stock as partial payment,
and distributed the Fairchild stock it received to its stockholders, induding the Fairchild
directors. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that this was essentially equivalent to the
Fairchild directors' purchasing the Fairchild stock from Fairchild for inadequate consideration.
174 In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 211-13 (2d Cir.),rev'don rehearingen banc,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), the trading and imputation of
knowledge concepts are treated separately. See notes 162-63 and accompanying textsupra. The
difference is dearly illustrated by reference to common law. An agent's knowledge is not
imputed if he "secretly is acting adversely to the principal and entirely for his own or another's
purpose ....

" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282(1) (1958). But the information is

imputed if the agent has more than one purpose, one of which is to aid his company. Id. § 282,
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When officers are in charge of the relevant corporate transactions, they are the decision-making group and the above-mentioned
deception principles apply to them. 175 Officers have authority under
state corporation law to perform certain actions without board approval. For example, a senior officer can sell securities of another
enterprise held by his employer as an investment. The Rule prohibits
him from personally buying those securities for inadequate consideration. If an officer purports to act for the corporation beyond his real
and apparent authority, the transaction will be ineffective under state
law. Nevertheless, a purchase or sale may take place for purposes of
10b-5 since the scope of "purchase" and "sale" are broader under
federal law. The officer should be held responsible under the Rule
for any injury if the "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security" clause can be satisfied17 and his actions are proscribed by
the Rule.
2. "New Fraud"
In 1968, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in whose
jurisdiction almost all deception-oriented cases have arisen, handed
down its decision in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.1 77 In so doing, the court
enunciated a concept of liability which has come to be popularly
known as "new fraud. 17 8 Deception no longer must be demonstrated
if "new fraud" can be shown.' 79
comment c at 613. Thus, the knowledge of a director is imputed to his corporation if one of his
purposes in buying stock from the corporation is to supply it with needed working capital.
Nevertheless, some courts confuse the two concepts.See, e.g., Continental Bank & Trust Co. v.
Garfinkle, 292 F. Supp. 709, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (conflict of interest discussed, but director
actually buying shares). The confusion isjustifiable since the two concepts are so closely allied.
The corporation would not be imputed with knowledge in a case like Gaifinkle because any
directorial conflict negates imputation, so the results of the two approaches are the same.
Trading as deception is also distinguishable from the "new fraud" approach. Deception
cases concern only the directors' trading with the company, whereas the "new fraud" approach
applies to situations in which the directors have no direct economic interest.
The principles applicable to deception of the board should also apply to a committee of the
board. See Lewis v. Adler, 331 F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (applyingsame approach to
board's stock option committee).
175 See generally Note, CorporateIndemn#icationfor10b-5 Violations, 70 COLUM. L. Rv. 504,
516 (1970). In SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 435 F.2d 510,517 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'g 289 F.
Supp. 3,38,40 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the Second Circuit upheld a district court ruling that failure to
inform the board of the corporation's sale of another corporation's securities constituted fraud.
176 See notes 82-145 and accompanying text supra.
177405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
178 Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714,719 (2d Cir. 1972); Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook:
The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L. REv. 1103, 1114-20 (1969).
179 See Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 825-27 (5th Cir. 1970); Herpichv. Wallace, 430
F.2d 792,809-11 (5th Cir. 1970); Bloomentha,supra note 76, at 347; Patrick,supranote 150, at
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In Schoenbaum, the Banff board of directors consisted of five
independent directors and three representatives of Aquitaine Corporation, the controlling stockholder. The Banff board issued stock
to Aquitaine and Paribas Corporation, an unrelated third party. Both
purchasers were alleged to have had inside information about Banff.
A panel decision applying deception principles found for the
defendants. 18 0 Then the en banc court upheld the claims based on the
sale to Aquitaine for inadequate consideration, even though the three
Aquitaine representatives on the board abstained from voting on the
Aquitaine sale.' 8 ' The court reasoned that a cause of action existed
because Aquitaine "exercised a controlling influence over the issuance to it of treasury stock of Banff for a wholly inadequate
consideration."'1 82 Approval of a majority of the board, who are not
representatives of the controlling stockholder, therefore affords no
defense in a case under "new fraud"1 83 However, the plaintiff in
Schoenbaum was unsuccessful in his attack upon the sale to Paribas for
inadequate consideration because Paribas was not "in any position to
influence the judgment of the [corporation's] directors by any improper
84

means."1

Several decisions have construed the italicized language of
Schoenbaum quoted above.' 8 5 A district court in the Southern District
of New York opined that the Second Circuit's test of improper
influence did not encompass the bargaining power of an unaffiliated
stock purchaser.18 6 Another case compared the stockholdings of a
prospective stock optionee with those of the stock option committee
to determine whether the optionee had the required influence. 87
457; Comment, supra note 178, at 1103; see Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719 (2d Cir.
1972).
180405 F.2d at 213-14. On rehearing, the en banc court noted that summary judgment
should rarely be granted to insiders in derivative suits before discovery is completed.Id. at 218.
181 Id. at 218-20.
182 Id. at 219. The court, noting what is apparently another ground sufficient unto itself to
support the decision, observed without elaboration: "Moreover, Aquitaine and the directors of
Banff were guilty of deceiving the stockholders of Banff (other than Aquitaine)."Id. at 220; see
note 170 and accompanying textsupra. District courts in the Second Circuit have not relied on
this holding.
' Compare Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 1I, 25-26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 925 (1972) (deception approach).
184 405 F.2d at 219 (emphasis added). The court also concluded that Paribas was "unable
through ownership of Banff stock or otherwise to bring any pressure on Banff to sell its stock at
a price below true value." Id.
'15 See Note, Breach of FiduciaryDuty InvolvingFull DirectorKnowledge Held lOb-5 Violation,
1969 DUKE L.J. 383, 393 n.54 (includes, e.g., bribery and blackmail).
I'6 Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 300 F. Supp. 731,736 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). This result is
true even if the buyer is an institutional purchaser. Id.
187 Lewis v. Adler, 331 F. Supp. 1258, 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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And one decision has gone so far as to hold that an investment
banking house was not within the proscribed class of purchasers, even
though it bought convertible debentures from the issuer after advising the board that the terms of the purchase were fair to the
company.' 88 Every controlling person, however, is in a position to
1 89
exert the requisite influence.
By permitting recovery for transactions with persons who could
improperly influence the directors' judgment, the Schoenbaum en
banc decision expanded the area of actionable mismanagement
beyond the limits of the deception approach, i.e., misrepresentation,
concealment, and transactions with interested directors. In other
words, full and fair disclosure to the board does not protect a transaction from attack under Rule 10b-5 when improper influence is
present. 90 The "new fraud" cases can also be viewed as expanding
the categories of deception to include situations in which the board of
directors is influenced by outsiders or in which insiders receive some
indirect benefit on the rationale that the board is not competent to
represent the stockholders and the directors' knowledge is not imputed to the corporation.
The Second Circuit added a wrinkle to the "new fraud" concept
in 1972. The court of appeals held that when state law requires a
stockholders' vote, full and fair disclosure to the shareholders-the
decision-making body as to the matter upon which the vote is
taken-ordinarily satisfies the Rule's requirements.' 9 1 Although
there is some merit to this approach, it does ignore the Supreme
188 Lewis v. Spiral Metal Co., 317 F. Supp. 905, 908-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). A sequel to this
decision, brought on motion of the corporation's directors and officers to dismiss the complaint,
reached an equally strange conclusion, perhaps to offset what the secondjudge considered to be
an unfortunate result in the first decision. The secondjudge held that if the investment banker
is not liable, as a "corollary," the directors must be. Lewis v. Spiral Metal Co., [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] CGH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,919, at 90,405 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). This result,
however, is inconsistent with the en bancSchoenbaum court's treatment of Paribas, on which the
second judge relied.
189 A district court case construingSchoenbaum and three cases in other circuits have found
controlling persons liable under a "new fraud" theory. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 882 (5th
Cir. 1970) (directors and officers and one controlling them); Brummer v. Rosenberg,
[1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,341, at 97,626 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(improper controlling influence); cf. Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 825, 827 (5th Cir. 1970)
(sale of control); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 811 (5th Cir. 1970) (purchase of assets from
controlling person).
19' Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719 (2d Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (semble), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), rev'g 268 F. Supp. 385,394-95
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
191 Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719 (2d Cir. 1972). The topics of disclosure and
ratification are discussed in the text accompanying notes 264-94 infra. See notes 279-82 and
accompanying text infra (special emphasis on disclosure).
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Court's view that 1Ob-5 protects the whole community of corporate
1 92
interests---creditors as well as stockholders.
The Third, 1 9 3 Fifth, 194 and Seventh' 9" Circuits have adopted
their own "new fraud" approaches which are broader than
Schoenbaum.196 Some Third and Seventh Circuit cases can be read as
imposing liability on directors for mismanagement in corporate securities dealings with anyone. 1 97 And the Fifth Circuit would extend
the 10b-5 net at least to transactions with officers, directors, and
"others in league with them or the one controlling them."'19 8 The
192 See Superintendent of Ins. v. BankersLife & Gas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). This is
particularly true when creditors are injured although stockholders receive full information.
193Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 869-70 (3d Cir. 1968).
194 Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 826-27 (5th Cir. 1970) (sale of control); Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 811 (5th Cir. 1970) (purchase of assets at excessive price); Rekant v:
Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 881-82 (5th Cir. 1970) (sale of securities for inadequate consideration).
195 Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., l'tc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1333-34 (7th Cir. 1969)
(derivative action proper when "directors in position of conflicting interest orloyalty" and know
of unfairness to corporation); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 269-70 (7th Cir.)
(concurring opinion of two of three judges; corporate acquisition of own stock for excessive
price), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967). Although the district court in Dasho found no misrepresentation or concealment (267 F. Supp. 508, 512 (N.D. I1. 1966)), the concurring court of
appeals judges found fraud in the defendants' failure "to disclose [their] adverse personal
interest." 380 F.2d at 266. One of'the most important considerations underlying the court's
holding was the inadequacy of the consideration paid for the stock. Read from this perspective,
Dasho is broader than Swanson. However, when Dasho was appealed to the Seventh Circuit a
second time, the court of appeals analyzed the case in terms of deception. See Dasho v.
Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 25-26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972). Condon v.
Richardson, 411 F.2d 489,492 (7th Cir. 1969), can be viewed as either a "new fraud" case or as a
deception case in which one director was selling securities to the issuer. Significantly, the court
stated that lOb-5 violations may arise even though the board is fully informed. Id.
In view of these cases and Schoenbaum, Ross v. Longchamps, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 434, 439
(E.D. Mo. 197 1), involving the dismissal of a case based on a transaction between a parent and a
53%-owned subsidiary on the ground of no deception, was decided incorrectly.
196 Each of the cases cited in notes 193-95supra involved a benefit, although not necessarily
a monetary one, to the defendants. Judge Smith's dissenting opinion in Drachman v. Harvey,
453 F.2d 722, 735-(2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on rehearingen banc, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972), appears
to expand the Second Circuit's "new fraud" concept to include any purchases that benefit the
controlling stockholder.
197 The Third Circuit case involved a sale for inadequate consideration to directors and
other purchasers. The directors were held responsible for damages with respect to all shares.
Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1968), on remand, 303 F. Supp. 1257, 1279, 1281
(D.N.J. 1969). Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 269-70 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 977 (1967), involved a sale by the corporation to a dissident stockholder group. The sale,
made for inadequate consideration in order to silence the dissenting group's objections, was
held to be a Rule 10b-5 violation.
One early district court decision in the Second Circuit seems to have gone this far as well. See
New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 264-65, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
199 Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 882 (5th Cir. 1970), quoted in Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d
467, 477 (5th Cir. 1973); cf. Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970) (purchase of
assets for excessive consideration; no deceit necessary if other party to transaction controls
board or conspires with board).
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Eighth Circuit also has adopted a far-reaching rule which condemns
any securities transaction in which self-dealing violative of fiduciary
obligations can be found, even if the insiders' benefits arise indirectly
out of a trade between the issuer and outsiders. 199
"New fraud" principles should, of course, apply to an alleged
violation emanating from actions of officers or a committee of the
board.
3.

Negligence

Negligence is a possible alternative to deception and "new
fraud." There is some authority for the proposition that negligent
mismanagement is actionable under the Rule. 20 0 But this reasoning is
somewhat inconsistent with cases holding that Rule 10b-5 does not
reach all breaches of fiduciary obligation.2"'
C. The Causation and Reliance Elements
Analyses of causation and reliance are often intermingled in
mismanagement decisions. 20 2 Even when discussed separately, their
individual roles are unclear. Although causation is a necessary element in all 10b-5 suits, 20 3 a less stringent standard suffices for injunc"99 Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 519, 527-28 (8th Cir. 1973) (tender offer
followed by merger claimed to result in increased voting control, improved dividends, and
higher salaries and benefits for defendants).
200 Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240, 243 n.2 (D. Neb. 1972) (negligence
enough); Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 234, 239 (D. Neb. 1972); see Dasho v.
Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 25 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972) (nondisclosure
to corporation not actionable if majority ofdirectors fully-informed, disinterested, and "ifin the
good faith exercise of their businessjudgment" they acted in best interests of company); Knauff
v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 408 F.2d 958,965 (10th Cir.),cerL denied,396 U.S. 831 (1969) (test
whether reasonably prudent judgment exercised). Contra, Kaplan v. Newman, [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,134, at 91,111 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (conscious
wrongdoing ordinarily required); Mader v. Armel, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 93,027, at 90,798 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (negligence possible basis for injunction, but
not for damages under lOb-5); Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25, 29 (D. Md. 1965)
(director's action beyond business judgment, but no 10b-5 cause of action because no deception); see Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 194, 195-96 (D. Colo. 1972)
(no evidence "directors acted in bad faith or with willful and intentional disregard of the rights
and interests of the stockholders"; lOb-5 complaint dismissed). See also Berman v. Thomson,
312 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (N.D.III. 1970) (no defense to claim of misrepresentation in merger
proxy statement that directors "exercised good faith and honest businessjudgment"); Entel v.
Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60,70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (10b-5 includes undisclosed breach of state corporate
fiduciary law).
201 See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
202 Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 319 F. Supp. 795,802 n.12 (D. Del. 1970); Adair

v. Schneider, 293 F. Supp. 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Note, Causation and Liability in Private
Actionsfor Proxy Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107, 137 (1970).
203 See, e.g., Review 71 v. Alloys Unlimited, Inc., 450 F.2d 482, 485-86 (10th Cir. 1971);
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tive suits than for actions seeking damages. 0 4 This bifurcation is a
result of the Supreme Court's opinion in SEC v. CapitalGainsResearch
Bureau, Inc., 20 5 which held that all elements of a case for monetary
damages need not be proven to obtain equitable or prophylactic
relief.20 6 In damage actions, the fraudulent securities transaction
must cause the plaintiffs injury. 20 7 Indeed, the Supreme Court applied a causation-in-fact test in a 10b-5 concealment case.20 8 This
approach will probably be adopted in mismanagement cases as well,
20 9
despite the fact that earlier cases employed different standards.
Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 881 (5th Cir. 1970); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus.,
Inc., 328 F. Supp. 797, 806 (S.D. Il1. 1971), rev'd, 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973).
204 Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433,435-36 (6th Cir. 1969) (relaxed causation-reliance
test in suit for injunctive relief); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d
Cir. 1967) (causation unnecessary in injunction actions). This standard should also apply to suits
brought by the SEC.
205 375 U.S. 180 (1963).

206 Id. at 193.

217 See, e.g., Review 71 v. Alloys Unlimited, Inc., 450 F.2d 482, 486 (10th Cir. 1971);
Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792,810 (5th Cir. 1970); Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 162, 163
(6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); Lewis v. Bogin, 337 F. Supp. 331, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Haberman v. Murchison, 331 F. Supp. 180, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),aff'd, 468 F.2d 1305
(2d Cir. 1972); Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079, 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Butsee Globus,
Inc. v. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378, 380-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (violation must be causally related to
stockholder ratification); Note, supra note 202, at 123 (in proxy cases, opinions confused if
causal relationship required between fraud on one hand and transaction or injury on other).
208 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
209 See Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 842, 850 (D.N.J. 1972)
("unbroken chain" of events; proximate cause). But see Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 435
(10th Cir. 1973) (using proximate cause).
Mismanagement cases had employed a wide variety of causation standards prior to the
Supreme Court's holding in Ute Citizens. See, e.g., Review 71 v. Alloys Unlimited, Inc., 450 F.2d
482, 486 (10th Cir. 1971) (strict proximate cause not required); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d
792,810 (5th Cir. 1970) (injury must result proximately from acts); Lewis v. Bogin, 337 F. Supp.
331, 336-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("but for" causation sufficient); Haberman v. Murchison, 335 F.
Supp. 286, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (indirect loss to plaintiff possibly enough), affg 331 F. Supp.
180, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (need direct loss), affd, 468 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1972); Jannes v.
Microwave Communications, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 896, 901 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (sheer speculation
insufficient), affd, 461 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1972); Adair v. Schneider, 293 F. Supp. 393, 396
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (causation-in-fact); Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378, 381 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (causation in strict mathematical sense not required); Voege v. American Sumatra
Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369, 375-76 (D. Del. 1965) (injury would not have occurred in
absence of fraud); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213,229 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (rejecting "but for"
test in favor of proximate cause).
If proximate cause is the test, cause-in-fact must be established and then the policies of the
1934 Act must be employed to determine whether the proximate cause criteria are satisfied.
Note, supra note 25, at 490 n.65; Note, supra note 202, at 121.
Common-law causation exists if the fraud is a substantial factor in causing the injury. Note,
supra note 161, at 801-02.
Courts are hesitant to grant relief in the absence of direct dealings between the plaintiffand
the defendant, because causation is then not readily apparent. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872,
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Troublesome issues of causation arise when defendants hold a
majority of the voting power of the decision-making body. Courts
consistently uphold complaints alleging that a majority or all of the
corporation's directors participated in the fraud. 210 But the district
court decisions in the Second Circuit reveal a split on whether causation exists when defendants control sufficient votes to pass a
resolution.2 11 In 1969, the Seventh Circuit approved a damage action
even though defendants had the necessary votes to approve a sale of
assets. 21 2 The Second Circuit has concurred with-the Seventh Circuit
by concluding, without elaboration,21 3 that minority stockholders'
inability to block an action by internal corporate procedures does not
defeat their suit for injunctive relief.21 4 This case probably reflects the
881 (5th Cir. 1970).
As to the efficacy of an interested stockholder's vote in ratification, see note 278 and
accompanying text infra. Causation is more easily proven ifa series of steps is part of the same
scheme or conspiracy. See notes 67-81 and accompanying text supra.
210 See notes 159-63 and accompanying textsupra. When the Second Circuit adopted the
"new fraud" approach (see notes 177-99 and accompanying text supra), it did not analyze
causation, but causation was present. See Seeburg-Commonwealth United Litigation,
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,277, at 91,597-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
opinion replaced, [1972-1973 TransferBinder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,802 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
211 District court cases in the Second Circuit permitting a cause of action include Stedman
v. Storer, 308 F. Supp. 881,889 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) and Globus, Inc. v.Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524,
530-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Other district courts in the Second Circuit have reached contrary
results. See, e.g., Laufer v. Stranahan, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,617, at 98,774 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (cases cited therein discuss rescission of merger, but not
personal claims of injury); Adair v. Schneider, 293 F. Supp. 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (causal
link between deceptive conduct and damage necessary); Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp.
356, 361-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) (Exchange Act § 14(a) claim upheld while lob-5 claim dismissed).
In Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766,775 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), a rigid causation
requirementwas imposed on actions brought under both Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act (15
U0.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)), and Rule lOb-5. But even when the Barnett view was adopted, cases
made distinctions to avoid its harsh results. See, e.g., Loeb v. Whittaker Corp., 333 F. Supp. 484,
487 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Barnett analysis inapplicable when contract provides that vote of minority
stockholders determinative); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 319 F. Supp. 795, 810-1"1
(D. Del. 1906) (that shares of management plus those of stockholders who claim no reliance
equals 67% insufficient to destroy causality; management must own required shares by itself);
Heit v. Davis, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,698, at 95,567 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (insufficient to have majority of votes cast if do not have majority of those outstanding);
Eagle v. Horvath, 241 F. Supp. 341,343-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (power to redeem voting stock not
equivalent to owning more than requisite number). Still another case left the matter open. Lewis
v. Bogin, 377 F. Supp. 331, 336-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
212 Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1331-32 (7th Cir. 1969).
Compare Krafcisin v. LaSalle Madison Hotel Co., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L.REP. 193,586, at 92,727 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (misrepresentation in tender offer when defendants
controlled two-thirds before tender; no causation in subsequent vote for dissolution; Swanson
distinguished on grounds that in that case appraisal rights available).
213 Reasons in favor of the Second Circuit's approach are set forth in Note,supra note 202,
at 114-23.
214 Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 717-18 (2d Cir. 1972).
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Second Circuit's views toward damage actions as well.21 5 The Supreme Court has not yet resolved this issue.2 16
Most decisions do not refer to reliance at all.2 17 A few opinions do
mention reliance, but not in the context of deception of the
decision-making body, where it is most relevant. If directors receive
false or incomplete information, the plaintiff should have to prove
that the directors relied on the misinformation to the same extent as
claimants in a general 10b-5 misrepresentation or concealment
case. 2 18 Reliance is irrelevant when no misrepresentation or omission
is made.2 1 9 When stockholders have the choice of action, the plaintiff
should also be required to demonstrate the same degree of reliance as
is necessary in the usual misrepresentation and concealment cases.
This requirement applies, for instance, when the fraud arises out of
misstatements or omissions in a proxy statement. 22 0 But reliance is
not a prerequisite for fraud on stockholders who can exercise no
volition. 22 1 Whatever reliance requirements are applicable to damage
222
actions, they are relaxed in injunctive proceedings.
225 See Lewis v. Bogin, 337 F. Supp. 331,336-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Seeburg-Commonwealth
United Litigation, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,277, at 91,597-98
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), opinion replaced, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,802
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). But see notes 204-0.5 and accompanying text supra.
Whatever rule governs a stockholders' meeting and vote should also apply to stockholders'
consent in writing to an action without a meeting. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (Supp. 1968).
See also Exchange Act § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1970) (must send information statement if
subject to proxy rules). For a commentator's discussion of this topic, see Cox, supra note 160, at
691-97.
216 See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 n.7 (1970).
217 When commentators attempt to fit the reliance element of misrepresentation and

concealment decisions into mismanagement cases, they either manufacture fictional types of
reliance or conclude that no reliance is required.See, e.g., DeLancy,Rule lOb-5-A Recent Profile,
25 Bus. LAW. 1355, 1372 (1970); Lockwood,supra note 113, at 373,377; Note,supra note 175, at
516.
218 The signal cases on reliance on misrepresentations and omissions are Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972) (if material fact omitted when defendant
underduty to disclose, no showing of reliance necessary) and List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d
457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (to show reliance need only show that
disclosure would have influenced plaintiff to act differently).
219 Puharich v. Borders Electronics Co., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 92,141, at 96,654 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). This reasoning applies to "new fraud" cases also.
220 See, e.g., Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 162 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930
(1969). This type of claim appears to be a "misrepresentation" claim as distinguished from a
"mismanagement" cause of action.
221 Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627,635 (2d Cir.),cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967)
(short-form merger). Compare Weisman v. MCA, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 258, 264 (D. Del. 1968)
(reliance on good faith and fair dealing of defendants); Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco
Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369, 375 (D. Del. 1965) (reliance on implied representation when no
volition).
In addition to short-form mergers, which are the subject matter of the three cases cited
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D. The Necessity of Injury
Injury to the plaintiff is a prerequisite to monetary recovery,
whether suit is brought by stockholders or by the corporation. 2 23 The
requirement may arise from Exchange Act section 28(a), which limits
recovery to "actual damages. 2 But injury is not necessary in injunc22 "
tion actions or SEC suits.
Whether or not the plaintiff is injured is a question of fact.2 2 6
Courts have become increasingly lenient in finding injury. For instance, claims have been upheld when the following were alleged or
above, a security holder lacks volition in certain other transactions, such as a redemption,
exercise by a corporation of an option to repurchase, and termination of a partnership by
general partners when the plaintiff is a limited partner. Even if voluntary action is not required,
there must nevertheless be some causal connection between the fraud-the misrepresentation
or omission, for example-and the injury. Decisions such as Ryan v.J. Walter Thompson Co.,
453 F.2d 444,446-47 (2d Cir. 1971),cert. denied, 406 U.S. 907 (1972) (company exercised option
to repurchase shares without revealing that public offering was forthcoming), may be justified
on the ground that the misrepresentation, omission, or other fraud did not cause the plaintiff's
loss.
222 See notes 204-05 and accompanying text supra223 See Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305, 1311 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'g 335 F. Supp.
286, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) and 331 F. Supp. 180, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Dasho v. Susquehanna
Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 24 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972) (can rescind or recover
damages if injured); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328,333 (2d Cir. 197 1); Herpich v. Wallace,
430 F.2d 792,810 (5th Cir. 1970); Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 162 (6th Cir. 1968),cert. denied,
394 U.S. 930 (1969); Emmi v. First-Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 336 F. Supp. 629,636 (D. Me.
1971); Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Samaha v. Steadman, 261
F. Supp. 845,846-47 (D.N.J. 1966); Kremer v. Selheimer, 215 F. Supp. 549,552 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
Compare Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66,99-100 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (injury can
result even if induced to sell at fair price by misrepresentation, if price ubsequently appreciates).
224 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970). Section 28(a) applies to a "person permitted to maintain a
suit for damages under the provisions of" the 1934 Act. An issue underlying the problem of
recovery under the Rule is whether the genesis of lOb-5 damage actions is general tort law or the
Exchange Act.
225 See Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540,547 (2d Cir. 1967); SEC v. Fifth
Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 435 F.2d 510, 517 (2d Cir.
1970); Note, supra note 73, at 327-28; 1 LOYOLA U.L.J. 146, 148 n.14 (1970). Contra, Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403,406 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), relying on Greenstein v. Paul, 275 F.
Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968) (involved request for damages
only). Equitable relief does require a showing of injury. Polakoff v. Delaware Steeplechase &
Race Ass'n, 254 F. Supp. 574, 580 (D. Del. 1966); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 227
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"' See Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 870 (3d Cir. 1968); Continental Tel. Corp. v.
Lycoming Tel. Corp., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,193, at 96,913
(E.D. Pa. 1968).
The determination of injury should be made on the basis of facts existing at the time of the
transaction. Cf. note 316 and accompanying textinfra. The Second Circuit's method of utilizing
subsequent market values to demonstrate lack of injury, as in Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d
1305, 1313 (2d Cir. 1972), is clearly erroneous. The court should have ignored later market
performance.
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shown, sometimes in combination with other injuries: working capital
was expended;2 27 borrowings at higher interest rates were made
necessary; 228 an opportunity to obtain new equity funds without
expense was lost;22 9 the value assigned to stock was not received;2 30 a
corporation was forced to assume debt it should not have acquired
23 1
and to make misrepresentations to persons buying its securities;
stock was sold for inadequate consideration2 32 or was purchased for
an excessive price; 2 33 assets were purchased for too much or sold for
too little; 2 34 and executive in-fighting between the controlling and
controlled corporations occurred, executives left, management time
was expended in defensive actions, and attorney fees were
incurred. 2 35 The improper purpose of a transaction may also injure
the issuer,23 6 and it is unnecessary that the defendant make a profit
23 7
from the transaction in order to hold him liable under 10b-5.
It does not follow, however, that injury is equivalent to actionable
fraud.2 38 Neither dilution of a shareholder's equity by an option plan
227 Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722,725 (2d Cir. 197 1),rev'd on othergroundson rehearing
en banc, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972); Lewis v. Bogin, 337 F. Supp. 331,332 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (by
bad acquisition);see Standard Int'l Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
78,394, at 80,879 (no-action letter from SEC dated Aug. 3, 1971);cf. Stella v. Kaiser, 82 F. Supp.
301, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). But see Ross v. Longchamps, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 434,436 (E.D. Mo.
1971) (for other reasons, no cause of action alleged).
228 Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 725, (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on
other grounds on
rehearingen banc, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972); Simon v. New Haven Board & Carton Co., 250 F.
Supp. 297,300 (D. Conn. 1966) (borrowings made more difficult).See also Zeller v. Bogue Elec.
Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 797-801 (2d Cir. 1973) (interest-free loan by subsidiary to parent;
case not mooted by subsequent repayment with eight percent interest).
229 Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722,725 (2d Cir. 1971),rev'don othergroundson rehearing
en banc, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972).
20 Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1244 n.7, 1245-46 (5th Cir. 1971);
Puharich v. Borders Electronics Co., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,141, at 96,654 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
231 Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1244 n.7, 1245-46 (5th Cir. 1971).
222 See, e.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 203 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961),quotedin Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 11 (1971); Pappas v. Moss, 303 F. Supp. 1257, 1270-79 (D.N.J. 1969); Simon v. New Haven
Board & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D. Conn. 1966) (in merger). The corporation may
be injured even if it sells at a fair market price if the buyer has favorable material inside
information which is not imputable to the issuer.
133 See generally notes 368-78 and accompanying text infra.
234 See generally notes 379-87 and accompanying text infra.
232 See Fabrikant v. Jacobellis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,686, at 99,017 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Schenker v. Meridan Inv. & Dev. Corp., [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,612, at 93,814 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
236 See Note, supra note 146, at 327-38.
21 Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1043 (5th Cir. 1973).
238 O'Neill v. Maytag, 230 F. Supp. 235, 239 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.
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approved by stockholders 239 nor reduction of nontrading stockholders' equity by acts of mismanagement,2 40 nor a fraudulent sale of
24 2
control 2 41 is a cognizable injury under the rule.
III
CONCEALMENT,

DISCLOSURE, AND RATIFICATION

Concealment, disclosure, and ratification are pervasive concepts,
applying to innumerable problems arising under both general corporation law and the federal securities laws. Because-of the breadth of
these terms, it is tempting to use them, and authorities construing
them, indiscriminately in differing contexts. For example, some cases
attempt to apply concealment, disclosure, and ratification principles,
as developed and utilized in other areas covered by 10b-5, to mismanagement situations. 43 This is, however, a futile and confusing exercise; mismanagement is governed by its own rules. 24 4 Thus, lOb-5
decisions dealing With other abuses are generally of little help in
determining the outcome of mismanagement matters.
1964); see note 28 and accompanying textsupra (all injuries from mismanagement not redressible under the Rule).
2'9 Review 71 v. Alloys Unlimited, Inc., 450 F.2d 482, 485-86 (10th Cir. 1971).
240
241

See note 144supra.
Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).See generally notes 413-29 and

accompanying text infra.
242 The New York Court of Appeals assumed that a corporation was injured in a commonlaw insider trading case:
[I]t is pertinent to observe that, despite the lack of any specific allegation of
damage, it may well be inferred that the defendants' actions might have caused some
harm to the enterprise. Although the corporation may have little concern with the
day-to-day transactions in its shares, it has a great interest in maintaining a reputation
of integrity, an image of probity, for its management and in insuring the continued
public acceptance and marketability of its stock. When officers and directors abuse
their position in order to gain personal profits, the effect may be to cast a cloud on the
corporation's name, injure stockholder relations and undermine public regard for the
corporation's securities. As Presiding Justice Botein aptly put it, in the course of his
opinion for the Appellate Division, "[t]he prestige and good will of a corporation, so
vital to its prosperity, may be undermined by the revelation that its chief officers had
been making personal profits out of corporate events which they had not disclosed to
the community of stockholders."
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494,499,248 N.E.2d 910, 912-13, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78,81-82
(1969).
243 Epstein v. Kearns, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L REP.
93,625
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), is one example of a case which might have been decided for the plaintiff on
mismanagement grounds, but which reached the opposite conclusion applying misrepresentation and omission concepts.
244 DeLancy, supra note 217, at 1378; see Note, ShareholderDerivative Suits Under Sections
10(b) and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 18 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 132-43 (1966).
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Concealment

Concealment is related to mismanagement in many ways. 45
Concealment is one type of deception, an alternative element in
mismanagement cases. 46 An act of mismanagement, whether cognizable under federal law, state law, or both, which substantially and
adversely affects a corporation, is a material fact.2 47 A purchaser of a
security who is ignorant of such mismanagement has a cause of action
against his seller who concealed the fact in violation of a duty to
disclose all material information. 2 48 However, a district court decision
allowing a corporation and nontrading security holders to sue for an
undisclosed breach of state corporate fiduciary law is of questionable
validity. 4 9
Plaintiffs have attempted to recover, with uniform lack of success, on the ground that they would not have purchased their securities had defendants disclosed an intent to mismanage. The Second Circuit aptly noted: "[I]f plaintiffs' proposition were accepted, it
would convert any instance of corporate mismanagement into a Rule
IOb-5 case.... We regard such a result as unjustified. ' 250 However,
concealment of certain types of intent by defendants under a duty to
disclose is actionable in other 1Ob-5 areas,25 1 and the same rationale
should apply to mismanagement cases. Perhaps the Second Circuit's
concern could be allayed by an investigation of each set of facts, with
particular attention paid to the time lag between the duty of disclosure and the mismanagement, 2 52 to determine when the intent to
245 For a discussion of concealment by management of abetter offer, see notes 391 & 420
infra.
246 See notes 148-76 and accompanying text supra.
247 See Bredehoeft v. Cornell, 260 F. Supp. 557, 558-59 (D. Ore. 1966).
248 For a discussion of concealment of mismanagement, see Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333, 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (question whether mismanagement injured
plaintiffs); Bredehoeft v. Cornell, 260 F. Supp. 557, 558-59 (D. Ore. 1966).
249 Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 68-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
230 Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1967), modifying on
othergrounds 266 F. Supp. 130, 132 (S.D.N.Y.); accord, Lester v. Preco Indus., Inc., 282 F. Supp.
459,462,464 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (intent allegedly not revealed in registration statement); Lester v.
Preco Indus., Inc., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,605, at 95,272
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). Compare Boggess v. Hogan, 328 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ill.
1971) (concealment
in tender offer of intent to loot held actionable).
25! See, e.g., A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393,397-98 (2d Cir. 1967) (concealment
of intent not to pay for stock); Keers & Co. v. American Steel & Pump Corp., 234 F. Supp. 201,
203 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (question of intent to keep promise); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 808, 828-31 (D. Del. 1951) (concealment of intent to liquidate inventory); Note, The
Regulation of CorporateTender Offers Under FederalSecuritiesLaw: A New Challengefor Rule 10b-5,
33 U. CH. L. R~v. 359, 368 (1966); cf. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 109, at 728-31 (4th ed. 1971)
(common law).
22 The duty to disclose might arise, for instance, when an exchange offer is made for the
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mismanage was formed. A similar approach is embodied in the
theory of an implied representation not to mismanage made by
insiders at the time of plaintiff's purchase. 253 The difficulty with the
implied representation theory is that it also converts every type of
mismanagement claim into a Rule IOb-5 cause of action, and it has
been rejected by all courts except the federal district court of
Delaware.2 54 The majority view does not, of course, preclude claims
by defendants or representations implied
based on misstatements
25 5
from their remarks.
Courts have generally refused to hold defendants liable under
1 Ob-5 for failing to state that a transaction was unfair to the corporation or its stockholders.2 5 6 This line of holdings is a bit questionable
25 7
even when facts demonstrating the inequity are public knowledge
or are otherwise known to the plaintiff.2 58 These cases are clearly
wrong when enough information from other sources is not available
to the investing public. If the misleading assertion occurs in the
context of shareholder action, a 10b-5 claim is generally upheld
target company's stock. There would seem to be no basis yet developed in the cases for imposing
a continuous duty to disclose mismanagement. Therefore, the Second Circuit's statement (see
text accompanying note 250 supra) is overly broad since every case of mismanagement does not
automatically become a lOb-5 problem; only when some duty to disclose arises, is Rule lob-5
potentially applicable under this theory.
252 The Second Circuit in the Genesco case equated an implied representation not to
mismanage with concealment of intent to mismanage, and held that neither was a cause of
action under lOb-5. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540,545 (2d Cir. 1967). But
these represent two different theories, the former being much broader. Cf Ruder,Dangersin a
Corporation'sPurchasesof its Own Shares, 13 PRAC. LAw. 75, 90-91 (May 1967) (discussing case in
which plaintiff alleged implied promise that notice of redemption fair).
25" Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1967); Britt v. Cyril
Bath Co., 290 F. Supp. 934,938 (N.D. Ohio 1968), rev'd on othergrounds, 417 F.2d 433 (6th Cir.
1969). The Delaware cases are Weisman v. MCA, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 258, 264 (D. Del. 1968) (law
implies that insiders will act in good faith and deal fairly) and Voege v. American Sumatra
Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369, 374 (D. Del. 1965) (merger case).
251 Cf. United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
91,288 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 1963) (statement of intent to list on New York
SEC. L. REPs
Stock Exchange successfully claimed to establish implied representation to continue listing).
'" See Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 717-18 (2d Cir. 1972) (must prove violation;
unfairness insufficient); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 130, 132-33
(S.D.N.Y.),modyfied, 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967) (transaction fully disclosed, but plaintiffclaims
would not have bought stock if plaintiff told deal unfair); notes 396-404 and accompanying text
infra (unfair merger exchange ratio); cf. Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356, 360-61
(E.D.N.Y. 1966) (proxy statement under Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)). But
see Note, supra note 202, at 125.
257 This reasoning might account for the result in O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.
1964), in which the prices of the two securities exchanged were publicly available.
251 See note 282 and accompanying textinfra. However, one aim of federal securities laws is
to present all material facts fairly and let investors conclude whether or not to trade based on
their analysis of the data.
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because misrepresentations or omissions often are embodied in the
proxy statement in these instances.2 5 9
Defendants rarely disclose an improper motive for taking an
action. For instance, a board of directors might approve a sale of stock
at fair value without revealing that the purpose for the step was to
enable the directors to retain control. In such a situation, the minority
and better reasoned view supports a IOb-5 claim for concealment of
the improper purpose, 6 ° giving recognition to the fact that a corpo26 1
ration can be injured by transactions having an improper purpose.
It follows from the majority view that plaintiffs cannot use the Rule to
attack an activity merely because it serves no valid corporate
purpose. 26 2 Of course, a 10b-5 claim is valid if all elements of an
259 See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1968). For a discussion of ratification, see
notes 283-92 and accompanying text infra.
260 Weber v. Bartle, 272 F. Supp. 201,203-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (that tender offer's purpose
was to perpetuate control constitutes material fact concealed from minority directors); Cochran
v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ("true reason for the cut in the
dividend rate" material fact); Bloomenthal,supra note 76, at358; Israels, CorporatePurchaseoflts
Own Shares-Are ThereNew Overtones?, 50 CORNE-L L.Q. 621,626 (1965); Note,supra note 146, at
325; see Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 269-70 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 389 U.S. 977
(1967). Authorities refusing to recognize a cause of action for concealment of an improper
purpose include O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 767-68 (2d Cir. 1964) (motive of purchase of
issuer's stock by issuer to retain control); Phelps v. Burnham, 327 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1964);
Segal v. Coburn Corp. of America, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1
93,009, at 90,721 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Stedman v. Storer, 308 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(concealed directors more interested in majority stockholder than subsidiary corporation of
which plaintiff stockholder); Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25, 30 (D. Md. 1965);
Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1146, 1166 (1965);
Fleischer, Securities Trading and CorporateInformation Practices:The Implications of the Texas Gulf
Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1302-03 (1965); Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate
Acquisition by TenderOffer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317,365-66 (1967); Note,supra note 251, at 379-82;
see Drachmanv. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722,731 (2d Cir. 1971) ("fraudulent motive and purpose of a
conspiracy and resultant corporate damage are not cognizable wrongs when the securities
markets and securities investors are not adversely affected"), rev'd on rehearing en banc without
specfic reference to thispoint, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972); Haberman v. Murchison, 331 F. Supp.
180 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (alleged manipulative purpose of corporation's stock purchases concealed
from stockholders; no cause of action), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1972); Abramson v.
Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519, 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (alleged purpose to maintain
control disclosed; no cause of action); cf. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d
787, 803 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) (action brought under Exchange Act §
14 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970); management recommends merger to stockholders to protect
against tender offer; motive disclosed so no cause of action), modifying [1967-1969 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,228, at 97,060 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (disclosure of motive not
required, but disclosed anyway).
A transaction involving an improper purpose would usually involve deception or "new
fraud," so the issue of whether or not concealment of an improper purpose is actionable is not
overly important.
See also note 429 and accompanying text infra (schemes to maintain control).
261 See note 236 and accompanying text supra.
262 Hirschleifer v. Fran-Tronics Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REI'. 93,681, at 93,029 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Contra, Cox, supra note 160, at 689-90.
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offense exist in addition to an improper motive or absence of a valid
2 63
corporate purpose.
B. Disclosure
Disclosure and concealment are opposite sides of the same coin.
Faulty disclosure of a fair deal (and a fortiori of an unfair transaction)
gives rise to a IOb-5 cause of action for misstatement or omission. 6 4
The consequences of full disclosure are less clear. The Second Circuit
at one time required only "honest disclosure" under Rule IOb-5,265
but that court abandoned this view four years later266 and further
modified its holdings in a recent case.2 67
The law now distinguishes between disclosure to directors and
disclosure to stockholders. Many cases hold that the interests in a
corporation to be protected are those of the shareholders.2 68 Directors' interests are not always synonymous with, and indeed are sometimes antagonistic to, those of the stockholders. Consequently, full
disclosure to the stockholders when they vote should insulate more
transactions from attack than possession by the board of all information when it acts.26 9
Even full disclosure to directors is insufficient to meet the standards of the Rule if one or more directors are interested2 70 in the
transaction or if the company is dealing with a director or controlling
stockholder. 27 1 But full disclosure to the board will insure against a
10b-5 claim when no director is interested or is trading with the
corporation, and the party dealing with the company is not in a
263 See, e.g., Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24,26, 29 (2d Cir. 1964) (sale of shares to

president for inadequate consideration; reason for sale to retain control); Note, supra note 250,
at 379-82.
264 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381-85 (1970).
265 O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 767 (2d Cir. 1964).
266 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 218-20 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
906 (1969).
267 Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
268 But see Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)
(creditors protected); Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1246 (5th Cir. 1971)
(creditors, persons dealing with corporation, and taxing authorities protected).
269 See Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719 (2d Cir. 1972).
270 ThePopkin case, which first referred to "self-dealing," did not elaborate on the concept.

See note 162 and accompanying textsupra. See also notes 177-99 and accompanying textsupra. A
director may also be interested if he has an improper purpose in mind when he approves a
transaction. See Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 269-70 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 977 (1967).
271 This is the impact of the Schoenbaum en banc decision and the Popkin opinion. See

Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719 (2d Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215,
219-20 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). See notes 148-99 and accompanying text
supra.
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"position to influence the judgment of the [corporation's] directors by
any improper means. ' 7 2
Full disclosure to stockholders is more complicated. Stockholders, when acting in a decision-making capacity, are entitled to "full
disclosure of all information which the ordinary investor of common
business experience would require in making an informed investment decision. '2 73 They are deemed to know information which is in
the public domain or in proxy solicitation material.2 7 4 But the availability of all information to stockholders should not bar an otherwise
actionable claim when stockholders are not asked to vote.2
When a shareholder vote is sought to ratify a proposition2 76 or to meet a requirement of state corporate law, the propriety of the vote, rather than any prior corporate action, is important
for 1Ob-5 purposes.2 7 7 In other words, directors' actions which are
ordinarily objectionable do not violate Rule 1 Ob-5 if such actions are
subject to stockholder approval; the fraud must then be related to the
shareholder vote. Shares held by persons interested in the transaction
subject to a stockholders' vote should not be counted to determine if a
quorum is present or if a sufficient number of favorable votes is
cast.

27 8

A transaction involving self-dealing of directors or controlling
stockholders is immune from attack according to the Second Circuit's
decision in Popkin v. Bishop 2 79 when shareholders are fully apprised
272 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906
(1969).

273 Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240, 243 (D. Neb. 1972).
274 Information disseminated to the same extent as that required to publicize inside

information should be deemed to be known by stockholders, and facts already known to a
stockholder need not be disclosed. Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240,244-45 (D.
Neb. 1972).
275 See SEC Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 3548, at 2 (Oct. 3, 1962)
(purchases by investment company of its own stock objectionable even with disclosure if failed to
declare dividends when funds available); notes 169-72 and accompanying textsupra; Cox,supra
note 160, at 685; cf. Jennings, Insider Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and
Disclosure Obligations Under Rule 10b-5, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 809, 832 n.102 (1968).
276 See notes 287-90 and accompanying text infra.
277 See Review 71 v. Alloys Unlimited, Inc., 450 F.2d 482,485 (10th Cir. 1971) (stock option
plan's effectiveness subject to stockholder approval).
278 Bahlman, Rule lOb-5: The Casefor Its FullAcceptance as FederalCorporationLaw, 37 CIN.
L. REv. 727, 775 (1968). In Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 868, 870 (3d Cir. 1968), the Third
Circuit concluded that effective ratification does not take place under NewJersey common law
when a majority of the stockholders is interested in the transaction being ratified. The court
then turned to the lOb-5 claim and never mentioned ratification. But cf. notes 211-15 supra
(causation when majority stockholder votes).
279464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972). The Popkin case involved a merger with a majority
stockholder, but the reasoning of the case should apply equally to self-interested directors. The
Popkin case overemphasizes the philosophy of disclosure and ignores other policies underlying
the Rule such as fairness, fostering investor -confidence, and protection of investors.
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of the facts and state law requires a vote.28 ° Other authorities
disagree. 28 ' The same split of opinion exists when self-dealing is not
alleged, but state law mandates shareholder approval. The Second
Circuit's approach elevates the disclosure aspect of the Rule's second
clause to the exclusion of the scheme to defraud and deceitful course
of business provisions of clauses (1) and (3). This violates a Supreme
Court directive handed down just two months before Popkin in a case
28 2
reversing the Tenth Circuit.
C. Ratification
Even if state statutory law doesnot require a stockholder vote, the
approval of stockholders still might be sought as a matter of prudent
Prior to Popkin, cases in the Second Circuit had held that an unfair merger is not actionable
if full disclosure is made to the voting stockholders. See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake
Co., 419 F.2d 787, 803 (2d Cir. 1969), cert denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) (alternative holding)
(disclosure ofimproper purpose); Voegev. Smith, 329 F. Supp. 180,183 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Lewis
v. Salny, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 92,687, at 99,019-20 (E.D.N.Y.
1970) (no misrepresentation alleged; allegedly unfair merger not enjoined prospectively). See
also Levin v. Great Western Sugar Co., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,117, at 96,557 (D.N.J. 1967), aff'd, 406 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 848 (1969)
(no misrepresentation or omission; directors acted in good faith and merger not actionable
whether or not fair). Butsee Laufer v. Stranahan, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L REP. 92,617, at 98,775 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (no misrepresentation found, but personal cause of
action allowed for impairment of stockholding interests).
Although the Seventh Circuit did not directly address the issue the second time it decided
the Dasho case, a fair reading of the opinion reveals its accord with Popkin. See Dasho v.
Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 28-30 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972).
280 Realistically, an attack will be made on a transaction in which stockholders have been
fully informed only when the plaintiff believes the terms are unfair to the corporation.See notes
256-59 and accompanying text supra (concealment of unfairness).
Obviously, thePopkin rationale does not apply when state law requires a vote, but no vote is
ever taken. An example of this type of case is Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1042-44
(5th Cir. 1973).
281 Bloomenthal, supra note 76, at 360; Cox, supra note 160, at 698 & n.107; Marsh, What
Lies Ahead Under Rule lOb-5?, 24 Bus. LAw. 69, 71 & n.9 (1968); Patrick, supra note 153, at
457-58,472; Comment,supra note 178, at 1122 (trial court should focus on fairness);see Dasho
v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262,269-70 (7th Cir.),cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967),rev'g267
F. Supp. 508,512 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (trial court requires full disclosure in merger proxy statement;
concurring opinion of two of three circuitjudges finds concealment, but essence is unfairness of
merger); cf. Frohling, The Promoterand Rule lOb-5; BasisforAccountability,48 CORNELL L.Q. 274,
299-307 (1963) (for promoter liability, 10b-5 should establish standard of fairness). Compare
Loeb v. Whittaker Corp., 333 F. Supp. 484,488 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The Delaware cases achieve
the same result by imputing to the corporation a representation that the terms of a merger will
be fair. See cases cited in note 254 supra; Marsh, supra at 71 n.9. Other cases recognize a cause of
action for an unfair merger without discussing disclosure to stockholders. See, e.g., Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 799-800, 813 (5th Cir. 1970) (can obtain injunction to prevent unfair
merger); Condon v. Richardson, 411 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1969) (can enjoin proposed unfair
merger);see Knauffv. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 408 F.2d 958,964 (10th Cir.),cert. denied, 396
U.S. 831 (1969),aff'g 277 F. Supp. 564 (D. Wyo. 1967) (decides merger fair). The topic ofunfair
mergers is treated in notes 390-92 and accompanying text infra.
282 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972); see notes 191-92
and accompanying text supra.
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corporate practice or in order to conform to the company's certificate
of incorporation, by-laws, or listing agreement with a stock
exchange.2 8 3 A vote under such circumstances ratifies prior corporate actions and for purposes of Rule 1Ob-5 its effect is governed by
federal law.2 84 Exchange Act section 29(a) provides that "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance
with any provision of [the- 1934 Act] or of any rule or regulation
thereunder ... shall be void. ' 2 85 Hence, stockholders cannot waive
their rights in a corporation's articles of incorporation or by-laws.2 8 6
However, shareholders may ratify an action of the board, a committee of the board, or the officers. Ratification is ineffective when
stockholders do not receive all pertinent information.2 7 But
ratification is valid when full disclosure is made. In fact, the Second
Circuit apparently would sustain ratification of a fully-disclosed unfair transaction under the rationale ofPopkin2 8 8 regardless of whether
self-interest is in question. 2 9 Some courts would not permit
ratification under these circumstances.2 90
283 Regarding the effect of fraud in a directors' vote when ratification ensues, and the
status of shares of interested stockholders, see notes 276-78 and accompanying text supra.
284 Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972) (semble). State courts applying state law
have also established a set of guidelines, but these are inapplicable to 10b-5 cases.
285 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1970). By analogy, the spirit ofthis sectionis to prohibit ratifications

in the absence of full disclosure.
286 See Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345, 350 (D.N.J. 1966),rev'donother grounds,393 F.2d
865 (3d Cir. 1968).
287 Cf. notes 264 & 276-78 and accompanying text supra. The scope of full disclosure is
discussed in notes 273-74 and accompanying text supra.
288 Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
289 Popkin stressed that disclosure is a key element under the Rule and that full disclosure to
stockholders is the "principal federal interest." Id. at 720. A case in a district court reached the
same conclusion twoyears earlier. Abramsonv. Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519,526 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
At common law, fraud may be ratified only by a unanimous vote of stockholders. But not all
actions which run afoul of the Rule are frauds under the common-law test. Bahlman,supra note
278, at 775.
A district court case, arising in the Second Circuit prior to Popkin, reached a contrary
conclusion and rccognized a cause of action notwithstanding stockholder ratification. Brummer
v. Rosenberg, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 92,341, at 97,624,97,626
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). And after Popkin, Judge Weinfeld opined that "the shareholders could not
ratify the alleged wrongs since they constituted violations of federal law.... Dopp v. American
Electronic Laboratories, Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 9 93,509, at
92,480 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
The Supreme Court has stressed that Rule 10b-5 protects creditors as well as stockholders.
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). A neat question is
therefore raised whether ratification by all stockholders of a fraudulent scheme can divest
creditors of their rights.
In his concurring opinion in Texas GulfSulphur,Judge Friendly indicated that the board of
directors must know of the illegality before board ratification is effective. SEC v. Texas Gulf
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Since directors' interests sometimes conflict with those of the

stockholders, 2 91 effective board ratification under the Rule should be

limited to situations in which full disclosure is made, the board knows
its prior action was illegal, and the ratifying act itself is legal. 292 Under
these guidelines, board ratification is permissible only when (1) the
1Ob-5 offense consisted solely of false or incomplete data being given
to the board, the committee of the board, or the officers taking the
original action, and (2) those data are fully and fairly disclosed to the
board and imputed to the corporation when the board ratifies the
action. 9 3 Interested directors should not be counted for purposes of
the quorum or the vote.2 9 4 The same rules governing ratification by
the full board should also apply to ratification by a committee of the
board.
IV
FORMS OF RULE 10b-5 CORPORATE MISMANAGEMENT SCHEMES

Plaintiffs have claimed that many actions violate the aspects of
Rule lOb-5 governing mismanagement. Allegations of mismanagement fall into several categories: sales by a corporation of its securities
for an inadequate price or insufficient consideration, mismanagement involving stock options, purchases by an issuer of its securities
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 865-66 n.2 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Four
years later,Popkin, in the context of a stockholder vote, made no mention of this analysis. For a
possible explanation of this result, see note 277 and accompanying text supra.
290 Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865,867-68 (3d Cir. 1968) (stockholder approval obtained to
conform to American Stock Exchange rules); Bloomenthalsupra note 76, at 360; cf. note 281
and accompanying text supra. The Pappas case can also be explained on the ground that a
majority of the shares were held by persons interested in the transaction.
291 See notes 268-69 and accompanying text supra.
292 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,865-66 n.2 (2d Cir. 1968),cert denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969) (Friendly, J., concurring) (board must know of illegality and hence full
facts). Compare the opinion of the court in Texas GulfSulphur (401 F.2d at 857 n.24) (ratification
ineffective), with those of the two dissenting judges (id. at 877-78) (ratification effective).
292 In Wolfv. Frank, 477 F.2d 467,477 (5th Cir. 1973), the court considered a purported
ratification by directors of a purchase of assets by the issuer from officers and directors for
excessive consideration and a purchase of the issuer's securities for an unsecured note. Three
new directors were elected by the three directors who traded with the company. The three new
directors voted to ratify the transactions while the trading directors abstained. The Fifth Circuit
concluded:
[T]he votes of the newly elected directors could not legally authorize defendants to
breach their fiduciary duties by accepting ... stock for unsecured . . . notes. ...
Moreover, the votes of the newly constituted Board of Directors, in which defendants
participated, could not constitute a valid ratification of defendants' illegal activities.
Id. The fraud in Wof was substantive; no amount of disclosure could cure it.
294 See Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 25 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925
(1972) (disinterested majority of directors acting with full knowledge and in good faith permissible); cf. note 278 and accompanying text supra (votes of interested stockholders).
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too dearly, corporate purchases of assets for too much or sales of
assets for too little, mergers and acquisitions, fraud in the sale of a
controlling block of shares, waste of corporate assets and looting,
misappropriation of corporate assets, and a few miscellaneous acts. A
short treatment of each of these types of mismanagement follows,
even though some principles apply to more than one category.
A.

Sales by a Corporation of Its Own Securities for Inadequate
Consideration
A corporation may have a claim against insiders and others when
they cause it to sell its securities for inadequate consideration. Some
decisions discuss misrepresentations or omissions, facts which are
relevant to the elements of deceit and injury.2 95 The essential factual
basis of the claim, however, is a sale from which the issuer receives too
little. In early cases, the purchase of a corporation's stock was followed by a subsequent sale which defrauded the public.2 96 Later
decisions demonstrate that a public distribution is not a sine qua
non. 297 In fact, although the Rule does apply to securities purchased
from the issuer in a public offering, 298 recent opinions deal more
often with private placements in which subsequent resales are not in
question. 299 There is no longer any doubt that lOb-5 applies to
stock,30 0 debt securities,3 0 1 warrants,30 2 or any other instrument fall295 See notes 148-76 & 223-42 and accompanying text supra.
296 Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365

U.S. 814 (1961); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); see Kremer v.
Selheimer, 215 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
297 See, e.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872,874-76, 879-82 (5th Cir. 1970) (no subsequent
public distribution); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215,218-20 (2d Cir. 1968),cert. denied,
395 U.S. 906 (1969) (no public distribution); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 867 (3d Cir. 1968)
(no subsequent public distribution); see Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (10b-5 not limited to integrity of securities markets). Remnants of the
reasoning requiring a subsequent sale can still be found. Cf. Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444
F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (5th Cir. 1971); id. at 1249 (concurring opinion) (promoters' liability;
eventual public distribution considered essential).
29' Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp. 616, 618-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (public offering first to
insiders and oversubscribed by them); see Condon v. Richardson, 411 F.2d 489,491-92 (7th Cir.
1969) (purchases in rights offering and sale to controlled corporation); cf. Surowtiz v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 364-65 (1966) (buy insiders' stock in public tender offer); Note,
supra note 251, at 376-78 (cause of action exists if insidersets price ofcorporation's tender for its
own shares too high so he can tender). See also Weber v. Bartle, 272 F. Supp. 201, 203-04
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (purchases through tender offer at excessive price and for improper purpose).
299 See, e.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 874-76 (5th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 218-20 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Pappas v.
Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 869-70 (3d Cir. 1968).
300 See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 218-20 (2d Cir. 1968), cerL denied,
395 U.S. 906 (1969); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 869-70 (3d Cir. 1968); Continental Bank &
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ing within the 1934 Act's broad definition of a "security. ' 30 3 And the
company
definition of a "sale" is satisfied regardless of whether the
30 4
receives full or inadequate consideration or none at all.
The three most common types of fraud in this area proscribed by
Rule 10b-5 are: (1) selling the securities at a price which is too low,
although the value of the payment received is not in issue (e.g., when
the buyer pays cash); (2) selling the securities at a price which is fair,
but receiving consideration which has a misstated value (e.g., oil rights
may be represented to be worth $100,000, which would be a fair price
for the securities, but really they are worth only $20,000); and (3)
Trust Co. v. Garfinkle, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,427 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (conversion of debt into stock); Adair v. Schneider, 293 F. Supp. 393, 395 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Garfinkle, 292 F. Supp. 709,711 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (debt
converted into stock).
301 See Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872,877 (5th Cir. 1970); Lewis v. Spiral Metal Co., 317 F.
Supp. 905, 907-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (convertible debentures); Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp.
616, 618-20, 622, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (debentures). But see Ross v. Longchamps, Inc., 336 F.
Supp. 434, 438-39 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (notes not "sold," but quaere if result correct); SEC v. Fifth
Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3,37-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd on othergrounds, 435 F.2d
510 (2d Cir. 1970) (personal loan not a purchase).
302 Brummer v. Rosenberg, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 94,341,
at 97,624-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see Wolf v. Ackerman, 308 F. Supp. 1057, 1058 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (allegations that warrants of subsidiary issued for inadequate consideration).
303 The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas,
or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participatioh in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of
exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not
exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity
of which is likewise limited.
Exchange Act § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(10) (1970).
Stock options are treated in the text accompanying notes 322-67 infra.
304 See, e.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 876, 881 (5th Cir. 1970) (no consideration);
Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 200-03 (5th Cir. 1960), cert denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1961) (inadequate consideration); Brummer v. Rosenberg, [1967-1969 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,341, at 97,626 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (inadequate consideration);
Aronstam v. Tenney Corp., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 192,237, at
97,087 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (for worthless property); Heilbrunn v. Hanover Equities Corp., 259 F.
Supp. 936, 938 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (worthless property as consideration); Kane v. Central Am.
Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559,561-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (inadequate or no consideration).
Receiving securities for no consideration or worthless property is economically equivalent to
stealing the securities. Nevertheless, no case has questioned that such a transfer is still a "sale."
1967) (illegal for broker to
Cf Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. I11.
overcharge customer; by analogy, illegal to sell nonexistent securities). In Hoff v. Sprayregen,
339 F. Supp. 369, 372-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the court held that controlling directors violated
lOb-5 when they agreed to pay Sprayregen excessive fees, largely in warrants, for obtaining
financing from a company controlled by those same directors.
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selling the securities at a price which is too low and receiving consideration with a misstated value. 30 5 Courts have found causes of action
in these situations without detailing the supportive reasoning. More
recent decisions, however, have generally relied upon a showing of
deception, 30 6 "new fraud, '"307 or perhaps negligence 30 8 to justify their
holdings for plaintiffs.
Two other allegations related to sales of securities for inadequate
consideration have been made by plaintiffs in 10b-5 actions.3 0 9 The
SEC attacked as fraudulent a sale for full value in which the buyer
lacked capacity to pay and the seller retained no lien on the
securities.3 10 And the Supreme Court upheld a cause of action when
true value, but the proceeds of the sale
securities were sold for their
11
were misappropriated.
These mismanagement schemes are redressible in court only by
the corporation since it is the defrauded seller. Security holders lack
standing to sue because they did not sell as a result of the fraud, even
though the corporation's injury decreased the value of their
holdings. 3 12 Furthermore, neither the corporation nor its existing
305Examples of these types of cases can be found in notes 148 & 149 supra.
306 See notes 148-76 and accompanying textsupra.
307 See notes 177-99 and accompanying text supra.
300 See notes 200-01 and accompanying textsupra.
309 Dilution of a stockholder's equity or voting rights occasioned only by the issuance of
stock does not itself give rise to a cause of action. Review 71 v. Alloys Unlimited, Inc., 450 F.2d
482, 485-86 (10th Cir. 1971).
Issuance of stock for less than par value does give rise to a corporate cause of action even if
the consideration is not alleged to be unfair. Subsequent creditors and purchasers of stock
would also have a Rule lOb-5 misrepresentation claim if the balance sheet did not accurately
show the shareholders' equity. Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1244-46 (5th Cir.
1971).
310 Cf. SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 435 F.2d 510, 517 (2d Cir. 1970), affg 289 F.
Supp. 3, 39-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (sale of stock in another corporation).
311 See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,9-10 (1971) (sale of
United States treasury bonds).
3'12 See notes 83-101 and accompanying text supra ("in connection with" clause under
mismanagement).
A stockholder probably does not have standing even when the fraud is directed at him.
Suppose controlling persons of a close corporation want to squeeze out a stockholder whom
they know has few liquid assets. They may make a rights offering to all stockholders pro rata to
purchase more stock at an unreasonably low price, knowing that he will not be able to buy his
share and his interest will thus be diluted. To sue successfully under Rule lOb-5, the stockholder
would have to satisfy the "in connection with the purchase or sale of a security" clause of the Rule
and convince the court that this type of activity is within its scope. A stockholder should not be
able to avoid the "in connection with" problem by purchasing one share and thus becoming a
buyer, since the fraud relates not to that purchase but to his inability to buy the other shares. In
this situation, the corporation should have a cause of action since it is selling an asset-its
stock-for too little. See Latty, The AggrievedBuyer orSellerorHolderof Shares in a Close Corporation
Under the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAW & CONrEMP. PROB. 505, 522 (1953) (corporation should have
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stockholders can successfully sue persons who pay the corporation
fair value for its stock and then defraud the public by reselling the
stock at an inflated price.3 13 Members of the public who bought the
stock would have a claim against such persons and, if the corporation
3 14
participated in the scheme, against the company as well.
Establishing the value of the security sold and the consideration
received is a difficulty inherent in these cases. While both issues are
questions of fact, 31 5 some guidelines have emerged. First, the security
and consideration are valued when contracts are signed and not when
the board of directors approves the sale. 31 6 Second, payment of an
amount equal to, or greater than, the market value does not insure
that the price is fair when the purchaser is aware of favorable inside
information.3 1 7 Third, a seller's disposition of a large percentage of the shares to finders should be viewed as evidence that the
consideration was worth less than the securities.3.18 Finally, facts extrinsic to the security transaction should be evaluated in certain instances to determine the adequacy of the consideration. For instance,
a buyer may purchase securities at a fair price, but receive an employment contract in connection with his purchase which is excessively generous. Here the securities sale and employment arrangements should be viewed as one package-the sales price and services
to be rendered (what the buyer tenders) should be weighed against
what the buyer receives (the value of the securities plus the salary and
other employee benefits). 19
claim); cf. Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 200-03 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
313 Kremer v. Selheimer, 215 F. Supp. 549, 552-53 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
314 One theory upon which such a claim could be founded is defendant's aiding and
abetting a breach of the Rule. A leading case in this area is Brennan v. Midwestern United Life
Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 681 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
315Pappas v. Moss, 303 F. Supp. 1257, 1273-79 (D.N.J. 1969); Bloomenthal,supra note 76,
at 357. If the defendant had nothing to do with setting the price, the reasoning of an early case
would absolve him, but quaere whether this is still true? See Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co.,
174 F.2d 799, 808-09 (3d Cir. 1949).
316 Pappas v. Moss, 303 F. Supp. 1257, 1277 (D.N.J. 1969) (date to value security). In
Abramson v. Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the court never reached
the plaintiff's claim that the court should consider the market drop between the date of the
agreement and the date of the stockholders' meeting at which approval of the purchase was
sought.
317 For example, this is the wrong underlying the grant of stock options in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Regarding
imputation of knowledge under the deception or "new fraud" approaches, see notes 1489-9
and accompanying text supra.
318 See SEC v. Great American Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453,459-60 (2d Cir. 1968),cert. denied,
395 U.S. 920 (1969).
319 Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 823,825 (5th Cir. 1970) (control premium paid byissuer
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Sales of securities for inadequate consideration are sometimes
involved when assets are bought for too much, an improvident
merger is consummated, or corporate assets are wasted. These topics
are discussed elsewhere, 3 20 as are the related areas of redemptions
32 1
and stock options.
B.

Mismanagement Involving Stock Options

Granting stock options is similar in a number of respects to
issuing securities for inadequate consideration: an option to purchase
stock is a "security" for purposes of the Rule122 and, as with any other
security, issuance by a corporation of a stock option is a "sale" to which
lOb-5 applies. 323 But the peculiar problems arising from the Rule's
impact on stock options justify separate treatment. In addition to the
sale that occurs when an option is granted, issuance of stock when the
option is exercised constitutes a related but distinct sale of a security
by the corporation.3 2 4 Each of these sales raises problems under the
Rule.
The most troublesome questions involving the grant of a stock
option arise when material inside information is withheld from, or is
known by, the board of directors or a stock option committee of the
board granting the option.,3 25 Allegations of abuse of inside information in connection with the issuance of securities often camouflage the
true basis of the complaint-the inadequacy of the consideration
received by the corporation for the securities. 326 Inside information
assumes greater importance with stock options than with other seby giving overly generous employment contract to seller, overpayment in purchase of assets
from buyer of control, and assumption by issuer of buyer's contract). See generally notes 67-81
and accompanying text supra.
320 See notes 379-412 & notes 430-35 and accompanying text infra.
21 See notes 462-63 and accompanying text infra. (redemptions); notes322-67 and accompanying text infra (stock options).
322 Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1286-88 (D. Mass. 1972); Globus, Inc. v.Jaroff, 271
F. Supp. 378, 380-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 292
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), modified on other grounds, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
323 Brummer v. Rosenberg, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 92,341,
at 97,626 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (warrants); Globus, Inc. v.Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524, 528 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); cf. notes 300-04 and accompanying textsupra. One author draws a distinction between
the grant of the option and its acceptance by the optionee, but nevertheless concludes that the
same rules should apply to both events. See Comment, Federal Securities Regulation-Insider
Trading-Stock Options Under SEC Rule 1Ob-5, 54 IOWA L.. REv. 635, 642-46 (1969).
324 A third sale occurs when the optionee disposes of the stock he receives upon exercise of
his option.
325 For convenience, the stock option committee will be assumed to be the decision-making
body.
326 See note 295 and accompanying text supra.
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curities, however, since the market value on the date the option is
granted determines the exercise price of qualified stock options, the
type most frequently issued.3 27 The definition of "material" in this
context is the same as it is in cases involving insider trades with the
public, 3 28 and the relevant type of "inside information

3

29

is that

which might affect the price of the underlying stock during the
period in which the option can be exercised. 3 3' Therefore, although
questions concerning inside information arise in connection with the
grant of an option, the real impact is on the adequacy of the consideration to be received on its exercise.
Whether the stock option committee, standing in the shoes of the
corporation, has actual or constructive knowledge of the inside information is a question that requires the same analysis as that taken
up above under the topic of deception. 33 1 Any person receiving
options for inadequate consideration who is within the ambit of the
"new fraud" decisions 33 2 might be violating the Rule even if he discloses the inside information to the committee or the committee itself
has such information. 3 3 However, prior stockholder approval of a
plan after full disclosure might alleviate any
typical employee benefit
"new fraud" problem. 334
Eight factual patterns of grants of options accompanied by material inside information are derived from the permutations of
whether the information is favorable or unfavorable and whether or
not it is known by the committee or the optionee. The first pattern
assumes that the stock option committee does not actually, or by
327 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b)(4).
328 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), modiied on
other grounds, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
329 "Inside information" consists of "material, non-public corporate information, which
[the possessor] has reason to know emanates from a corporate source, and which by itself places
him in a position superior to other investors." Investors Management Co., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 9267, at 11 (July 29, 1971).
330 SEC v. Texas Gdlf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 857 n.24 (2d Cir. 1968), cerL denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
"I See notes 148-76 and accompanying text supra. The question is still whether the
information is imputed to the corporation even though a committee of the board, rather than
the full board, is acting. For simplicity, reference is made to the knowledge of the committee.
332 See notes 177-99 and accompanying text supra.
13 Lewis v. Adler, 331 F. Supp. 1258, 1263-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), is a case involving a grant
* of a stock option which was analyzed in terms of "new fraud." The plaintiff's failure to allege
that the optionee had improperly influenced the stock option committee resulted in dismissal of
the lOb-5 claim.
"' See notes 283-94 and accompanying textsupra. Stockholder approval is often obtained
for these plans for tax, corporate law, stock exchange, or federal securities acts purposes. See,
e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b)(1); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 505 (McKinney 1963);
Exchange Act Rule 16b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1973).
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imputation, know favorable material inside information. An optionee
who is also ignorant of the facts would not run afoul of the Rule by
receiving an option. But an optionee who is aware of the data and is
granted an option, the exercise price of which is tied to market price,
violates the Rule unless he makes disclosure to the committee or
rejects the option.33 5
Although speculation that "something good is in the offing"
might arise from the mere rejection of an option, 33 6 other alternatives
for treating this problem also have objectionable features. 337 The
knowledgeable optionee could not defend a suit on the grounds that
he later returned his option to the corporation or that the market
price prior to public disclosure was used to set the option exercise
pcice. 3 38 An optionee's liability for nondisclosure could include
damages arising not only from the granting of his options but-also
from grants to others at the same time.3 39 An optionee's failure to
reveal his favorable nonpublic data could be a 10b-5 infraction
whether or not the exercise price is based on the market. Even though
the exercise price is determined by the par or book value of the
shares, the committee might have issued fewer options had it anticipated a market price rise upon release of the inside information. The
district court decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 340 however,
335 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 856-57 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969); id. at 865 (Friendly, J., concurring) (secrecy no defense). But see id. at 877-78
(Moore, J., dissenting) (optionee must refrain from exercising option until information publicized). As to the class of employees who have this obligation, see notes 340-47 and accompanying
text infra.
336 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 857 n.24 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969) (in proper circumstances, could require optionee only to forego exercise
until after subsequent disclosure and ratification). On the other hand, it might be assumed that
the rejecting optionee had adverse material facts and hoped to get more, lower priced options
later See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 422(b)(5), 422(c)(6) (blockage rules).
311 It is somewhat naive to suggest that an optionee who conceals inside information should
be forced only to delay exercise until the data are publicized. This was the contention of the
dissentingjudges in the Texas Gulf Sulphurcase. 401 F.2d at 877-78. The fallacy of this approach
is that the optionee then has the ability to exercise his option at an unfairly low price. Bromberg,
CorporateInformation: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its Implications, 22 Sw. L.J. 731, 734 n.9 (1968);
Comment, supra note 323, at 642. The proper response toward options granted in violation of
1Ob-5 is cancellati3n of the option or payment of damages upon its exercise. SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 331 F. Supp. 671, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Another possible remedy is raising the
exercise price.
"' Both of these conditions existed in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case as to the company's
president and executive vice-president, yet a violation was found. 401 F.2d at 856.
339 Id. at 865 (Friendly, J., concurring) (liable for all options if optionee got committee to
include others as optionees who did not know).
...258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),modifed, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969). The Second Circuit never faced the issue because the SEC did not appeal the
disposition as to the two low-level employees.
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limited the class of optionees who must make disclosure, regardless of
the type of option involved. Judge Bonsal imposed a duty to disclose
on higher echelon optionees, but permitted lower level employees,
who knew that their superiors also possessed the data, to assume that
their superiors would inform the stock option committee. 34 ' The
president, executive vice-president, and general counsel, also a vicepresident, were classified as higher echelon employees, while the
not. 342
chief geologist and a mining engineer-vice-president were
Unfortunately, this approach limits the scope of the Rule's "any
person" wording, 343 which has been read broadly in every other
context. 3 44 Judge Bonsal's ruling also leaves some questions unanswered. Is a lower level employee responsible if he conceals data
34
while ignorant of the fact that his superiors have made disclosure?
Does a lower level employee violate the Rule if he refrains from
disclosing and knows the upper level employees do not intend to
employee's obligations
inform the committee? 34 6 Do a lower echelon
34 7
change if he actively solicits the option?
In cases in which an employee is aware of unfavorable material
inside data but the committee is not, the only question which arises is
whether the employee incurs any liability if he rejects an option. 4 8 A
10b-5 cause of action is difficult to construct on these facts even if the
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" clause of the
Rule is deemed satisfied. 3 49 The same difficulty is encountered when
I'l Id. at 291. The low-level employees either received the information from their
superiors or told it to them. They therefore knew that the superiors were aware of the facts.
342 Id. at 292,modified, 401 F.2d at 856-57. The Instruction to Item 8, Securities Exchange
Act Form 10-K, defines executive officers as follows: "The term 'executive officer' means the
president, secretary, treasurer, any vice president in charge of a principal business function
(such as sales, administration or finance) and any other officer who performs similar policy
making functions ..
"
343 Comment, supra note 323, at 645.
344 Even if this construction prevails concerning stock options, quaerewhether it ought to
be extended so far as to permit lower echelon employees to purchase stock from the issuer other
than through the exercise of options without disclosing inside information known to their
superiors?
345 The employee unsuccessfully tried to defraud the corporation, but no injury was
suffered, so the company had no claim.
346 Judge Friendly, concurring in Texas Gulf Sulphur, indicated that this would violate
10b-5. 401 F.2d at 865; accord, Sandler & Conwill, Texas Gulf Sulphur: Reform in the Securities
Marketplace, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 225, 261 (1969).
311 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,864-65 (2d Cir. 1968),cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969) (Friendly, J., concurring). The grant of the options in Texas Gulf Sulphur was
initiated by the committee.
348 He might do so to avoid the blockage rule of the Internal Revenue Code or in the hope
that he will receive more options later. See note 336 supra.
3'9 See Sandler & Conwill, supra note 347, at 262.
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neither the committee nor the optionee is aware of unfavorable inside
information.
The other side of the coin is seen when the stock option committee knows the material inside information. Since knowledge of the committee is usually regarded as coterminous with that of
the corporation, granting options is not a IOb-5 infraction. 350 But the
committee may not grant options when it knows favorable inside
351
information, and that information is not imputed to the company.
Finally, when the committee knows unfavorable material inside
information, but nevertheless grants options, an employee who is also
aware of the data could reject his option while his uninformed counterpart could be injured by accepting an option. 35 2 It is not likely that
the rejecting employee incurs any 10b-5 liability or that the accepting
35 3
optionee has any claim under the Rule.
Certain other 10b-5 issues arising in connection with the grant of
an option should be noted.3 54 First, if misrepresentations of material
facts made by an optionee cause the stock option committee to grant
options, the misrepresenting optionee is liable for damages flowing
from the grant of his own options and probably other options issued
as a result of his fraud.35 5 Second, the effect of stockholder approval
of a single option or an option plan is negated by misrepresentations
or omissions of material facts made to them when they approve the
option or plan.3 5 6 Third, the grant of the option must be supported
by consideration flowing from the optionee to the corporation. A
recitation in an option plan adopted by stockholders to the effect that

"

But see note 333 and accompanying textsupra. The result should not depend upon the

knowledge or ignorance of the optionee. When stockholders (i.e., the corporation) know the
"inside information," no cause of action should accrue because a fraud element does not exist
(Lewis v. Adler, 331 F. Supp. 1258, 1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)) at least when "new fraud" is
inapplicable.
351 This is equivalent to the committee having no knowledge of the data. See notes 335-49
and accompanying text supra. The result is the same regardless of whether the optionee has
knowledge of the subject information.
352 The injury would arise out of the tax blockage rule. See note 336 supra.
M See Sandler & Conwill, supra note 347, at 262.
354 If stockholders approve a plan, they have no claim that their equity and voting rights
are being diluted. Review 71 v. Alloys Unlimited, Inc., 450 F.2d 482,485-86 (10th Cir. 1971).
Another problem arises when the committee attempts to set the exercise price of an option
relating to a thinly-traded stock. See Kaplan v. Newman, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,134, at 91,109-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (question whether thin market is true
value on which to base stock option).
355 Cf Pappas v. Moss, 303 F. Supp. 1257, 1279 (D.N.J. 1969). This situation is no different
from the more usual case of a buyer misrepresenting to the seller. Bloomenthal,supra note 76, at
354.
356 Globus, Inc. v.Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524,526-27,529-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (misrepresentations and omissions in proxy statement; single option).
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the plan is designed to provide incentive to the employees is ordinarvalue
ily sufficient.3 57 The optionee must demonstrate 3adequate
58
when grants are not made under this type of plan.
The exercise of an option may also raise questions.3 59 Adequate
consideration must support not only the option but also the issuance
of the underlying stock.3 60 Moreover, a grossly unfair method of paying for the stock may breach the Rule. 36 ' An optionee's inside information may have an impact on the exercise of his option as well as on
the grant. The Rule should prohibit an optionee who has favorable
inside information from exercising the option until the information is
announced publicly and assimilated.3 62 This approach seems to be
foreclosed, however, by a Second Circuit decision permitting a corporation to exercise its option to repurchase shares from a stockholder
even though it conceals favorable material information. 3 63 Analogously, an optionee ought to be able to exercise his option regardless
of his knowledge. 364 An optionee probably would not violate the Rule
36 5
if he failed to exercise because he knew adverse inside information.
a Lewis v. Adler, 331 F. Supp. 1258, 1266 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see Trainor v. Berner, 334 F.
Supp. 1143, 1144, 1147-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (plaintiff alleges that must look at entire compensation to optionee to determine if option supported by adequate consideration; some weight
accorded to fact that stockholders approved plan).
358 Brummer v. Rosenberg, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CGH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,341,
at 97,624-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (warrants);see Lowenfels,Rule 1Ob-5 and the Stockholder'sDerivative
Action, 18 VAND. L. REv. 893, 896-97 (1965); cf. notes 295-321 and accompanying textsupra.
'5' The analysis concerning exercise of a stock option should apply equally to conversion of
a security, assuming the conversion is a "purchase" for purposes of the Rule.
360 See notes 295-321 and accompanying textsupra (issuance of securities for inadequate
consideration).
361 The plaintiff in Levine v. Bradlee, 378 F.2d 620,621 (3d Cir. 1967) alleged that Rule
lOb-5 was violated when the corporation's chief executive officer paid for the exercise of an
option by giving a promissory note which bore less interest than the dividends on the stock.
362 Bromberg, supra note 337, at 734 n.9; Comment, supra note 323, at 646. This view does
not, however, prevent exercise when the option is about to expire and the exercise price is less
than the market. The incentive to exercise is obvious when the market is greater than the
exercise price. Even if the market price is less than the exercise price, the anticipated appreciation in the market value resulting from the release of the data may still make exercise desirable if
the option is nearing the end of its term. The optionee could not purchase shares in the open
marketbecause of his knowledge.See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co', 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
363 Ryan v.J. Walter Thompson Co., 453 F.2d 444,447 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
907 (1972),aff gpercuriam322 F. Supp. 307,313 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);cf. Fershtman v. Schectman,
450 F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1971) (termination of limited partnership); notes 457-59 and
accompanying text infra (redemption of securities).
364 Sandier & Conwill,supra note 346, at 263-64. This is a sound result, for all Rule lob-5
ever requires is that the buyer and seller in a transaction know the inside information. Were the
law to require that the corporate seller be told the information, it would be a useless act because
the optionee could still exercise on the same terms.
365 The "in connection with" clause of the Rule would not be satisfied.Butseeln re Faberge,

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:27

There are two related points. One case permitted a corporation
to cancel an option when it was being injured by the optionee.3 6 6 Also,
the trading public may have a cause of action if stock options are
granted in violation of the Rule and the inside information known to
3 67
the optionees is not announced.
C. Purchases by a Corporation of Its Own Securities for Excessive Consideration
Many of the considerations which govern a corporation's sales of
its securities for inadequate consideration also apply to overpayment
by a corporation for its own securities.3 6 s The most common violations arise when (1) the purchase price is too high while the value of
the consideration tendered by the corporation is not disputed (as
when cash is paid), (2) the purchase price is fair but the consideration
is worth more than its assigned value, and (3) the purchase price is too
high and the consideration tendered is worth more than its assigned
value. 3 69 The legal consequences of these three alternatives are indistinguishable; a Rule lOb-5 cause of action will lie based on either
3 71
deception 37 0 or "new fraud.
A number of other types of repurchase schemes may involve
lOb-5 fraud. For example, the Supreme Court has indicated that
insiders who sell their shares to the corporation after manipulating
the stock price upwards run afoul of Rule lOb-5.37 2 Even corporate
purchases at a fair price which are so extensive that the cash drain
impairs the corporation's ability to conduct business may give rise to a
lOb-5 claim against insiders who directed the purchases.3 7 3 The Second Circuit has extended this concept to a situation in which a
redemption of bonds decreased working capital and forced the corInc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,174 (May 25, 1973) (tipping violates lOb-5
even without trading).
366 Doelle v. Ireco Chem., 391 F.2d 6, 8 (10th Cir. 1968). Whether or not the terms of the
option permitted this action is not clear.
367 Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333, 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
366 See notes 295-321 and accompanying textsupra.
369 Examples of these types of cases can be found in notes 148 & 149 supra.
370 See authorities cited in notes 148-76 supra.
371 See notes 177-99 and accompanying textsupra. See also notes 200-01 and accompanying
text supra (negligence).
372 Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 364 (1966).
373 In Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25, 27-29 (D. Md. 1965), the court did not
reach the lOb-5 claim based on the cash needs of the company, but stated that a state law cause of
action existed. This was also an allegation in Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363,
364-65 (1966); cf.Stella v. Kaiser, 82 F. Supp. 301,308,312 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (purchases during
stabilization).
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poration to pay higher interest rates. 374 Nevertheless, most authorities would not permit recovery for repurchases at a fair price
which are made for an improper purpose. 37 5 Courts have dismissed
claims brought on behalf of the issuer when it repurchased securities
3 76
at less than fair value.
Repurchase of securities by issuers is fraught with other dangers.
For example, state laws often prohibit repurchases except from
surplus.

37 7

A violation of this type of state-created restriction would

not necessarily lead to a lOb-5 cause of action, however. 37 8
D. Mismanagement in Sales and Purchases of CorporateAssets
The same rules that apply to sales of corporate securities for too
little also govern purchases of assets for too oiuch. The present
discussion concerns a purchase or sale by a corporation of less than
substantially all of its assets; later comments focus on a transaction
involving all or substantially all of a corporation's assets. 3 79 In order to
satisfy the Rule's "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security" clause, the assets or the consideration paid for them must
consist at least partially of securities. 3 80 Liability for deception 38 1 or
"new fraud"3 82 attaches when (1) the worth of the assets bought by the
enterprise is not as much as purported, (2) the value of the consideration paid by the corporation for the assets is more than was ascribed to
it, and (3) a combination of (1) and (2)is found. 38 3 Liability is similarly
incurred when the corporation is defrauded in the sale of its assets.
37" Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 737-38 (2d Cir. 1971) (in connection with control
scheme).
375 See notes 260-62 and accompanying text infra.
376 Carlinerv. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25,29 (D. Md. 1965).See also notes 223-42 and
accompanying text supra (injury to corporation in mismanagement cases). It is arguable that a
cause of action exists if the benefit from the repurchases is outweighed by increased interest
expenses or other injury arising from the loss of working capital. See notes 374-75 and accompanying text supra (injury from loss of working capital).
377 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 243 (Supp. 1970); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 513
(McKinney 1963).
378 See note 28 and accompanying text supra (not all state-cognizable mismanagement
schemes covered by lOb-5).
37'See notes 388-412 and accompanying textinfra. See also notes 464-66 and accompanying
text infra (liquidations and dissolutions).
380 Cf. Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1956) (10b-5 covers sale of
securities and nonsecurities in one scheme).
381 See notes 148-76 and accompanying text supra.
382 See notes 177-99 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 200-01 and accompanying textsupra (negligence). Some cases uphold the claim without stating a reason. See cases cited
in notes 148-76 and accompanying text supra.
383 Examples of these types of cases can be found in notes 148 & 149 supra.
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A misappropriation of the assets purchased or of the proceeds3 8of5
3 8 4 As discussed above,
the asset sale is a cognizable lOb-5 injury.
purchases and sales for improper purposes are probably not 10b-5
violations on that ground alone, but extensive purchases which injure
a company's working capital,38 6 and sales to buyers who are not in a
position to complete payment, 38 7 are within the Rule's purview.
E. Mismanagement in Mergers and Acquisitions
The complexity of mergers and acquisitions and the large
amounts of money at stake in these transactions make them ideal
vehicles for fraud. 38 8 The more frequently litigated fact pattern involves the merger.38 9 Objectionable actions arising from a merger can
be divided chronologically: those occurring prior to the merger,
those resulting from the merger itself, and those taking place after
the merger.
The exchange ratio,91 the crucial element in any merger, is
established prior to the merger 39 by the merger partners, and is
usually based on such factors as the companies' respective net income
and book value and the market price of their securities. It follows that
3s4 See note 311 and accompanying text supra.

381 See notes 260-62 and accompanying text supra.
386 See notes 373-74 and accompanying text supra.
387 See note 310 and accompanying text supra
388 See Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262,267 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977
(1967); Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 161 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969)
(serious gap if merger not sale in light of millions of stockholders involved).
389 A merger is indisputably a sale within Rule lOb-5. See notes 108-23 and accompanying
text supra.
390 The exchange ratio is the ratio of the number of the surviving corporation's shares a
stockholder of the disappearing entity receives to the number of disappearing company's shares
he surrenders.
391 Prior to the merger, the company may engage in negotiations with a number of
potential merger partners. This, of course, can result in multiple offers, and the question that
then arises concerns the extent to which competing offers must be disclosed to the shareholders
of the merging party.
The plaintiff claimed that a corporation's recommendation of a merger, without disclosing
a prior offer from a third corporation foran exchange of shares, was actionable in Alameda Oil
Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 164, 166 (W.D. Mo. 1970). After transfer, the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado held that directors have no duty to
convey a second merger offer to stockholders when recommending the first if the second is
indefinite or its advantages over the first are not clear. Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus.,
Inc., 337 F. Supp. 194, 195 (D. Colo. 1972). For a discussion of management's duty to inform
stockholders of competing tender offers, see note 420 and accompanying text infra. In merger
situations, management must have a reasonable basis for its recommendation. Crane Co. v.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 803 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
Disclosure of one offer is insufficient to reveal another offer having different terms which might
be more advantageous. Lewis v. Marder, 343 F. Supp. 1050, 1057 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
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certain actions which injure the corporation, and therefore indirectly
affect the exchange ratio, are transgressions of the Rule even if such
actions would not normally constitute 10b-5 violations. 3 92 It is not
clear whether these actions' in order to constitute transgressions of
the Rule, must be undertaken with the primary purpose of
influencing the ratio or whether a 10b-5 breach occurs when the
injury is merely a foreseeable consequence of the actions.
The manipulation and insider trading aspects of Rule lOb-5
prohibit or at least bring into question purchases and sales of the stock
of a party to a merger by the constituent companies or their insiders
prior to the public announcement of the merger. Aside from those
aspects of the Rule, trading by an officer or director of a merger
partner might still be redressible; however, a constituent corporation's purchase or sale of the stock of either constituent would
not be actionable :3 Misrepresentations contained in proxy material
or otherwise conveyed'to stockholders before they vote are actionable
even if the merger is fair.3 9 4
392 See Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1332 (7th Cir. 1969)
(should have received better exchange ratio); Knauff v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 408 F.2d
958,961,963 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 831 (1969) (premerger mismanagement relating
to dealings between two merger partners, one of which was majority stockholder of other,
intermingled with merger so treat together, but then decide no mismanagement and not in
connection with purchase or sale of security, ignoring potential effect on merger ratio); Lewis v.
Bogin, 337 F. Supp. 331, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (must determine if premerger acquisition
undertaken to affect exchange ratio); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 810 (5th Cir. 1970)
(merger part of fraudulent scheme). Butsee Review 71 v. Alloys Unlimited, Inc., 450 F.2d 482,
486 (10th Cir. 1971) (no cause of action arises if received less in subsequent merger because
stockholders approved stock option plan); Heit v. Davis, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L RP.
91,698, at 95,566 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (exchange ratio approach not mentioned).
Viewing actions which affect the exchange ratio as 10b-5 violations is similar to integrating a
number of related transactions and treating them as components of a single scheme. See notes
67-81 and accompanying textsupra. See also Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (misrepresentation occurring in prior tender offer which
permitted allegedly inju rious short-form merger to take place; held in connection with merger);
Mader v. Armel, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,027, at 90,796 (S.D.
Ohio 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1973) (liquidating
value not only criterion in establishing exchange ratio). Compare Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid
Co., 341 F. Supp. 234 (D. Neb. 1972) (no cause of action although only book value used).
For similar reasons, acts done prior to a liquidation should be condemned as strongly as
those occurring before a merger if they affect the amount to be distributed.See notes 279-82 and
accompanying textsupra (effects of disclosure to stockholders).
393 Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 194, 197 (D. Colo. 1972); see
Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 677,680-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (purchase by directors and associates
of one corporation of stock of another; merger never consummated; no cause of action);
Elfenbein v. Yaeger, [1961- 1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,368, at 94,549-50
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (sale by director of one company to merger partner at better ratio than
subsequent merger; stockholder has no standing to sue); notes 450-55 and accompanying text
infra (corporate opportunity).
394 See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,381 (1970) (Exchange Act § 14(a),
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The main issue 39 5 regarding objectionable conduct occurring in
the consummation of the merger is whether an unconscionable exchange ratio gives rise to a cause of action under the Rule.3 96 At first
blush, one might think that the rules applicable to selling securities
for inadequate consideration would also govern fixing the exchange
ratio. A corporation has a cause of action arising from selling its
securities for too little if deception or "new fraud" can be shown; "197 by
analogy, an unfair merger ratio should be actionable upon proof of
deception or "new fraud.139 8 Unlike a sale of securities, however,
most mergers require stockholder approval. 3 99 Although other circuits may disagree, in the Second Circuit this added element is crucial
because full disclosure to stockholders before the vote insulates
against a 10b-5 claim of an unfair merger. 40 0 Thus, the distinction
between the usual (or long-form) merger (in which stockholder votes
of both corporations are necessary 40 1) and a short-form merger be15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66,99-100 (E.D.N.Y.
1969). Compare Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 803 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) (no deception if chairman of board does not reveal to board
that merger partner's income will be $5,000,000 less than planned).
For a discussion of management's duties with respect to conflicting offers, see note 391 and
accompanying text supra.
'" Any other consideration to be received by favored stockholders in connection with the
merger must be clearly disclosed to stockholders. Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 319 F.
Supp. 795, 807-08 (D. Del. 1970). The court in a subsequent opinion in Gould left open the
question of whether the different treatment was legal. 331 F. Supp: 981, 999 (D. Del. 1971)
(§ 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970) discussed).
'" Unfairness is a question of fact when it is recognized as a cause of action. In the event of
a conflict of interest, it is therefore advisable to have negotiations on the exchange ratio
conducted by a large stockholder of one company unconnected with the other merger partner.
Knauff v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 408 F.2d 958, 964 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 831
(1969). Better still would be an evaluation by an independent expert.
'9' See notes 295-321 and accompanying textsupra
39" DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp. 834,836 n.1 (D. Colo. 1969), modifled,
435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1971) (using deception approach); Bragalini v. Biblowitz, [1967-1969
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,349, at 97,665 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ("new fraud"
approach relied on); Simon v. New Haven Board & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297,299 (D. Conn.
1966) (corporation injured by issuing too much in merger); cf. Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 416 F.2d
1189, 1190 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (common-law case; in merger in
which exchange ratio unfair, corporation injured by issuing shares for inadequate consideration); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766,775 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (need deception). On the
other hand, the surviving corporation cannot be considered a seller of assets to a new enterprise.
Lewis v. Bogin, 337 F. Supp. 331, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
199 The proxy rules under the 1934 Act might be applicable if stockholder votes are
solicited. This would not, however, preclude the application of Rule lOb-5.
400 See notes 279-82 and accompanying textsupra.
401 Some mergers take on the character of an acquisition with no vote of the "surviving"
corporation's stockholders being required. In that type of merger, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
the surviving entity is merged into the "disappearing" company, stockholders of the "disappear-
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tween a parent and subsidiary (which requires no stockholder action)
assumes added importance. A short-form merger is therefore legally
indistinguishable on this issue from a sale of securities for inadequate
consideration and should be controlled by the same rules. 40 2 Longform mergers may also be governed by these same rules40 3 except in
the Second Circuit, where full disclosure to stockholders renders an
unfair transaction immune from attack. Actions undertaken by man40 4
agement after a merger are treated below.
Acquisitions involve the transfer of stock or assets of the acquired
corporation. The Rule clearly applies when stock is sold, 40 5 and a
material omission or misstatement by one party to an acquisition is no
different from the usual lOb-5 concealment or misrepresentation
offense. 40 6 Assuming that the assets or payment given consists at least
ing" entity receive securities of the survivor, and the "disappearing" entity becomes a whollyowned subsidiary of the "surviving" corporation. This type of merger should be treated as a
short-form merger with respect to the "surviving" entity and along-form merger with respect to
the "disappearing" entity. This treatment follows from the corporate procedures required
within the two entities to approve the merger. The same result should occur with another
variation of the merger statutes; under certain conditions, approval of the surviving
corporation's stockholders is not necessary for mergers with small companies. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 251(f) (Supp. 1970).
402 The two leading short-form merger cases reached the same result as the inadequateconsideration-for-securities decisions, but for different reasons. Both courts seemed to go to
great lengths to construct a misrepresentation as a basis for finding the conduct objectionable.
See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. C6., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967)
(tender offer followed by short-form merger; misrepresentation in tender offer, which plaintiff
did not accept, held in connection with merger since tender offer key to permitting short-form
merger); Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369, 374 (D. Del. 1965)
(representation of fair treatment to stockholder in merger 15 years after purchase of stock
implied from corporate charter and Delaware law at time of purchase); accord, Weisman v.
MCA, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 258, 264 (D. Del. 1968). Perhaps this exercise in logic was necessary in
order to reach ajust result because the "new fraud" cases, under which these mergers could be
condemned, had not yet been decided. Bloomenthal, supra note 76, at 375; Marsh, supra note
281, at 71 n.9 (1968).
403 See Knauff v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 277 F. Supp. 564, 570, 577, 579 (D. Wyo.
1967), modfied on othergrounds and aff'd on this ground, 408 F.2d 958,964 (10th Cir.),cert.denied,
396 U.S. 831 (1969), is one case which indicates that a long-form merger must be fair even if full
disclosure is made. The question is left open in deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp.
834, 837 (D. Colo. 1969). The exchange ratio may be set at an unfair number as a pay-off for
prior transactions in which a party received a benefit. See, e.g., Condon v. Richardson, 411 F.2d
489, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1969); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 977 (1967).
404 Looting is the term usually applied To acts of mismanagement by new controlling
persons. See note 430-35 and accompanying text infra.
405 See note 49 supra.
401 It is difficult for a seller of a business to claim successfully that the buyer misrepresented
the value of the business; the seller is in the best position to determine its worth. Chiodo v.
General Waterworks Corp., 380 F.2d 860, 867 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1004 (1967).
Mismanagement claims in acquisitions would encompass such actions as inordinately high
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partially of securities, 40 7 an asset acquisition 40 8 should be treated in
40 9
the same fashion as a stock acquisition for the acquiring company,
and except for a wrinkle, it should be treated as a sale of assets for
inadequate consideration for the acquired entity. 41 0 It should be
noted, however, that state corporation statutes require stockholder
approval of sales of all or substantially all the corporation's assets,4 1 '
raising again the question of whether full disclosure to stockholders
avoids 10b-5 impropriety as regards the rights of such stockholders.4 a2
F. Mismanagement in the Sale of a ControllingBlock of Shares
The sale of a controlling block of stock at a premium above the
market price is often characterized as a breach of fiduciary duty.4 1 3
Such a sale involves a transfer of a large block of stock by one person
or a small group of sellers, as opposed to purchases from numerous
parties through open market transactions, a tender offer, or an
exchange offer. 4 14 The lOb-5 cases do not specify how many shares
constitute a controlling block. Perhaps this is because control is
usually indisputably transferred-old directors resign and the
purchaser's designees fill their positions. An appropriate definition of
a controlling block is "that number of shares which gives the holder
payment by the acquiring corporation and concealment by some members of the board of one
company from their fellow directors. Buying assets for excessive consideration is an apt analogy
to these situations. See notes 379-87 and accompanying textsupra. In Bredehoeft v. Cornell, 260
F. Supp. 557, 558-59 (D. Ore. 1966), a stockholder's claim, based on allegations that the
management of his own company concealed material facts before all stockholders sold their
shares to a third party, was upheld.
407 One of these conditions is necessary to satisfy the "in connection with" clause of the
Rule. Filmways, Inc. v. Artistic Liquidating Corp., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L REP. 92,332, at 97,589 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Lockwood, supra note 113, at 372.
408 Concerning liquidation after a sale of assets, see notes 464-66 and accompanying text
infta.
409 This was the approach taken in Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 539, 541-43
(N.D. Ill.
1970).
410 See notes 379-87 and accompanying text supra.
411 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (Supp. 1970); N.Y. Bus. CORP.LAw § 909(a)
(McKinney 1963). Failure to obtain the required stockholder approval should be treated as a
lOb-5 violation quite aside from any other grounds for complaint.
412 See notes 398-403 supra.
41'See generally Bromberg, supra note 67, at 885, 889.
414 See notes 260-63 and accompanying text supra (concealment of motives, such as intent
to gain control). The existence of other stockholders who retain their shares is implicit in a
transfer of a controlling block. This is distinguished from a merger or an acquisition of all the
stock of a corporation, which also involves a change of control. See notes 388-412 and accompanying text supra.
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'the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and
policies' of a corporation. 4 15
Sales of control have been attacked on four fronts: by the corporation whose control is sold, by stockholders who are not invited to sell
their shares with the controlling block, by the seller or buyer of
control against the other party to the sale, and derivatively by a
corporate seller receiving too little for control of another enterprise.
A corporation whose control is sold is neither a buyer nor a seller
in the control transaction. It follows that such a corporation has no
standing to recover froni either the seller or buyer the premium
above market (control premium) received by the seller. 4 16 Even if the
question of standing is bypassed, the fraudulent acquisition of control
as such does not injure the corporation.4 1 7 However, companies have
successfully challenged transfers of their control as part of a larger
41 8
scheme involving another 10b-5 violation.
415 The quotation within the quotation comes from Exchange Act Rule 12b-2 (17 C.F.R. §
240.12b-2(f) (1973)) which defines the concept of"control." It was relied on to define control in
Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 826 (5th Cir. 1970). Many other definitions have been used,
however. See, e.g., H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 241, at
478-79 (2d ed. 1970); Leech, Transactionsin CorporateControl, 104 U. PA. L. Rv. 725, 725 n.1
(1956). See generally Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARv. L. REv. 986 (1957). Control
should be presumed if the block is sold and the directors resign in favor of the purchaser's
nominees.
416 See, e.g., Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795,797,800 (8th Cir. 1970); Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); Emco Porcelain
Enamel Co. v. Wolfe, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,143, at
91,124-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (also alleges injury to corporation's reputation); Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079, 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Chashin v. Mencher, 255 F. Supp. 545, 548
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). Only one case goes the other way. McManus v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 5
S.E.C.Jud. Dec. 810,811 (E.D. Pa. 1948);see Ruder, supra note 76, at 204-05 (seems likely that
lob-5 will reach sales of control at premium). This is true even if the consideration for the
purchase of control comes from the issuer. Cf. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083, 1097-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 355, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1970),
rev'don othergrounds, 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (sale of all stock). Compare note 454 and accompanying
text infra (corporate opportunity).
417 Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925
(1972); Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403,405 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (permissible for controlling stockholder to receive premium); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 390
(S.D.N.Y. 1967),affdon othergrounds, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.),rev'donothergroundsonrehearingen
banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (no injury to corporation);
Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). On the other hand, there is authority
supporting the view that the persons from whom control is fraudulently taken suffer injury.
Young v. Seaboard Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,042, at
94,198 (D. Utah 1973).
418 See notes 67-81 and accompanying text supra. Concerning the liability of a person
buying control from another who purchased it by fraud, one court held: "[T]he purchaser,
charged with knowledge or notice of [the original purchaser's] wrongdoing, surely would not be
immunized from suit for damages and other relief by [the issuer] and the other aggrieved."
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An attempt to recover the control premium by stockholders who do not sell their shares must also fail because they are neither
buyers nor sellers. 4 19 They have no claim under the Rule even if the
controlling person rejects a favorable proposal made to all stockhold4 20
ers in order to accept a better offer relating only to his shares.
On the other hand, stockholders who retain their shares have
been successful on a number of theories. One case may be construed
as imposing a duty to invite all stockholders to sell their holdings if the
Fabrikant v.Jacobellis, [ 1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L REP. $ 92,686, at 99,018
(E.D.N.Y. 1970). The court noted that the original purchaser remains liable. Id.
4 See Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795, 800 (8th Cir. 1970); Chashin v. Mencher, 255 F.
Supp. 545,548 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Hooverv. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 2i3,228 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Contra,
Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 838-42 (D.N.J. 1972) (retrospective
injunctive relief, but causation, rather than remedy, determinative) (sale of class of stock with
voting control to corporation and reissuance to defendants; other stockholders can attack); see
Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383, 384, 386 (5th Cir. 1970) (sale by 40% holder back to
corporation "perhaps" made purchaser of minority stockholder, but unnecessary to decide
question). As to the purchaser issue, see notes 102-45 and accompanying text supra. See also
Krafcisin v. La Salle Madison Hotel Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1
93,586, at 92,729 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (attack on sale of control by minority stockholder; control
premium permissible since controlling block worth more).
In Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., [ 1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
1972), the court rejected two arguments made by the plaintiff.
9 93,646, at 92,897 (N.D. Ill.
First, the plaintiff argued that the sellers of control should have attempted to induce the buyer
to agree in the contract that he would acquire holdings of the remaining stockholders on no less
favorable terms. The court noted that adoption of this approach would contradict a controlling
stockholder's right to sell at a premium without notifying the other stockholders. The second
point raised by the plaintiff was that the sellers of control must insist that the buyer agree not to
use its control to the detriment of the other shareholders. But the court held that a cause of
action might exist if the sellers negligently transferred their control and aided and abetted the
buyer in obtaining the remaining ownership of the company by a transaction involving securities. Id. at 92,898-99. In the course of this discussion, the trialjudge opined that the seller of
control has no duty to investigate the buyer of control unless the seller's suspicions are aroused.
Persons who know they are going to sell their shares as part of a controlling block may not
make purchases on the open market. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 32 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972).
420 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461,462 (2d Cir.),cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952); Chashin v. Mencher, 255 F. Supp. 545, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The Rule's buyer-seller
requirement precludes the plaintiffs from recovering either the premium received by the
controlling person or the profit they would have received had the firstoffer been accepted. This
unsavory conduct on the part of controlling persons has understandably been condemned by
the common law. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955) (decided on common-law grounds with same factual situation asBirnbaum and by same
court). The duties of management or a controlling stockholder when more than one offer for
the purchase of stock or for a merger is made are analyzed in Fleischersupra note 260, at 1288;
Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 260, at 343, 359; Krasik, Tender Offers: The Target Company's
Duty of Disclosure, 25 Bus. LAW. 455, 471 (1969); cf. note 391 supra See also Smith v. Newport
Nat'l Bank, [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,200, at 91,207, 91,209
(D.R.I. 1971) (management's recommendation of tender offer not actionable when made
sincerely and honestly).
A controlling stockholder has no duty to disclose the offers it receives. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 32 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972).
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controlling person permits any other shareholders to sell their shares
to the purchaser on the same terms. 42 1 In this same decision, the court
held that the existence of negotiations to buy a controlling block is
material inside information which must be disclosed to persons sellingin the open market, even though they are not in privity of contract
with the buyer or seller of control.4 2 2 There is a better reasoned line of
authorities, however, which has reached the opposite conclusion regarding the controlling person's duties to invite 423 and disclose 42 4 in
these circumstances. Another approach integrates the transfer of
control with a liquidation of the issuer or any other event occurring
4 25
after the transfer in which stockholders are buyers or sellers.
A buyer or seller of control may sue successfully on the basis of
any misstatement, omission, or other fraud between buyers and sellers generally cognizable under the Rule.4 26
421 Ferraioli v. Cantor, 281 F. Supp. 354, 356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); accord, McManus v.
Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 5 S.E.C.Jud. Dec. 810,811 (E.D. Pa. 1948). The next installment of
the Ferraiolicase was the approval ofa settlement in which the essence of the claim seemed to be
concealment of the negotiations and transfer of control. [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,336, at 97,608 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Thus, the firstFerraiolidecision may be a
dictum on the issue of the duty to invite.
422 Ferraioli v. Cantor, 281 F. Supp. 354, 356, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), settlement approved,
[1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,336, at 97,608 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Note,
Rule lOb-5 and the ControlPremium:Duties of Disclosureand Invitation, 10 B.C. INn. & COM. L REv.
743,745-49 (1969) (questioning whether this result correct, but concurring if persons who sold
control were buying on market during negotiations for sale of control).
423 See Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 16 n.8, 32 (7th Cir.),cerL denied, 408 U.S.
925 (1972); Haberman v. Murchison, 331 F. Supp. 180, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (implying that
Ferraioliincorrectly decided),aft'd, 468 F.2d 1305,1312 (2dCir. 1972) (in general, no obligation
to invite); Chashin v. Mencher, 255 F. Supp. 545, 546-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (stockholder has no
standing to complain about inability to sell with controlling persons); Note, supra note 422, at
751 (criticizing this aspect ofFerraioli);Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403,405 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (sale of control by one stockholder; not required to permit others to participate); Keers &
Co. v. American Steel & Pump Corp., 234 F. Supp. 201,203-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (oral promise of
controlling person not to sell unless others given chance tojoin in sale; death ofpromisor ended
promise).
424 See Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 32 & n.49 (7th Cir.),cert. denied, 408 U.S.
925 (1972); Haberman v. Murchison, 331 F. Supp. 180, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 468 F.2d
1305, 1312 (2d Cir. 1972).
This situation must be distinguished from the case in which a sale of control is being
negotiated or has been agreed upon, and the seller of control then begins purchasing in the
market. Such conduct should constitute a violation of Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Ward LaFrance
Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373, 375-76, 380 (1943); Fleischer, supra note 260, at 1167 (tender
offer).
4s Cf notes 416-18supra(corporation as purchaser). As to integration, see notes 67-81 and
accompanying text supra.Butsee Krafcisin v. LaSalle Madison Hotel Co., [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,586, at 92,729 (N.D. IIl. (1972) (acquisition of control
followed by dissolution).
426 Condon v. Richardson, 411 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1969) (controlling individual
personally tried to buy control of another corporation, and when failed had his controlled
corporation take over contract; two corporations controlled by same party agree jointly to
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One opinion rebuffed an argument that it should hold directors
of a corporation liable for selling control in another enterprise without a premium. 42 7 Nevertheless, this result is not a foregone conclusion; analogies drawn from sales of securities or assets for inadequate
consideration 4 28 indicate that a breach may sometimes occur if too
little is received for any security, including a controlling block in
another enterprise.
Schemes by incumbents to maintain control are a species of
transactions conducted for an improper purpose. Since most cases
deny recovery when a transaction isattacked merely on the basis of an
improper purpose, 4 29 schemes to retain control are actionable only if
the acts in furtherance of that purpose are themselves infractions of
the Rule.
G.

Waste of CorporateAssets and Looting

Claims based on "waste" of corporate assets and "looting" are
often added in complaints as catch-alls. Waste refers to the use of
corporate assets without sufficient justification. It is not generally a
.term connected with a change of control. Looting, by contrast, is
usually charged against persons who obtain control of a corporation
by merger or by acquisition of a controlling block of stock and then
use corporate assets without justification. 4 30 The term has also been
used to describe unjustified depletions by lenders who have assumed
control of corporate policy as a result of making a loan. 43 1 Looting
implies taking unfair advantage of a dominant position in a corporation by engaging in transactions which benefit the controlling persons
and their associates at the corporation's expense.
The few authorities which have addressed looting and waste
under Rule 1Ob-5 have quite properly indicated that neither claim is
actionable by itself unless the acts which constitute waste or looting
acquire control of third party, but one corporation receives 37% and other receives only 25%;
both possible causes of action); Ellis v. Carter, 328 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1964) (suit between
two joint venturers who had agreed to acquire control; plaintiff failed to prove case); Holiday
Publishing Co. v. Gregg, 330 F. Supp. 1326 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (procedural questions discussed);
see notes 405-12 and accompanying text supra (fraud in acquisitions).
.
427 Most v. Alleghany Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,583,
at 98,667 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (relinquishing control without compensation may constitute waste
but not fraud).
428 See notes 295-321 & 379-87 and accompanying textsupra.
429 See notes 260-62 and accompanying text supra.
4' See, e.g., Swinney v. Keebler Co., 329 F. Supp. 216 (D.S.C. 1971).
431 An example ofthe latter situation is found in the allegations made in Wolfv. Ackerman,
308 F. Supp. 1057, 1058 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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are independent breaches of the Rule.4 32 A charge of waste based on a
sale of the corporation's securities for inadequate consideration, for
example, is redressible under lOb-5. 43 3 Yet such a claim is cognizable
even if it is not labelled "waste"; therefore the "waste" or "looting"
claim is mere surplusage. Applying a label of "waste" or "looting" to
an action which is not otherwise a breach of the Rule does not aid the
plaintiff. But relief can be obtained for acts of waste or looting which
are part of a larger scheme involving a 10b-5 infraction, whether or
not the acts are otherwise a violation of 10b-5 or common law. 43 4 In
addition, failure to disclose a plan to loot the target company in a
tender offer for control can be actionable as an omission to state a
4 35
material fact.
H. Misappropriationof CorporateAssets
Although there is a wide variety of actions which fall under the
broad umbrella of misappropriation of corporate assets, 4 36 this discussion is limited to diverting assets 437 and usurping corporate opportunities. Plaintiffs have not been wholly successful in either area.
Misappropriation (or theft) of the proceeds from a sale of securities is the most clearly actionable type of diversion of assets. 4 38 A
432 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385,396 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),aff'd, 405 F.2d 200
(2d Cir.), modified on other grounds on rehearingen banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 906 (1969).
433 This assumes, of course, that the other necessary elements of a Rule lOb-5 claim are
met.
434 See notes 67-81 and accompanying text supra. A number of cases alleging waste and
involving conduct which would otherwise be actionable (e.g., sales of securities for inadequate
consideration) were dismissed because deception was not present. Penn Mart Realty Co: v.
Becker, 300 F. Supp. 731, 735-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (deception not shown; "new fraud" also
inapplicable); Heit v. Davis, [1964-1966 Ti-ansfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. V91,698, at
95,567 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25, 27-28 (D. Md. 1965);
O'Neill v. Maytag, 230 F. Supp. 235,239 (S.D.N.Y.),affd, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964). But when
deception or "new fraud" is present, a cause of action exists. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872,
879-81 (5th Cir. 1970) (deception).
435Boggess v. Hogan, 328 F. Supp. 1048, 1052-53 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
436For example, a sale ofsecurities to insiders for inadequate consideration, waste, looting,
and conducting corporate affairs in a manner designed to manipulate its market price fall
within this realm. These topics are covered elsewhere. See notes 295-321 & 431-35 and accompanying text supra & notes 480 and accompanying text infra.
437Diverting assets and engaging in transactions for an improper purpose (see notes
260-62 and accompanying text supra) are similar in that assets are used for the insider's own
purposes. Unlike diversion, however, in transactions for an improper purpose, the insiders do
not obtain the assets for their own-the assets still remain corporate property. Bloomenthal,
supra note 76, at 358.
438 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Gas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9-13 (1971) (sale of
United States treasury bonds); SEC v. Kelly Andrews & Bradley, Inc. [1971-72 Transfer
Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. V 93,448, at 92,207 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (conversion of securities
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loan by a corporation to an insider or his designee is another example
of asset diversion. Although one case found for the plaintiff on the
basis of an insider loan, 439 theBirnbaumpurchaser-seller requirement
usually bars recovery4 40 unless the loan is considered a purchase of
the insider's note. 4 4 1 Another complaint which has been upheld is the
use of A company's funds to purchase control of B company for the
benefit of C company when A company and C company are under
common control. 4 42 In addition, a stockholder has a legitimate grievance if he is ignorant of a misappropriation of assets and consequently receives less when he sells his shares.4 4 3 Using the assets of an
acquired company to pay the purchase price of the acquisition has
also been held to be redressible, 4 44 and an insider may violate the Rule
if by means of a recapitalization he usurps for himself voting control
44 6
of some subsidiaries. 445 On the other hand, no cause of action
from subordinated loan account of broker-dealer; fraud on customers who dealt with firm on
basis of subordination agreement, but no reference to fraud on firm itself); Bush v. Masiello,
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,417, at 92,050 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(conversion actionable, but unclear from case what was converted). But cf. Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.),rev'din parton
rehearingen bane, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (10b-5 does not
reach misappropriation of assets). Misappropriation should be actionable whether the securities
are issued by the corporate seller or are issued by another entity and held as an investment.
In thelBankersLife case, the Supreme Court apparently did not consider whether deceit or
"new fraud" is an essential element of a successful 10b-5 action. The facts, however, were within
the parameters of "new fraud." The sole stockholder appropriated corporate assets, so "new
fraud" was available. Another case held that deception is required. Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F.
Supp. 677, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (corporate opportunity). See generally notes 146-47 and
accompanying text supra.
439 In Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 822-23 (5th Cir. 1970), P company, a parent of S
company, bought A, and A received P company's note in return. S company then loaned P
company money to pay interest on the note. Thereafter, and as part of a separate transaction,S
company loaned money to another corporation underP company's control so such corporation
or A could buy shares of P company from another controlling person.
440 See notes 83-101 and accompanying text supra.
441 See 1 L. Loss, SECURrrIES REGULATION 546 (2d ed. 1961); 4id. at 2574 (Supp. 1969).
442 Condon v. Richardson, 411 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1969).
443 Bredehoeft v. Cornell, 260 F. Supp. 557, 558-59 (D. Ore. 1966). However, this is a
concealment of mismanagement situation. Implicit in the case is the fact that the purchaser was
aware of the diversion of assets.
'44 Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,798, at 93,445 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Baylor v. Mading-Dugan Drug Co., [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,664, at 92,966-69 (N.D. Ill. 1972). See generally notes 67-81
and accompanying text supra.
445 SEC v. Koenig, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,536, at
92,557-58, 92,560 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 469 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1972).
44 The integration theory may be used to attack otherwise unassailable transactions. See
generally notes 67-81 and accompanying text supra. This presumably justifies the holding in
Braasch v. Muscat, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,148 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (following acts held to constitute cause of action: making unsupported disbursements,
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arises under the Rule for diverting cash,4 47 wrongfully using funds to
defeat a tender offer, 4 48 or giving a mortgage on a corporation's
assets to another entity owned by a stockholder of the corporation
because such actions are not undertaken "in connection with the
' 449
purchase or sale of any security.
Insiders are precluded at common law from usurping an opportunity in which their corporation has a right, property interest, or
expectancy, or one which injustice belongs to the company. 450 The
45 1 of
Birnbaum rule, requiring the plaintiff to be a buyer or seller
securities, is the major stumbling block to recovery under the Rule for
usurpation of corporate opportunities. Thus, the corporation cannot
attack the most obviously unfair practices-insiders purchasing their
corporation's shares from stockholders without first offering the
opportunity to the issuer and insiders competin4 with their corporation by purchasing shares of a company targeted for a corporate
tender offer. 45 2 However, a valid 10b-5 claim exists whenever the
losing alleged deposit of $250,000, loaning $300,000 to controlling person without board
approval, borrowing from bank and relending to another corporation under common control
which then defaults, paying $427,500 commitment fee to insider for future loan although
corporation could borrow elsewhere, lending to insiders through bank bought by corporation,
and mistakenly transferring funds to another corporation under common control).
The facts were less complicated in Young v. Seaboard Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,942, at 94,198 (D. Utah 1973). There, the defendants deposited
$1,000,000 into a bank and used the leverage of the deposit to direct the bank to loan $450,000
to defendants' designees. The loans went bad and caused the bank's collapse.
447 SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3,38 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),aff'd, 435 F.2d
510 (2d Cir. 1970); see Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 798, 810-11 (5th Cir. 1970).
448 Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 966 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
449Cooper v. Garza, 431 F.2d 578, 580-81 (5th Cir. 1970) (not in connectionwith purchase
or sale of security).
450See H. HENN, supra note 415, at 462-65.
4" See notes 83-101 and accompanying textsupra.
452 Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795,797-800(8th Cir. 1970) (buying shares ofissuer); Cohen
v. Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 677, 680-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (shares of tender offer target; not alleged
that insiders tendered); see Polakoff v. Delaware Steeplechase & Race Ass'n, 254 F. Supp. 574,
580 (D. Del. 1966) (seizure of corporate opportunity not alleged; corporation not injured). But
see Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 822 (5th Cir. 1970) (cause of action when insider caused
corporation to loan money to other corporation under his control for purchase of shares of
corporation's parent from stockholder).
Plaintiffs have alleged that certain other unfair practices are lOb-5 violations. Knauff v.
Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 408 F.2d*958, 963 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 831 (1969)
(seizure of piece of property for mining claim labelled as usurpation of corporate opportunity;
no claim under lOb-5 because not in connection with purchase or sale of security); Wolf v.
Ackerman, 308 F. Supp. 1057, 1058 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (controlling corporation allegedly
caused customer to switch business from injured corporation to controlling corporation); see
Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 803 (5th Cir. 1970) (sale of control alleged diversion of
corporate opportunity; court upholds claim on other grounds).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:27

common-law corporate opportunity doctrine is breached and the
corporation is a purchaser or seller. For instance, a cause of action
arises when a corporation purchases stock from another company
and the purchaser's insiders receive seller's stock from the seller for
little or no consideration.4 53 Rule lOb-5 liability has also been found
when, as part of a larger scheme, one controlling person borrowed
funds from the corporation to buy shares from another controlling
person, and did not account to the corporation for the premium he
received on the subsequent resale of those shares.4 54 Finally, courts
have condemned a parent for acquiring a partially-owned subsidiary
by merger or purchase of assets in order to take advantage of the
45 5
subsidiary's corporate opportunity.
I. Miscellaneous Acts of Mismanagement
A number of other actions have been assailed as Rule lOb-5
mismanagement violations. 45 ' For example, several attacks have been
made on corporate redemptions of securities. When plaintiffs have
contended that the issuer concealed or misrepresented material facts
in connection with the redemption of their securities, courts have
found for the defendants on the grounds that the issuer has an
absolute right to redeem and the security holders' knowledge is
therefore irrelevant. 45 7 This reasoning has validity for redemptions
Quaerewhether a claim is valid when insiders buy the shares at a low price in anticipation of
selling them to their corporation at a higher price and in fact make such a sale through a merger
or tender offer? Cf Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 288 F. Supp. 855, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified,
416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969), cerL denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (common-law claim stated).
453 New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 263-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
454 Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 823 (5th Cir. 1970).
455 Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1331-32 (7th Cir. 1969)
(deception in proxy statement; subsidiary should have received better exchange ratio); see
Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369,373 (D. Del. 1965) (concealment
ofseizure of corporate opportunity in tender offer through which defendant received sufficient
stock to use short-form merger statute; plaintiff objecting to merger). See also Jannes v.
Microwave Communications, Inc., 461 F.2d 525,527,529 (7th Cir. 1972) (cause of action stated
when assets and corporate opportunities sold for too little).
456 In addition to these problems, there is the question of whether failure to remove from a
security a legend restricting transfer is a Rule lob-5 offense. See Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich &
Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,-406 U.S. 949 (1972) (allegations of refusal to remove
legend; case decided on procedural point). Also, the Commission's staff has taken the position
that a tender offer designed to reduce the number of record holders below 300 so periodic
reports do not have to be filed under the 1934 Act could violate 10b-5.See House of Adler, Inc.,
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,515 (no-action letter of Sept. 30,
1971). But it is difficult to see the basis for this conclusion.
457 See 35 Mo. L. REv. 119, 122 (1970); cf. Fershtman v. Schectman, 450 F.2d 1357, 1360
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972) (termination of limited partnership in accord-
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of nonconvertible securities because the plaintiff cannot demonstrate
that the fraud caused injury.4 5 8 The opposite result might be proper
when convertible securities are redeemed 45 9 because the stockholder
then has to make an investment decision-whether or not to
convert-and he is therefore entitled to full disclosure.
When an issuer buys back any security pursuant to a contractual
right4 60 or exercises an option to repurchase any security46' the
security holder has no right to receive disclosure. This situation is
analogous to a redemption of nonconvertible securities.
A redemption involves a breach of Rule IOb-5 if it is undertaken
as part of a scheme to obtain control (even if the redemption is made
in accordance with the terms- of the security),4 62 or if it is made in
violation of a promise to secure the security holders' consent. 463
Rule lOb-5 infractions may be committed in liquidating a
corporation. 4 64 A stockholder has a lOb-5 claim if he receives less than
he is entitled to in a liquidation, 465 or a liquidation is pursued for the
benefit of the controlling stockholder. 46 6
ance with partnership agreement). A security holder is entitled to reasonable notice of the
redemption. Abramson v. Burroughs Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 93,456, at 92,253-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (entitled to assume will receive reasonable notice;
publication sufficient for unregistered bonds when bonds state method of notice on their face;
prospectus need not reveal method of notice if debentures do so on their face); Ruder, supra
note 253, at 90-91 (plaintiff claims that adequate notice of redemptionimplied from prospectus
selling securities). A purported redemption which avoids some of the procedural safeguards in
the governing instrument may be actionable even if the redemption is enforceable under state
law.
458 But see Note, The Prospectsfor Rule X-I Ob-5: An EmergingRemedyfor DefraudedInvestors,
59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1151 & n.143 (1950).
4'9 See Latty,supra note 312, at 530; Note,supra note 458, at 1151. The rationale behind the
distinction is that the holder of a convertible security must know the true state of affairs before
he can intelligently decide whether to convert. But even to a convertible security holder, a
concealment or misrepresentation will not always be actionable. For example, no claim arises
when the conversion price of a debenture is $55 per share, the underlying common stock is
trading at $13 per share, and material information is concealed which, under any standard,
could result in a rise of the common stock price to no more than $20 per share. This rationale is
also applicable to options or warrants which are about to expire.
460 Doelle v. Ireco Chem., 391 F.2d 6, 8 (10th Cir. 1968).
461 Ryan v.J. Walter Thompson Co., 453 F.2d 444,446-47 (2d Cir. 1971),cert. denied, 406
U.S. 907 (1972).
462 Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 736,737-38 (2d Cir. 1972). This case reversed an earlier
panel decision (453 F.2d 722, 732 (2d Cir. 1971)) which had dismissed the complaint in part on
grounds that the redemption was in accordance with the terms of the debentures.
4'3 Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 332 (2d Cir. 1971).
464 See Feldberg v. O'Connell, 338 F. Supp. 744, 746-47 (D. Mass. 1972) (dissolution of
partnership delayed because of accountant's false financial statements; accountant liable). See
also note 392 and accompanying text supra (acts prior to merger or liquidation).
465 Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303, 308 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 858 (1971).
466 Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1043-44 (5th Cir. 1973); Coffee v. Permian
Corp., 434 F.2d 383, 384 (5th Cir. 1970) (deciding that shareholder was seller in liquidation).
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A 1Ob-5 violation rarely, if ever, occurs in the course of amending
the certificate of incorporation; an amendment changing stockholders' rights does not constitute a purchase or sale of securities. 46 7 A
change of a stock's par value is not a violation of the Rule, 4 68 and a
stock dividend or stock split ordinarily does not result in lOb-5
469
liability.
Few cases have examined promoters' liability under the Rule,
primarily because the incentive for fraud is considerably lessened by
the disclosures required in registration statements by the Securities
Act of 1933 .470 A leading case dealing with promoters' liability isBailes
v. Colonial Press, Inc.,47 1 in which a corporation had issued stock to
promoters for inadequate consideration. Although all directors,
officers, and stockholders of the company at the time of the stock
issuance were aware of the defect and, indeed, were defendants, the
Fifth Circuit, finding that the issuance was the first step in a scheme to
defraud the public, held that Rule lOb-5 had been violated. The court
did not decide whether a claim exists when there is no intention to
defraud the public or when full public disclosure is made.4 7 2 The
Bailes court emphasized too strongly the public distribution aspect of
the promoters' fraud. This development is analogous to the early
cases involving a corporation's issuance of securities for inadequate
467 In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1336-38 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (reorganization by merger created new preferred stock, eliminated pre-emptive rights and cumulative
voting; and changed par value and number and terms of directors). See note 141 and accompanying text supra.
468 Knauff v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 408 F.2d 958, 962 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 831 (1969),aff'g 277 F. Supp. 564,568 (D. Wyo. 1967).See also note 141 and accompanying
text supra (recapitalization not stockholder's purchase or sale).
469 But see SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9618 (June 1, 1972) (stock dividend
and some stock splits require transfer to capital account; possible lOb-5 violation if transfer not
made or if dividend or split declared without sufficiently large retained earnings and current
earnings). A stock split or stock dividend has no intrinsic value. Hafner v. Forest Laboratories,
Inc., 345 F.2d 167, 168 (2d Cir. 1965). The following is, however, a manipulative device: stock of
A company is selling at about $1.00 per share and many times the real price-earnings ratio. The
stock is hovering around $1.00 because the market value at a true price-earnings ratio would be
too low to facilitate trading. Directors of A company authorize a reverse stock split so that
one-fifth of the number of shares is outstanding and the price of each goes to about $5.00
initially. They know that the price will decline to a true price-earnings ratio and thenB company
(a corporation under common control with A company) could be merged into A company at a
more favorable exchange ratio than if no reverse stock split were undertaken.
47' Frohling, supra note 281, at 282-86. See generally Comment, Individual Recovery for
Promoter'sFraud-ProceduralProblems Under S.E.C. Rule 10b-5, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 939 (1963).
471 444 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 197 1);see Cohenv. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115,123 (2d Cir.
1973) (promoters allegedly liable for misrepresentations in offering materials); Berel Indus.,
Inc. v. Abrams, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,118, at 96,559
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (promoters defrauding corporation in the issuance of stock).
472 444 F.2d at 1245 n.10.
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consideration which relied on the fraud perpetrated on the public by
the subsequent resale of the watered stock.4 73 The Supreme Court
has held that the effect of Rule lOb-5 is not limited to insuring the
integrity of the securities markets, 4 74 and more recent lower-court
cases condemning sales of securities for too little have not required a
public redistribution. 7 5 Courts should consider promoters' acts
analogous to acts performed by directors after the corporation's
formation and should apply the general mismanagement standards
discussed in this Article to such actions. Under this approach, the
corporation, as a defrauded entity, 4 76 would have a cause of action
even if all directors, officers, and stockholders at the time of the fraud
participated in the objectionable conduct, although suit by the individual participants might be barred on equitable principles. 47 7 In
short, there should be no requirement that the promoters have contrived a scheme to defraud the public through a public distribution.
The Supreme Court has also held that misappropriation of the
proceeds from a securities sale is actionable. 47 8 Hence, stealing securities from a corporation is also a breach of Rule 10b-5.47 9
Directing corporate affairs in an effort to manipulate security
prices is also a violation of the Rule. Similarly, the purchase by an
issuer of its own stock is viewed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission as a IOb-5 violation if no dividends are paid by the issuer
and funds are available for that purpose. 48 0 Although the SEC's
expression is limited to investment companies, the underlying principle is broad enough to apply to any entity.
Finally, the Rule may play a role when management acts in its
own interests and to the detriment of stockholders. For instance, a
See note 296 and accompanying text supra.
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
See notes 297-99 and accompanying textsupra.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts considered the corporation a separate, defrauded entity in a common-law case. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow,
203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193 (1909), affd 225 U.S. 111 (1912). Compare Old Dominion Copper
Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1908).
477 This approach has the virtue of protecting creditors and other persons dealing with the
corporation.
478 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9-13 (1971).
479 If the securities are authorized but unissued or are treasury shares, the grant is
equivalent to issuing shares for no consideration. See note 304 and accompanying textsupra. If
the securities are those of another issuer, it is analogous to sellingassetsfor no consideration.See
notes 379-87 and accompanying text supra. Theft of cash immediately following a public
offering of securities may be attacked on the grounds that the "use of proceeds" section of the
registration statement was misleading. See Securities Act Form S-1, Item 3.
480 SEC Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 3548, at 2 (Oct. 3, 1962). Disclosure
does not change the result. Id.
473
474
47'
476
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cause of action exists against insiders who receive undisclosed special
treatment while outsider stockholders buy or sell.4 8 1 Also an illegal
benefit, such as a bribe, will not be enforced even when stockholders
do not trade.48 2 Perhaps this approach explains the Seventh Circuit's
holding that persons controlling one corporation may have violated
Rule 10b-5 by first purchasing from stockholders rights received in a
rights offering, and then selling the shares underlying the rights to
another company under the same control. 4 3 There is a split of
stockopinion on the question of whether squeezing out minority
48 4
fraud.
other
some
of
absence
the
in
actionable
is
holders

CONCLUSION

This Article has outlined the Rule 1Ob-5 liability of a corporation
and its management for acts of corporate mismanagement. This
discussion may not be exhaustive because the breadth of Rule 10b-5,
one of its chief assets, has not yet been precisely determined. Nor is it
likely that the specific areas of mismanagement liability discussed will
41 Boggess v. Hogan, 328 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (must disclose bribe by

tenderor to management of target company). A stockholder who is not a buyer or seller does not
have standing to assert the breach. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461,462-63 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952) (sale of control although better offer); Chashin v.
Mencher, 255 F. Supp. 545, 546-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (sale of control; better offer for all
stockholders not accepted). See also notes 391 & 395 supra (competing offers and favored
treatment).
482 Hogan v. Teledyne, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1043, 1046-47 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (bribe to management of target company); see Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 260, at 358-59 (improper to
induce target company management to acquiesce in tender offer by giving favorable contracts
conditioned upon success of tender; management cannot secretly sell its own stock to tenderor
at higher price).
483 Condon v. Richardson, 411 F.2d 489,491 (7th Cir. 1969). Compare Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1949).
484 Compare Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., Inc., 343 F. Supp. 1062, 1065-1070 (N.D. Ga.
1972) (actionable) with Krafcisin v. LaSalle Madison Hotel Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,586, at 92,730 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (not actionable). The methods
described in the above cases can be used, but a tax loss carry forward of a partially-held
subsidiary can be preserved by a different procedure: forming a shell corporation wholly owned
by the parent, merging the shell into the publicly-held subsidiary of the parent, paying stockholders ofethe publicly-held subsidiary cash, and in the merger converting the stock of the shell
into stock of the publicly-held subsidiary. As a result, the publicly-held subsidiary becomes
wholly owned and the minority stockholders receive only cash. This can be accomplished
without a stockholders' vote of the parent, without a proxy statement or information statement
(unless the partially-owned subsidiary has a class of securities registered under the 1934 Act),
without soliciting proxies (if the parent has the requisite number of shares), and without
granting appraisal rights (at least in New York State, where the face of the statute does not give
minority stockholders appraisal rights).
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remain comprehensive over a lengthy period of time. Future developments will undoubtedly bring into question other practices, 485
even some that are now customary in corporate management.
48 Cf. Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1171 (2d Cir. 1971) (substituted
opinion) permissible to outlaw violation in first litigation on issue); accord, Opper v. Hancock
Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 676 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966).

